Russia: A Victim to Transition or to the Financial Crisis?
Marina Grusevaja
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2009
Abstract
The global financial crisis has revealed deficiencies of the Russian economic system which are caused by the path of the transformation from central planning to the market economy, and not only attributable to the downfall of crude oil prices. While the worldwide liquidity crunch impaired the availability of loans to enterprises, the situation in Russia has deteriorated especially by the large exposure of the private sector to short-term foreign liabilities and by the one-sided orientation of the economy relying on the natural resources industry. Until the mid-2008, the foreign debt of the private banks and non-banks had increased strongly and had strengthened the dependence of the Russian economy on the developments on the international financial markets. The Ruble devaluation at the end of January 2009 aggravated the situation. The high short-term foreign debt of the private sector and the dependence on exports of natural resources are typical outcomes of the Russian transformation path. Therefore, on the one hand, the banking sector has not being able to satisfy financing demand of the private sector beyond the natural resources industries, enterprises became forced to borrow short-term money abroad. On the other hand, the economic strategy of the past seventeen years has strengthened the influence of the state on the natural resources sector – with the strong priority to develop it further. Hence, the one-sided economic development negatively affects the adaptability of the real-economic sector to change during the crisis period. In essence, the present political preferences of the government are aimed at providing direct financial assistance and at protectionist measures. In the long run, these actions could lead to stronger intervention of the state in the economy. Due to these recent developments, the crisis is likely to continue in Russia longer than in the other transformation countries.
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German Economy on the Brink of Recession
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
2. Sonderausgabe
2008
Abstract
In autumn 2008, the word economy is in a downswing, caused by the commodity and energy price hike of the first half of the year, housing crises in the US and some other important countries, and in particular by the financial crisis that has recently intensified. The downswing will continue this year and for some time during 2009, and will only come to an end later next year if governments and central banks succeed in stabilizing financial markets in the coming months. In this case, lower prices of commodities and still high growth dynamics in important emerging markets countries will lead to a tentative revival of the world economy.
The German economy is on the brink of a recession. It is particularly vulnerable to a global downswing because exports of investment goods are of upmost importance for the overall economy. Because the uncertainty about the worldwide effects of the financial crisis is very high, the forecast is split. A more probable scenario is based on the assumption of a stabilizing world economy. In this scenario, the growth rate of the German economy in 2009 is 0.2%. The second scenario is based on the assumption of a worldwide recession next year and forecasts that German GDP will shrink by 0.8% in 2009.
Concerning policy, the institutes recommend a strengthening of the capital base of banks via injection of government money. This should be done in a way that gives incentives to banks for attracting additional capital from private sources.
A special chapter of the report analyzes the nature and causes of the price hikes of energy and commodities in the first half of 2008.
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Interbank Exposures: An Empirical Examination of Contagion Risk in the Belgian Banking System
Hans Degryse, Grégory Nguyen
International Journal of Central Banking,
No. 2,
2007
Abstract
Robust (cross-border) interbank markets are important for the proper functioning of modern financial systems. However, a network of interbank exposures may lead to domino effects following the event of an initial bank failure. We investigate the evolution and determinants of contagion risk for the Belgian banking system over the period 1993–2002 using detailed information on aggregate interbank exposures of individual banks, large bilateral interbank exposures, and cross-border interbank exposures. The "structure" of the interbank market affects contagion risk. We find that a change from a complete structure (where all banks have symmetric links) toward a "multiplemoney-center" structure (where money centers are symmetrically linked to otherwise disconnected banks) has decreased the risk and impact of contagion. In addition, an increase in the relative importance of cross-border interbank exposures has lowered local contagion risk. However, this reduction may have been compensated by an increase in contagion risk stemming from foreign banks.
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Money and Credit Market Integration in an enlarging Euro Zone: Methodological Issues
Johannes Stephan, Jens Hölscher
European Economic Policies - Alteratives to Orthodox Analysis and Policy Concepts,
2006
Abstract
“The chapter discusses methodological issues of money and credit market integration within the context of an enlarging Euro area. Common methods of interest parity tests are rejected in favour of a comparison of nominal interest rates. Hölscher and Stephan find that from an institutional point of view the new EU member countries look under-banked, whereas interest rates are converging. As policy implication the paper argues for a Euro adoption of the new EU members rather sooner than later.“
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‘Ich-AG’, bridge money and foundation allowance – more efficient promotion or simply budget recapitalization
Herbert S. Buscher
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2006
Abstract
Die bislang bestehenden Förderkonzepte zur Gründung einer selbständigen Existenz aus der Arbeitslosigkeit – das Überbrückungsgeld und der Existenzgründungszuschuß – sollen zum 1. August 2006 zu einem einheitlichen Förderkonzept „Gründungszuschuß“ zusammengefaßt werden. Neben einer verbesserten Transparenz in den Förderinstrumenten erwartet die Regierung hiervon eine zielgerichtetere Förderung mit einer höheren Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit und nicht unerhebliche Einsparungen bei den Fördermitteln. Der Beitrag überprüft auf der Grundlage der bisher veröffentlichten Informationen über das neue Förderkonzept, ob mit den erwarteten Einsparungen zu rechnen ist und welche beschäftigungspolitischen Signale hiervon ausgehen können. Die Ergebnisse einer Überschlagsrechnung zeigen, daß es voraussichtlich nicht zu den erhofften Einsparungen kommen wird, wenn nicht die Zahl der geförderten Personen deutlich abgesenkt wird. Als eindeutige „Gewinner“ der Neuregelung gelten die Empfänger von Überbrückungsgeld; für die vorherigen Ich-AGs ergeben sich keine nennenswerten Einspareffekte pro geförderte Person. Somit stellt sich die Frage, ob dieser Effekt aus arbeitsmarktpolitischen Überlegungen heraus gewünscht ist.
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Why do we have an interbank money market?
Jürgen Wiemers, Ulrike Neyer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 182,
2003
Abstract
The interbank money market plays a key role in the execution of monetary policy. Hence, it is important to know the functioning of this market and the determinants of the interbank money market rate. In this paper, we develop an interbank money market model with a heterogeneous banking sector. We show that besides for balancing daily liquidity fluctuations banks participate in the interbank market because they have different marginal costs of obtaining funds from the central bank. In the euro area, which we refer to, these cost differences occur because banks have different marginal cost of collateral which they need to hold to obtain funds from the central bank. Banks with relatively low marginal costs act as intermediaries between the central bank and banks with relatively high marginal costs. The necessary positive spread between the interbank market rate and the central bank rate is determined by transaction costs and credit risk in the interbank market, total liquidity needs of the banking sector, costs of obtaining funds from the central bank, and the distribution of the latter across banks.
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