Risikoaufschläge für Staatsschulden. Ergebnis von Unsicherheit oder von (akkumulierten) Defiziten?
Toralf Pusch
Zur aktuellen Finanz-, Wirtschafts- und Schuldenkrise. Schriften der Keynes-Gesellschaft, Band 6,
2013
Abstract
Mit Beginn der Finanzkrise 2008 wurde quer durch Europa die antizyklische Fiskalpolitik als Mittel zur Krisenbekämpfung wiederentdeckt. Nach dieser vielleicht wenig überraschenden Renaissance der Fiskalpolitik ist die ökonomische Mehrheitsmeinung inzwischen wieder weitaus skeptischer im Hinblick auf keynesianische Politik. Mittlerweile ist die These sehr verbreitet, es seien die aus dem Ruder gelaufenen Staatsfinanzen in den südlichen Mitgliedsländern (Griechenland, Portugal, Spanien, Italien, ergänzt um das nördlichere Irland), welche die Eurozone in die schärfste Krise seit ihrem Bestehen geführt haben. Als Gradmesser der „Schuldenkrise“ werden dabei im Allgemeinen die steigenden Finanzierungskosten (Risikoaufschläge der Staatsschuldentitel im Vergleich zu deutschen Staatsschulden) in den betroffenen Ländern angeführt. Die in diesem Beitrag vertretene Sichtweise ist hingegen, dass ein wesentlicher Grund für die erhöhten staatlichen Finanzierungskosten in der Zunahme der Unsicherheit an den Finanzmärkten zu sehen ist.
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The Role of Uncertainty in the Euro Crisis - A Reconsideration of Liquidity Preference Theory
Toralf Pusch
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics,
2013
Abstract
With the world financial crisis came the rediscovery of the active role fiscal policy could play in remedying the situation. More recently, the Euro Crisis, with its mounting funding costs facing governments of a number of Southern EU member states and Ireland, has called this strategy into question. Opposing this view, the main point of this contribution is to elaborate on the link between rising sovereign risk premia in the Eurozone and a major feature of the financial crisis - elevated uncertainty after the Lehman collapse. Theoretically, this link is developed with reference to Keynes' liquidity preference theory. The high explanatory power of rising uncertainty in financial markets and the detrimental effects of fiscal austerity on the evolution of sovereign risk spreads are demonstrated empirically by means of panel regressions and supplementary correlation analyses.
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What Drives Banking Sector Fragility in the Eurozone? Evidence from Stock Market Data
Stefan Eichler, Karol Sobanski
Journal of Common Market Studies,
No. 4,
2012
Abstract
This article explores the determinants of banking sector fragility in the eurozone. For this purpose, a stock-market-based banking sector fragility indicator is calculated for eight member countries from 1999 to 2009 using the Merton model (1974). Using a panel framework, it is found that the macroeconomic environment, the structure of the banking sector and the intensity of banking regulation all have an effect on banking sector fragility in the eurozone.
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The Impact of Banking and Sovereign Debt Crisis Risk in the Eurozone on the Euro/US Dollar Exchange Rate
Stefan Eichler
Applied Financial Economics,
No. 15,
2012
Abstract
I study the impact of financial crisis risk in the eurozone on the euro/US dollar exchange rate. Using daily data from 3 July 2006 to 30 September 2010, I find that the euro depreciates against the US dollar when banking or sovereign debt crisis risk increases in the eurozone. While the external value of the euro is more sensitive to changes in sovereign debt crisis risk in vulnerable member countries than in stable member countries, the impact of banking crisis risk is similar for both country blocs. Moreover, rising default risk of medium and large eurozone banks leads to a depreciation of the euro while small banks’ default risk has no significant impact, showing the relevance of systemically important banks with regards to the exchange rate.
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What Can Currency Crisis Models Tell Us about the Risk of Withdrawal from the EMU? Evidence from ADR Data
Stefan Eichler
Journal of Common Market Studies,
No. 4,
2011
Abstract
We study whether ADR (American depositary receipt) investors perceive the risk that countries such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal or Spain could leave the eurozone to address financial problems produced by the sub-prime crisis. Using daily data, we analyse the impact of vulnerability measures related to currency crisis theories on ADR returns. We find that ADR returns fall when yield spreads of sovereign bonds or CDSs (credit default swaps) rise (i.e. when debt crisis risk increases); when banks' CDS premiums rise or stock returns fall (i.e. when banking crisis risk increases); or when the euro's overvaluation increases (i.e. when the risk of competitive devaluation increases).
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Interest Rate Convergence in the Euro-Candidate Countries: Volatility Dynamics of Sovereign Bond Yields
Hubert Gabrisch, Lucjan T. Orlowski
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade,
2010
Abstract
We argue that a “static“ specification of the Maastricht criterion for long-term bond yields is not conducive to assessing stability of financial systems in euro-candidate countries. Instead, we advocate a dynamic approach to assessing interest rate convergence to a common currency that is based on the analysis of financial system stability. Accordingly, we empirically test volatility dynamics of the ten-year sovereign bond yields of the 2004 EU accession countries in relation to the eurozone yields during the January 2, 2001-January 22, 2009, sample period. Our results show a varied degree of the relationship between domestic and eurozone sovereign bond yields, the most pronounced for the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Poland, and weaker for Hungary and Slovakia. We find some divergence of relative bond yields since the EU accession.
