Productivity gap of East German industry: A summarizing evaluation
Joachim Ragnitz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 7,
2001
Abstract
Ten years after German unification labor productivity in the New Laender reaches only 70 per cent of West German levels. Further, in the second half of the 1990ies, convergence did not continue. Because productivity can be regarded as a key for wages, for competitiveness of firms and for future transfer payments, the reasons for low productivity in East Germany are of major importance. In this article, it is argued that the existing productivity gap reflects mainly structural differences between East and West Germany, that is the high share of small firms and the predominance of sectors with low value added per worker. Additionally, difficulties on product markets leading to insufficient selling prices are responsible for the comparative low productivity of East German firms. Differences in capital intensity or in human capital, however, do explain only a small part of the productivity gap.
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Capital equipment of East German work stations: Do not overstate gaps
Joachim Ragnitz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 9,
2000
Abstract
New jobs depend heavily on productive investment. As nearly 800 bio DM were invested in the East German enterprise sector since 1990, most existing jobs can be regarded potentially competitive now. However, capital intensity is still much lower than in West Germany and reaches a level of only 75 per cent. In manufacturing, however, capital intensity is only slightly lower than in the old Laender.
There are mainly two reasons for the low capital intensity in the aggregate: The dominance of small firms producing regularly with a small capital stock per employee, and lower wages in East Germany compared with West Germany: Although capital prices are distorted by high subsidies, factor price relations favour labor to capital. This leads to the conclusion that low capital intensity reflects an optimum; convergence is therefore not necessarily to occur.
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Uncovered Workers in Plants Covered by Collective Bargaining: Who Are They and How Do They Fare?
Boris Hirsch, Philipp Lentge, Claus Schnabel
Abstract
In Germany, employers used to pay union members and non-members in a plant the same union wage in order to prevent workers from joining unions. Using recent administrative data, we investigate which workers in firms covered by collective bargaining agreements still individually benefit from these union agreements, which workers are not covered anymore, and what this means for their wages. We show that about 9 percent of workers in plants with collective agreements do not enjoy individual coverage (and thus the union wage) anymore. Econometric analyses with unconditional quantile regressions and firm-fixed-effects estimations demonstrate that not being individually covered by a collective agreement has serious wage implications for most workers. Low-wage non-union workers and those at low hierarchy levels particularly suffer since employers abstain from extending union wages to them in order to pay lower wages. This jeopardizes unions' goal of protecting all disadvantaged workers.
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Worker Beliefs about Outside Options
Simon Jäger, Christopher Roth, Nina Roussille, Benjamin Schoefer
Quarterly Journal of Economics,
2099
Abstract
Standard labor market models assume that workers hold accurate beliefs about the external wage distribution, and hence their outside options with other employers. We test this assumption by comparing German workers’ beliefs about outside options with objective benchmarks. First, we find that workers wrongly anchor their beliefs about outside options on their current wage: workers that would experience a 10% wage change if switching to their outside option only expect a 1% change. Second, workers in low-paying firms underestimate wages elsewhere. Third, in response to information about the wages of similar workers, respondents correct their beliefs about their outside options and change their job search and wage negotiation intentions. Finally, we analyze the consequences of anchoring in a simple equilibrium model. In the model, anchored beliefs keep overly pessimistic workers stuck in low-wage jobs, which gives rise to monopsony power and labor market segmentation.
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