Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala
Review of Finance,
No. 4,
2004
Abstract
The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that deposit insurance may reduce moral hazard, if deposit insurance credibly leaves out non-deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the share of insured deposits in banks' liabilities.
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Market Indicators, Bank Fragility, and Indirect Market Discipline
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala, Giuseppe Vulpes
Economic Policy Review,
No. 2,
2004
Abstract
A paper presented at the October 2003 conference “Beyond Pillar 3 in International Banking Regulation: Disclosure and Market Discipline of Financial Firms“ cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Jerome A. Chazen Institute of International Business at Columbia Business School.
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Promotion of investment in East Germany - Results of an empirical study of effectiveness
Harald Lehmann, Andreas Stierwald
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 5,
2004
Abstract
In Germany considerable amounts of public funds are being spent on business development programs. In order to do so economic reasoning is needed. In particular the programs for supporting investment lack microeconometric empirical evaluation. To close this gap the special program „Gemeinschaftsaufgabe zur Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur“ (GA) is exemplarily analyzed. This program is intended to strengthen the capital stock of the East German economy, so firms of the East German manufacturing industries will be studied. A comparison of the two fundamental methods for microeconometric evaluation shall demonstrate the general problems in analyzing the effectiveness of development programs. The matching estimator provides more stable results then a sample selectivity model. The results suggest that the GA generates considerable extra investment activities.
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Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
Journal of Industrial Economics,
No. 1,
2004
Abstract
We show that competing banks relax overall competition by inducing borrowers to switch lenders. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclosing borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to poach their first-period market. Disclosure of borrower information increases the rival's second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market.
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Diversifikation und regionale Wirtschafts- und Beschäftigungsentwicklung - Eine empirische Analyse für ausgewählte deutsche Gebiete
Peter Haug
Jahrbuch für Regionalwissenschaft,
No. 2,
2004
Abstract
This article analyses the effects of heterogeneous economic structures on the long-term development of regional employment. A simple model is introduced to illustrate the beneficial outcomes for households as well as for enterprises of locating in highly diversified municipalities because risk (volatility of income, recruitment costs in a broader sense) diminishes for both. Econometric results for a sample of municipalities in Lower Saxony provide some evidence for a positive effect of local economic diversification on employment opportunities. The results seem to be not confined to the aggregated local labour demand but also apply to most branches the local business sector.
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Why do we have an interbank money market?
Jürgen Wiemers, Ulrike Neyer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 182,
2003
Abstract
The interbank money market plays a key role in the execution of monetary policy. Hence, it is important to know the functioning of this market and the determinants of the interbank money market rate. In this paper, we develop an interbank money market model with a heterogeneous banking sector. We show that besides for balancing daily liquidity fluctuations banks participate in the interbank market because they have different marginal costs of obtaining funds from the central bank. In the euro area, which we refer to, these cost differences occur because banks have different marginal cost of collateral which they need to hold to obtain funds from the central bank. Banks with relatively low marginal costs act as intermediaries between the central bank and banks with relatively high marginal costs. The necessary positive spread between the interbank market rate and the central bank rate is determined by transaction costs and credit risk in the interbank market, total liquidity needs of the banking sector, costs of obtaining funds from the central bank, and the distribution of the latter across banks.
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Does Transparency of Central Banks Produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 178,
2003
Abstract
A recent strand of literature (see Morris and Shin 2001) shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information between traders. It is known that this approach works only if there is not too precise common knowledge in the market. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We present a model in which more transparency of the central bank means better private information, because each trader utilizes public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
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Investment Behaviour of Financially Constrained Multinational Corporations: Consequences for the International Transmission of Business Cycle Fluctuations
Diemo Dietrich
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 165,
2002
Abstract
The paper investigates the investment decision of a financially constrained multinational
corporation (MNC) planning investment projects both at home and in a developing
country. The collateral values of the projects diverge because of country specific
transactions costs so that the willingness of banks to grant a loan depends not only on
the MNCs financial wealth but also on the share of FDI in total investment. It is shown
that i) variations in the MNCs financial standing affects FDI stronger than domestic
investment, ii) FDI is likely to decrease following a macroeconomic shock to the MNC
parent, and iii) domestic investment is likely to increase following a macroeconomic
shock to the MNC affiliate.
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Germany s dependence on the economic situation in the U.S. is less crucial than generally assumed
Klaus Weyerstraß
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2002
Abstract
In the context of the recent cyclical downturn in Germany it has often been argued that Germany depends more than other European countries on international economic developments. In this article it is investigated whether empirical support can be found for this proposition. Moreover, it is explored whether this relation has changed over time. For this purpose, vector autoregressive (VAR) models are applied to the output gaps of different economies.
It is shown that in the seventies and eighties, the transmission of business cycle shocks was more pronounced to Germany than to the other EU countries. Since the middle of the nineties, no such differences can be detected. Furthermore, since the middle of the nineties, the effects of shocks from abroad on the German business cycle have been significantly more short-lived than before.
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Bank-Firm Relationships and International Banking Markets
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
International Journal of the Economics of Business,
No. 3,
2002
Abstract
This paper reviews how long-term relationships between firms and banks shape the structure and integration of banking markets worldwide. Bank relationships arise to span informational asymmetries that are endemic in financial markets. Firm-bank relationships not only entail specific benefits and costs for both the engaged firms and banks, but also directly affect the structure of banking markets. In particular, the sunk cost of screening and monitoring activities and the 'informational capital' collected by the incumbent banks may act as a barrier to entry. The intensity of the existing firm-bank relationships will determine the height of this barrier and shape the structure of international banking markets. For example, in Scandinavia where firms maintain few and strong relationships, foreign banks may only be able to enter successfully through mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, Southern European firms maintain many bank relationships. Therefore, banks may consider entering Southern European banking markets through direct investment.
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