25 Jahre IWH

Professor Michael Koetter, Ph.D.

Professor Michael Koetter, Ph.D.
Aktuelle Position

seit 9/16

Leiter der Abteilung Finanzmärkte

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 9/16

Professor für Financial Economics

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität, Magdeburg


  • Finanzintermediation, Allokation von Investitionen, Wachstum
  • Risikobereitschaft und Wettbewerb
  • (unorthodoxe) Geldpolitik und die Realwirtschaft

Seit September 2016 ist Michael Koetter Universitätsprofessor für Financial Economics an der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg und Leiter der Abteilung Finanzmärkte am IWH. Er war Wim Duisenberg Fellow bei der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) im Jahr 2014, ist regelmäßiger Gastforscher bei der Deutschen Bundesbank und absolvierte Forschungs- und Lehraufenthalte in den USA, bei der Riksbank in Schweden und anderen Institutionen.

Sein Forschungsinteresse gilt dem Zusammenhang zwischen regionalen Finanzierungsbedingungen und den Auswirkungen auf die reale Wirtschaft. In der Forschungskooperation mit dem IWH sollen die vielfältigen am Institut erhobenen Mikrodatensätze mit Mikrodaten über Finanzintermediäre verknüpft werden. Spezifische Forschungsfragen sind zum Beispiel, welche Rolle den Finanzintermediären bei der effizienten Allokation produktiver Ressourcen unter kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen zufällt, oder ob und wie Banken Familienunternehmen dabei unterstützen können, ihr Produktivvermögen reibungslos auf die nächste Generation zu übertragen.

Michael Koetter studierte International Money and Banking an der Universität Maastricht und der Stern School of Business. Er promovierte an der Utrecht School of Economics und absolvierte den tenure track an der Universität Groningen. Von 2012 bis 2016 war er Professor of Banking and Finance an der Frankfurt School of Finance & Management. Ab 2013 war er Forschungsprofessor am IWH und leitete die Abteilung Finanzmärkte bereits kommissarisch von August 2014 bis Dezember 2015.

Ihr Kontakt

Professor Michael Koetter, Ph.D.
Professor Michael Koetter, Ph.D.
Leiter - Abteilung Finanzmärkte
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-727



Too Connected to Fail? Inferring Network Ties from Price Co-movements

Jakob Bosma Michael Koetter Michael Wedow

in: Journal of Business & Economic Statistics , im Erscheinen


We use extreme value theory methods to infer conventionally unobservable connections between financial institutions from joint extreme movements in credit default swap spreads and equity returns. Estimated pairwise co-crash probabilities identify significant connections among up to 186 financial institutions prior to the crisis of 2007/2008. Financial institutions that were very central prior to the crisis were more likely to be bailed out during the crisis or receive the status of systemically important institutions. This result remains intact also after controlling for indicators of too-big-to-fail concerns, systemic, systematic, and idiosyncratic risks. Both CDS-based and Equity-based connections are significant predictors of bailouts.

Publikation lesen

Bank Recapitalization, Regulatory Intervention, and Repayment

Thomas Kick Michael Koetter Tigran Poghosyan

in: Journal of Money Credit and Banking , Nr. 7, 2016


We use prudential supervisory data for all German banks during 1994–2010 to test if regulatory interventions affect the likelihood that bailed-out banks repay capital support. Accounting for the selection bias inherent in nonrandom bank bailouts by insurance schemes and the endogenous administration of regulatory interventions, we show that regulators can increase the likelihood of repayment substantially. An increase in intervention frequencies by one standard deviation increases the annual probability of capital support repayment by 7%. Sturdy interventions, like restructuring orders, are effective, whereas weak measures reduce repayment probabilities. Intervention effects last up to 5 years.

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Lend Global, Fund Local? Price and Funding Cost Margins in Multinational Banking

Rients Galema Michael Koetter C. Liesegang

in: Review of Finance , Nr. 5, 2016


In a proposed model of a multinational bank, interest margins determine local lending by foreign affiliates and the internal funding by parent banks. We exploit detailed parent-affiliate-level data of all German banks to empirically test our theoretical predictions in pre-crisis times. Local lending by affiliates depends negatively on price margins, the difference between lending and deposit rates in foreign markets. The effect of funding cost margins, the gap between local deposit rates faced by affiliates abroad and the funding costs of their parents, on internal capital market funding is positive but statistically weak. Interest margins are central to explain the interaction between internal capital markets and foreign affiliates lending.

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Delay Determinants of European Banking Union Implementation

Michael Koetter Thomas Krause Lena Tonzer

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere , Nr. 24, 2017


To safeguard financial stability and harmonise regulation, the European Commission substantially reformed banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance via EU directives. But most countries delay the transposition of these directives. We ask if transposition delays result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems? Supervisors might try to protect national banking systems and local politicians maybe reluctant to surrender national sovereignty to deal with failed banks. Alternatively, intricate financial regulation might require more implementation time in large and complex financial and political systems. We therefore collect data on the transposition delays of the three Banking Union directives and investigate observed delay variation across member states. Our correlation analyses suggest that existing regulatory and institutional frameworks, rather than banking market structure or political factors, matter for transposition delays.

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Inside Asset Purchase Programs: The Effects of Unconventional Policy on Banking Competition

Michael Koetter Natalia Podlich Michael Wedow

in: ECB Working Paper Series , Nr. 2017, 2017


We test if unconventional monetary policy instruments influence the competitive conduct of banks. Between q2:2010 and q1:2012, the ECB absorbed Euro 218 billion worth of government securities from five EMU countries under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Using detailed security holdings data at the bank level, we show that banks exposed to this unexpected (loose) policy shock mildly gained local loan and deposit market shares. Shifts in market shares are driven by banks that increased SMP security holdings during the lifetime of the program and that hold the largest relative SMP portfolio shares. Holding other securities from periphery countries that were not part of the SMP amplifies the positive market share responses. Monopolistic rents approximated by Lerner indices are lower for SMP banks, suggesting a role of the SMP to re-distribute market power differentially, but not necessarily banking profits.

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Do We Want These Two to Tango? On Zombie Firms and Stressed Banks in Europe

Manuela Storz Michael Koetter Ralph Setzer Andreas Westphal

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere , Nr. 13, 2017


We show that the speed and type of corporate deleveraging depends on the interaction between corporate and financial sector health. Based on granular bank-firm data pertaining to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) from five stressed and two non-stressed euro area economies, we show that “zombie” firms generally continued to lever up during the 2010–2014 period. Whereas relationships with stressed banks reduce SME leverage on average, we also show that zombie firms that are tied to weak banks in euro area periphery countries increase their indebtedness even further. Sustainable economic recovery therefore requires both: deleveraging of banks and firms.

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