Vietnam, a low middle-income economy, grapples with considerable climate impacts, primarily driven by heat waves, sea level rise, and tropical cyclones. Under ongoing global warming, these extreme weather events are projected to further intensify. We use a dynamic general equilibrium model to study economic transition dynamics from 2015 to 2100, accounting for heat-induced labor productivity losses, agricultural land loss from sea level rise, and residential property damage from tropical cyclones. We compare a Paris-compatible strong mitigation scenario where global warming is limited to well below 2 °C above preindustrial levels to a strong emission scenario where warming reaches 4–5 °C. We find that the impacts of climate change on output and investment are highly uncertain, with differences between the two emission scenarios remaining statistically insignificant until the end of the century, despite substantially higher climate forcing in the latter. By contrast, consumption losses are significantly larger under the high emission scenario. These negative impacts are primarily driven by heat-induced labor productivity losses, while TCs are the main source of uncertainty. Our findings highlight the need for analytical frameworks to capture the different channels through which climate and climate change affect economic development, rather than focusing mainly on output-related damage, as done in many existing studies.

More individualistic countries experience higher economic growth. We provide evidence for a human-capital-based explanation of the growth effects of individualism. Using data from the largest international adult skill assessment, we establish that individualism shapes human capital formation. We identify the effects of individualism by exploiting variation between migrants at the origin-country, origin-language, and person level. Migrants from more individualistic cultures have higher cognitive skills and larger skill gains over time. They also invest more in their skills over the life cycle, as they acquire more years of schooling and are more likely to participate in adult education activities. Individualism is more important in explaining adult skill formation than any other cultural trait that previous literature has emphasized. In the labor market, more individualistic migrants earn higher wages and are less often unemployed. We show that our results cannot be explained by selective migration or omitted origin-country variables.

We study the impact of stricter and more harmonized banking regulation along the income distribution using household survey data for 25 EU countries. Exploiting country-level heterogeneity in the implementation of European Banking Union directives allows us to control for confounders and identify effects. Our results show that these regulatory reforms aimed at increasing financial system resilience affect households heterogeneously and result in a widening of the income distribution. These results are dependent on a country’s ex-ante regulatory stringency, and more pronounced in countries with stronger bank dependence. Furthermore, we find that more stringent regulation reduces income growth for low-income households primarily due to exits from employment, whereas affluent households tend to experience increased growth rates for employee and self-employed income.

Large emitters reduced their carbon emissions by around 11-15% after the 2015 Paris Agreement (“the Agreement”) relative to public firms that are less in the limelight. We show that this effect is predominantly driven by divestments. Large emitters are 9 p.p. more likely to divest pollutive assets in the post-Agreement period, an increase of over 75%. This divestment effect comes from asset sales and not from closures of pollutive facilities. There is no evidence for increased engagements in other emission reduction activities. Our results indicate significant global asset reallocation effects after the Agreement, shifting emissions out of the limelight.

In this study, establishment-level employment effects of investment grants in Germany are estimated. In addition to the quantitative effects, I provide empirical evidence of funding effects on different aspects of employment quality (earnings, qualifications, and job security) for the period 2004 to 2020. The database combines project-level treatment data, establishment-level information on firm characteristics and employee structure, and regional information at the district level. For the estimations, I combine the difference-in-differences approach of Callaway and Sant’Anna (J Econom 2252: 200–230, 2021) with ties matching at the cohort level. The estimations yield positive effects on the number of employees, but point to contradicting effects of investment grants on different aspects of employment quality.

We document a global reallocation of pollutive assets as a response to investor pressure: large firms facing increased investor pressure divest foreign-located pollutive assets to firms that are less in the limelight. There is no evidence of increased engagement in any other emission reduction activities. We estimate that 369 million metric tons (mt) of CO2e are reallocated via divestments in the post-Paris Agreement period. Our results indicate that investor pressure to decarbonize reshapes the global conglomerate structure of large firms.

The three articles in this special issue on “Monopsonistic Labour Markets” provide novel insights on how to model the reasons for employers’ monopsony power, how to measure it, and how much of it materialises in lower wages. We are confident that the studies published in this issue will be of high interest to specialists and a broader audience of economists alike. They definitely deserve a wide readership, and our not unwarranted hope is that they will provide new impulses to those partaking in the monopsony literature.

Socioeconomic inequalities shape who accesses early childcare, even in countries that claim universal provision. This entrenched inequality limits child development, women’s employment and gender equality — but governments have clear tools to close the gap.

Promoting green product consumption is one important element in building a sustainable society. Yet green products are usually more costly. In times of high inflation, not only budget constraints but also the fear that prices will continue to rise might dampen green product consumption and, hence, limit the effectiveness of exerted efforts to promote sustainable behaviors. To test this suggestion, we conducted a Germany-wide survey with almost 1,200 respondents, followed by a framed field experiment (N=500) to confirm causality. In the survey, respondents’ stated “green” purchasing behavior is, as to be expected, positively correlated with concerns about climate change. It is also negatively correlated with concerns about future inflation and energy costs, but after controlling for observable characteristics such as income and educational level only the correlation with concerns about future prices remains significant. This result is driven by individuals with below-median environmental attitude. In the framed field experiment, we use the priming method to manipulate the saliency of inflation concerns. Whereas sizably relaxing the budget constraint (i.e., by 50 percent) has no impact on the share of organic products in participants’ baskets, the priming significantly decreases the share of organic products for individuals with below-median environmental attitude, similar to the survey data.

Promoting green (usually more costly) product consumption is one essential element in building a sustainable society. In times of high inflation, not only budget constraints but also the fear that prices will continue to rise might limit the effectiveness of exerted efforts to promote sustainable behaviors. To test this suggestion, we conducted a Germany-wide survey with almost 1200 respondents, followed by a framed field experiment to confirm causality. Our proxy for green consumption is organic food purchases. Survey respondents’ stated organic purchasing behavior is positively correlated with concerns about climate change but negatively correlated with concerns about inflation. The latter result is driven by individuals with a below-median environmental attitude. In the framed field experiment, we use the priming method to manipulate the saliency of inflation concerns. Whereas sizably relaxing the budget constraint has no impact on the share of organic products in participants’ baskets, the priming significantly decreases the share of organic products for individuals with below-median environmental attitude. Using the same inflation priming in a subsequent survey experiment with around 1800 respondents, we find that high inflationary environments affect both the perception of organic being luxury products and the social norm of buying organic. Both effects are more pronounced for individuals with below-median environmental attitude and, hence, they are the likely mechanisms driving the negative effects on organic product consumption.