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Unsägliche Industriepolitik und ein übergriffiger StaatReint GroppThe Pioneer, 1. März 2025
The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association is organising a workshop on "Challenges to Financial Stability" on August 29th and 30th, 2022, to be held in Halle (Saale). We aim to attract excellent papers that analyse whether and how financial sector regulation changes, the resulting impact on financial stability, and the associated consequences for the real sector.
Ein Experten-Dialog zum Thema „Die Zukunft der Banken in und nach der Coronakrise“ mit Reint E. Gropp (IWH) und Jörg Rocholl (ESMT Berlin) im Rahmen der Berlin Science Week 2020.
Im Rahmen der gemeinsamen Veranstaltungsreihe der Nationalen Akademie der Wissenschaften Leopoldina und des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) zu brennenden europapolitischen Themen diskutieren Lars Feld und Reint Gropp über die Stabilität der Finanzmärkte. Moderiert wird die Veranstaltung von Ursula Weidenfeld.
A bank in poor financial shape may have incentives to maintain a lending relationship with a "zombie" firm in order to avoid or delay the recognition of credit losses.
This paper provides a detailed description of an extended version of the ECB's New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) of the euro area (cf. Christoffel, Coenen and Warne, 2008).
This paper analyzes the effects of policy rates on financial intermediaries' risk-taking decisions. We consider an economy where (i) intermediaries have market power in granting loans, (ii) intermediaries monitor borrowers which lowers their probability of default, and (iii) monitoring is not observable which creates a moral hazard problem.
We provide a comprehensive analysis of the transmission of macroprudential policies aimed at limiting bank risk-taking in residential real estate.
We use a quasi-natural experiment to identify the effects of supervision on bank behavior. Under the decentralized structure of U.S. bank supervision, banks in the same geographic area may be supervised by different regulatory offices.
Uncertainty shocks cause economic activity to contract and more so, if monetary policy is constrained by an effective lower bound on interest rates.
The U.S. banking sector has become substantially more concentrated since the 1990s, raising questions about both the causes and implications of this consolidation.
