25 Jahre IWH

Juniorprofessor Stefano Colonnello, Ph.D.

Juniorprofessor Stefano Colonnello, Ph.D.
Aktuelle Position

seit 9/15

Leiter der Forschungsgruppe Recht und Finanzen

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 9/15


Otto-von-Guericke-Universität, Magdeburg


  • empirische Unternehmensfinanzierung
  • Relationship Banking
  • Unternehmensführung
  • Rechts- und Finanzwissenschaft

Stefano Colonnello ist seit September 2015 als wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter in der Abteilung Finanzmärkte und als Juniorprofessor an der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg tätig.

Sein Studium (Finance) absolvierte Stefano Colonnello an der Bocconi Universität in Mailand, seine Promotion erfolgte an der École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne und am Swiss Finance Institute. Stefano Colonnello verfasste seine Dissertation zum Thema "Essays in Empirical Corporate Finance".

Ihr Kontakt

Juniorprofessor Stefano Colonnello, Ph.D.
Juniorprofessor Stefano Colonnello, Ph.D.
Mitglied - Abteilung Finanzmärkte
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Direct and Indirect Risk-taking Incentives of Inside Debt

Stefano Colonnello G. Curatola Ngoc Giang Hoang

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere , Nr. 20, 2016


We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about the relation between credit spreads and different compensation components. First, we show that credit spreads are decreasing in inside debt only if it is unsecured. Second, the relation between credit spreads and equity incentives varies depending on the features of inside debt.

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Empty Creditors and Strong Shareholders: The Real Effects of Credit Risk Trading

Stefano Colonnello M. Efing F. Zucchi

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere , Nr. 10, 2016


Credit derivatives give creditors the possibility to transfer debt cash flow rights to other market participants while retaining control rights. We use the market for credit default swaps (CDSs) as a laboratory to show that the real effects of such debt unbundling crucially hinge on shareholder bargaining power. We find that creditors buy more CDS protection when facing strong shareholders to secure themselves a valuable outside option in distressed renegotiations. After the start of CDS trading, the distance-to-default, investment, and market value of firms with powerful shareholders drop by 7.9%, 7%, and 8.8% compared to other firms.

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Internal Governance and Creditor Governance: Evidence from Credit Default Swaps

Stefano Colonnello

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere , Nr. 6, 2017


I study the relation between internal governance and creditor governance. A deterioration in creditor governance may increase the agency costs of debt and managerial opportunism at the expense of shareholders. I exploit the introduction of credit default swaps (CDS) as a negative shock to creditor governance. I provide evidence consistent with shareholders pushing for a substitution effect between internal governance and creditor governance. Following CDS introduction, CDS firms reduce managerial risk-taking incentives relative to other firms. At the same time, after the start of CDS trading, CDS firms increase managerial wealth-performance sensitivity, board independence, and CEO turnover performance-sensitivity relative to other firms.

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