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A Dynamic Approach to Interest Rate Convergence in Selected Euro-candidate Countries
Hubert Gabrisch, Lucjan T. Orlowski
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 10,
2009
Abstract
We advocate a dynamic approach to monetary convergence to a common currency that is based on the analysis of financial system stability. Accordingly, we empirically test volatility dynamics of the ten-year sovereign bond yields of the 2004 EU accession countries in relation to the eurozone yields during the January 2, 2001 untill January 22, 2009 sample period. Our results show a varied degree of bond yield co-movements, the most pronounced for the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Poland, and weaker for Hungary and Slovakia. However, since the EU accession, we find some divergence of relative bond yields. We argue that a ‘static’ specification of the Maastricht criterion for long-term bond yields is not fully conducive for advancing stability of financial systems in the euro-candidate countries.
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The Euro and the Competitiveness of European Firms
Filippo di Mauro, Gianmarco Ottaviano, Daria Taglioni
Economic Policy,
No. 57,
2009
Abstract
Much attention has been paid to the impact of a single currency on actual trade volumes. Lower trade costs, however, matter over and beyond their effects on trade flows: as less productive firms are forced out of business by the tougher competitive conditions of international markets, economic integration fosters lower prices and higher average productivity. We assess the quantitative relevance of these effects calibrating a general equilibrium model using country, sector and firm-level empirical observations. The euro turns out to have increased the overall competitiveness of Eurozone firms, and the effects differ along interesting dimensions: they tend to be stronger for countries which are smaller or with better access to foreign markets, and for firms which specialize in sectors where international competition is fiercer and barriers to entry lower.— Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano, Daria Taglioni and Filippo di Mauro
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Institutionelle Defizite und wachsende Spannungen in der Euro-Zone
Hubert Gabrisch
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 7,
2007
Abstract
The introduction of the Euro was certainly a success. Nevertheless, behind this success one may find some increasing asymmetries and imbalances across member countries, which may undermine the stability of the common currency in the long run. Tensions include the paralysis of fiscal policy, increasing divergence in per capita income, a high volatility of real state prices, and diverging unit labour cost developments. The given forms of macroeconomic coordination seem not to be appropriate to mitigate the problems. Obviously, countries can compete with wage policy only after currencies and their exchange rates were abolished, and the use of fiscal policy has been restricted. In particular, Germany and Austria were successful in competitive wage policy, while countries like Spain, Greece, Portugal, Italy, and also France did not yet use the competitiveness channel. Germany was able to reduce its unit labour costs more than other countries by labour market reforms and higher indirect taxes in replacing social taxes. However, the advantage may proof to be temporary only, for other countries will be forced to follow the German example. Given an ECB inflation target of 2 %, more competitive wage policy in the Euro area might jeopardize the stability of the currency through deflation and higher unemployment. It does not wonder that the discussion on other and new forms of macroeconomic coordination revived recently. This debate does not only include the introduction of a central EU budget with anti-cyclical effects, but also forms of direct and indirect coordination of national wage policies. In any case, it would be useful to oblige national wage policies to obey the common interest of the Union.
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Business activity updated: German economy features a slow start into 2005
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2005
Abstract
Die ersten Monate des Jahres 2005 warteten mit einigen unangenehmen Überraschungen für die Konjunktur auf. Der Ölpreis überschritt erneut die 50-Dollar-Marke. Die Bundesagentur für Arbeit zählte 5,2 Millionen Arbeitslose, und das Statistische Bundesamt meldete im Februar für das Schlussquartal des vergangenen Jahres einen Rückgang der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Produktion. Zeitgleich fielen auch einige Stimmungsindikatoren. So scheint zu Jahresbeginn die konjunkturelle Zukunft trüber als zuletzt erwartet. Den Hiobsbotschaften zum Trotz: An den äußeren und inneren Rahmenbedingungen der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung hat sich fundamental wenig geändert. In Japan und in der Eurozone schwächelte die Konjunktur zwar zum Jahresende. In den Wachstumszentren der Weltwirtschaft nahm die Produktion aber erneut mit hohen Raten zu. Der Investitionsboom ist hier ungebrochen. Hohe Gewinne und historisch niedrige Kapitalmarktzinsen regen weiterhin an. Die positiven Impulse, die 2005 von den Kapitalmärkten auf die reale Wirtschaft ausgehen, werden im Frühjahr auch die Entwicklung in Japan und in der Eurozone wieder beleben. Die Notierungen für Rohöl werden nach dem Rückzug des Winters etwas nachgeben...
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