A Congestion Theory of Unemployment Fluctuations
Yusuf Mercan, Benjamin Schoefer, Petr Sedláček
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
No. 1,
2024
Abstract
We propose a theory of unemployment fluctuations in which newhires and incumbentworkers are imperfect substitutes. Hence, attempts to hire away the unemployed during recessions diminish the marginal product of new hires, discouraging job creation. This single feature achieves a ten-fold increase in the volatility of hiring in an otherwise standard search model, produces a realistic Beveridge curve despite countercyclical separations, and explains 30–40% of U.S. unemployment fluctuations. Additionally, it explains the excess procyclicality of new hires’ wages, the cyclical labor wedge, countercyclical earnings losses from job displacement, and the limited steady-state effects of unemployment insurance.
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"Let Me Get Back to You" — A Machine Learning Approach to Measuring NonAnswers
Andreas Barth, Sasan Mansouri, Fabian Wöbbeking
Management Science,
No. 10,
2023
Abstract
Using a supervised machine learning framework on a large training set of questions and answers, we identify 1,364 trigrams that signal nonanswers in earnings call questions and answers (Q&A). We show that this glossary has economic relevance by applying it to contemporaneous stock market reactions after earnings calls. Our findings suggest that obstructing the flow of information leads to significantly lower cumulative abnormal stock returns and higher implied volatility. As both our method and glossary are free of financial context, we believe that the measure is applicable to other fields with a Q&A setup outside the contextual domain of financial earnings conference calls.
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CoCo Bonds, Bank Stability, and Earnings Opacity
Melina Ludolph
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 1,
2022
Abstract
This paper examines the effect of CoCo bonds that qualify as additional tier 1 capital on bank stability and reporting. The results reveal a significant reduction in the distance to insolvency following the hybrid bond issuance due to increased earnings volatility. Banks report less stable net income due to more volatile loss provisions, which increases earnings opacity rather than reflects changes in asset quality. The findings are consistent with the premise that persistent uncertainty and misconceptions among investors about bail-in likelihoods limit their monitoring engagement, which results in banks becoming less transparent.
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How to Talk Down Your Stock Performance
Andreas Barth, Sasan Mansouri, Fabian Wöbbeking, Severin Zörgiebel
SSRN Discussion Papers,
2020
Abstract
We process the natural language of verbal firm disclosures in order to study the use of context specific language or jargon and its impact on financial performance. We observe that, within the Q&A of earnings conference calls, managers use less jargon in responses to tougher questions, and after a quarter of bad economic success. Moreover, markets interpret the lack of precise information as a bad signal: we find lower cumulative abnormal returns and a higher implied volatility following earnings calls where managers use less jargon. These results support the argument that context specific language or jargon helps to efficiently and precisely transfer information.
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The Value of Firm Networks: A Natural Experiment on Board Connections
Ester Faia, Maximilian Mayer, Vincenzo Pezone
CEPR Discussion Papers,
No. 14591,
2020
Abstract
This paper presents causal evidence of the effects of boardroom networks on firm value and compensation policies. We exploit exogenous variation in network centrality arising from a ban on interlocking directorates of Italian financial and insurance companies. We leverage this shock to show that firms whose centrality in the network rises after the reform experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement date and are better hedged against shocks. Information dissemination plays a central role: results are driven by firms that have higher idiosyncratic volatility, low analyst coverage, and more uncertainty surrounding their earnings forecasts. Firms benefit more from boardroom centrality when they are more central in the input-output network, hence more susceptible to upstream shocks, when they are less central in the cross-ownership network, or when they have low profitability or low growth opportunities. Network centrality also results in higher directors' compensation, due to rent sharing and improved executives' outside option, and more similar compensation policies between connected firms.
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