02.09.2016 • 35/2016
The German Economy: Still Robust Despite Sliding Sentiment
The prospects for the German economy are still quite favorable. While sentiment indicators suggest that growth will slow at the end of the year, domestic demand will continue on an upward trend. The German GDP should increase by 1.9% in 2016. For 2017 we expect a lower growth rate of 1.2%“Weaker export volumes and higher growth of imports are the relevant factors for the slowdown”, says Prof Oliver Holtemöller, IWH Vice president. Unemployment will rise a bit as more refugees enter the labor market. Consumer price inflation remains moderate. The general government balance (cyclically ad¬justed as well as unadjusted) will be in surplus in both 2016 and 2017.
Oliver Holtemöller
Read press release
How Effective is Macroprudential Policy during Financial Downturns? Evidence from Caps on Banks' Leverage
Manuel Buchholz
Working Papers of Eesti Pank,
No. 7,
2015
Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of a macroprudential policy instrument, caps on banks' leverage, on domestic credit to the private sector since the Global Financial Crisis. Applying a difference-in-differences approach to a panel of 69 advanced and emerging economies over 2002–2014, we show that real credit grew after the crisis at considerably higher rates in countries which had implemented the leverage cap prior to the crisis. This stabilising effect is more pronounced for countries in which banks had a higher pre-crisis capital ratio, which suggests that after the crisis, banks were able to draw on buffers built up prior to the crisis due to the regulation. The results are robust to different choices of subsamples as well as to competing explanations such as standard adjustment to the pre-crisis credit boom.
Read article
Financial Factors in Macroeconometric Models
Sebastian Giesen
Volkswirtschaft, Ökonomie,
2013
Abstract
The important role of credit has long been identified as a key factor for economic development (see e.g. Wicksell (1898), Keynes (1931), Fisher (1933) and Minsky (1957, 1964)). Even before the financial crisis most researchers and policy makers agreed that financial frictions play an important role for business cycles and that financial turmoils can result in severe economic downturns (see e.g. Mishkin (1978), Bernanke (1981, 1983), Diamond (1984), Calomiris (1993) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). However, in practice researchers and policy makers mostly used simplified models for forecasting and simulation purposes. They often neglected the impact of financial frictions and emphasized other non financial market frictions when analyzing business cycle fluctuations (prominent exceptions include Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)). This has been due to the fact that most economic downturns did not seem to be closely related to financial market failures (see Eichenbaum (2011)). The outbreak of the subprime crises ― which caused panic in financial markets and led to the default of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 ― then led to a reconsideration of such macroeconomic frameworks (see Caballero (2010) and Trichet (2011)). To address the economic debate from a new perspective, it is therefore necessary to integrate the relevant frictions which help to explain what we have experienced during recent years.
In this thesis, I analyze different ways to incorporate relevant frictions and financial variables in macroeconometric models. I discuss the potential consequences for standard statistical inference and macroeconomic policy. I cover three different aspects in this work. Each aspect presents an idea in a self-contained unit. The following paragraphs present more detail on the main topics covered.
Read article
The Financial Crisis from a Forecaster's Perspective
Katja Drechsel, Rolf Scheufele
Kredit und Kapital,
No. 1,
2012
Abstract
This paper analyses the recession in 2008/2009 in Germany. This recession is very different from previous recessions in particular regarding their causes and magnitude. We show to what extent forecasters and forecasts based on leading indicators fail to detect the timing and the magnitude of the recession. This study shows that large forecast errors for both expert forecasts and forecasts based on leading indicators resulted during this recession which implies that the recession was very difficult to forecast. However, some leading indicators (survey data, risk spreads, stock prices) have indicated an economic downturn and hence, beat univariate time series models. Although the combination of individual forecasts provides an improvement compared to the benchmark model, the combined forecasts are worse than several individual models. A comparison of expert forecasts withthe best forecasts based on leading indicators shows only minor deviations. Overall, the range for an improvement of expert forecasts in the crisis compared to indicator forecasts is small.
Read article
The Financial Crisis from a Forecaster’s Perspective
Katja Drechsel, Rolf Scheufele
Abstract
This paper analyses the recession in 2008/2009 in Germany, which is very different from previous recessions, in particular regarding its cause and magnitude. We show to what extent forecasters and forecasts based on leading indicators fail to detect the timing and the magnitude of the recession. This study shows that large forecast errors for both expert forecasts and forecasts based on leading indicators resulted during this recession which implies that the recession was very difficult to forecast. However, some leading indicators (survey data, risk spreads, stock prices) have indicated an economic downturn and hence, beat univariate time series models. Although the combination of individual forecasts provides an improvement compared to the benchmark model, the combined forecasts are worse than several individual models. A comparison of expert forecasts with the best forecasts based on leading indicators shows only minor deviations. Overall, the range for an improvement of expert forecasts during the crisis compared to indicator forecasts is relatively small.
Read article
The global downturn and its impact on euro area exports and competitiveness
Filippo di Mauro, Katrin Forster, Ana Lima
ECB Occasional Paper Series,
No. 119,
2010
Abstract
World trade contracted sharply in late 2008 and early 2009 following the deepening of the financial crisis in September 2008. This paper discusses the main mechanisms behind the global downturn in trade and its impact on euro area exports and competitiveness. It finds that the euro area was hit particularly hard by the contraction in global demand.
Read article
Characteristics of Business Cycles: Have they Changed?
Oliver Holtemöller, J. Rahn, M. H. Stierle
IWH-Sonderhefte,
No. 5,
2009
Abstract
The most recent economic downturn has shown that economic activity nowadays is still prone to large fluctuations. Despite a long tradition of research, the understanding of such fluctuations, namely business cycles, is still far from comprehensive. Moreover, in a developing world with new technologies, faster communication systems, a higher integration of world markets and increasingly better-skilled people the nature of business cycles changes continuously and new insights can be drawn from recent experience.
Read article
East German Exports: Remarkable Catch-up, but Still Lagging Behind
Götz Zeddies
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
20 Jahre Deutsche Einheit - Teil 1 -
2009
Abstract
German reunification entailed severe adjustment processes in East German export industries. With political and economic transition in Eastern Europe, at that time the main export market for East German producers, export demand initially collapsed in the early 1990s. Additionally, the introduction of the Deutschmark in Eastern Germany amounted to a massive revaluation, and international competitiveness of East German producers deteriorated. However, manufacturers in the New Federal States opened up new markets, especially in Western Europe and the Americas. As a consequence, after the downturn of construction activity and investment in the mid-1990s, international trade became the driving force of GDP-growth in Eastern Germany. Although since then, goods exports of the New Federal States grew twice as much as those of Western Germany, export ratio (goods exports as a percentage of GDP) only amounts to 22 per cent in Eastern Germany, compared to 42 per cent in the western part of the country. Even in comparison to Eastern European countries in transition, openness to trade of the New Federal States is still comparatively low. As an empirical analysis shows, this must be largely traced back to smaller firm sizes in the New Federal States as well as to the lower importance of manufacturing industries, which are traditionally more export-oriented. Moreover, East German manufacturers largely specialized on intermediate inputs, which are supplied to final assembly lines in Western Germany, but are not recorded as exports. Thereby, East German export performance is considerably underestimated.
Read article
German Economy Drawn into the World Recession
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
1. Sonderausgabe
2009
Abstract
In spring 2009, the world economy is in a deep recession. The intensification of the financial crisis in autumn has caused a sharp contraction of demand. The reaction of monetary and fiscal policy was substantial, but up to now (April 2009), it has not succeeded in restoring confidence of economic agents. Although some leading indicators point to a stabilization of production in the coming quarters, the downturn will not come to an end before next winter, because the financial crisis will continue to put strain on the real economy for some time to come.
The German economy is in its deepest recession since the foundation of the Federal Republic. Germany is particularly affected, because at the core of the economy is the production of those goods for that world demand has collapsed most: capital goods and high-quality consumer durables. While exports and private investment activity will continue to shrink this year (albeit at a slower rate), private consumption will be a stabilizing factor for some time, as will public investment activity in the second half of the year. Later in 2009 and in 2010, rising unemployment will depress consumption, while in this forecast, it is assumed that exports and investment slowly recover in 2010, because the financial turmoil will calm down.
For economic policy, a recapitalization of the banking sector should have priority. The ECB should lower its key interest rate to 0.5%. Given the sharply increasing fiscal deficits, a new, third fiscal program would be counterproductive. Only if monetary policy fails to stabilize the economy, further fiscal measures, coordinated at a European level, should be considered.
Read article
Development of Economy and Public Budgets in the Medium Term
Kristina vanDeuverden, Rolf Scheufele
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2009
Abstract
The paper presents a forecast of the medium term development in Germany. In the years 2010 until 2013, economic growth will come on average to 1½%, basically borne by foreign trade as well as domestic demand. Public budgets will worsen in the years 2009 until 2010 mainly due to the present downturn and the political measures taken in this context. During the years afterwards, public finances will start to recover slightly.
Read article