Sächsischer Technologiebericht 2012
Studie im Auftrag des Sächsischen Staatsministeriums für Wissenschaft und Kunst,
2013
Abstract
Der „Sächsische Technologiebericht 2012“ verfolgt das Ziel, das Innovationsgeschehen im Freistaat Sachsen umfassend darzustellen. Er beschreibt Potenziale und Rahmenbedingungen sowie Stärken und Schwächen der Innovationspraxis im Freistaat und ermöglicht als Monitoring-Instrument die Beobachtung der Entwicklung innovationsrelevanter Indikatoren im Zeitverlauf. Die Funktion des Monitorings erschöpft sich dabei nicht in der Erfassung von Ist-Zustand und Dynamik des Innovationsgeschehens, sondern soll Rückschlüsse darauf zulassen, ob durch die Politik vorgegebene Ziele erreicht wurden.
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Corporate Boards and Bank Loan Contracting
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Michael Koetter, Qiang Wu
Journal of Financial Research,
No. 4,
2012
Abstract
We investigate the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that when corporate boards are more independent, both price and nonprice loan terms (e.g., interest rates, collateral, covenants, and performance-pricing provisions) are more favorable, and syndicated loans comprise more lenders. In addition, board size, audit committee structure, and other board characteristics influence bank loan prices. However, they do not consistently affect all nonprice loan terms except for audit committee independence. Our study provides strong evidence that banks recognize the benefits of board monitoring in mitigating information risk ex ante and controlling agency risk ex post, and they reward higher quality boards with more favorable loan contract terms.
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Is Rated Debt Arm's Length? Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions
Reint E. Gropp, C. Hirsch, Jan Pieter Krahnen
CFS Working Papers, No. 2011/10,
No. 10,
2011
Abstract
In this paper we challenge the view that corporate bonds are always arm's length debt. We analyze the effect of bond ratings on the stock price return to acquirers in M&A transactions, which tend to have significant effects on creditor wealth. We find acquirers abnormal returns to be higher if they are unrated, controlling for a wide variety of other effects identified in the literature. Tracing the difference in returns to distinct managerial decisions, we find that, everything else constant, rated firms increase their leverage in takeover transactions by less than their unrated counterparts. Consistent with a significant role for rating agencies, we find monitoring effects to be strongest when acquirer bonds are rated at the borderline between investment grade and junk. Finally, we are able to empirically exclude a large number of alternative explanations for the empirical regularities that we uncover.
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Preventing Innovative Cooperations: The Legal Exemptions Unintended Side Effect
Christian Growitsch, Nicole Nulsch, Margarethe Rammerstorfer
European Journal of Law and Economics,
No. 1,
2012
Abstract
In 2004, European competition law had been considerable changed by the introduction of the new Council Regulation No. 1/2003. One of the major renewals was the replacement of the centralized notification system for inter-company cooperations in favor of a so-called legal exemption system. We analyze the implications of this reform and its arising uncertainty on the agreements firms implement, especially on innovative agreements like vertical R&D agreements. By means of a decision theoretic approach, we show that the law’s intention to reduce the incentive to establish illegal cartels will be reached but innovating cooperations might be prevented. To avoid this unintended side effect, fines but not the monitoring activities should be increased.
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Human Capital Investment, New Firm Creation and Venture Capital
Merih Sevilir
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
No. 4,
2010
Abstract
This paper studies the relation between firm investment in general human capital, new firm creation and financial development for new firm financing, such as the existence of a venture capital industry. On one hand, firm investment in general human capital leads employees to generate new innovative ideas for starting their own firm. Since employees need a venture capitalist to start their new firm, firm investment in general human capital encourages the creation of venture capitalists by increasing the need for their services, such as providing advice and monitoring. On the other hand, as new firm financing becomes available, firms' willingness to invest in general human capital increases, and as a by-product, the creation of employee-founded and venture capital-backed new firms increases in the economy. Hence, our model provides a rational explanation for the emergence of new firms created by employees of established firms, which represents one of the most common type of new firms in many industries.
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Book Review on: Dirk Hansohm et al. (eds.), Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook, Vol. 1, 2001, Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmillan
Tobias Knedlik
African Development Perspectives Yearbook: Private and Public Sectors: Towards a Balance,
2004
Abstract
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Preventing Innovative Cooperations: The Legal Exemptions Unintended Side Effect
Christian Growitsch, Nicole Nulsch, Margarethe Rammerstorfer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 6,
2008
Abstract
In 2004, European competition law had been faced with considerable changes due to the introduction of the new Council Regulation No. 1/2003. One of the major renewals was the replacement of the centralized notification system for inter-company cooperations in favor of a so-called legal exemption system. We analyze the implications of this reform on the agreements firms implement. In contrast to previous research we focus on the reform’s impact on especially welfare enhancing, namely innovative agreements. We show that the law’s intention to reduce the incentive to establish illegal cartels will be reached. However, by the same mechanism, also highly innovative cooperations might be prevented. To avoid this unintended effect, we conclude that only fines but not the monitoring activities should be increased in order to deter illegal but not innovative agreements.
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Vielfältigkeit eines Hybridberufes: Mechatronikfacharbeiter nach der Ausbildung
Simone Scharfe, K. Tautenhahn
External Publications,
No. 8,
2006
Abstract
In the period from 2002 to 2004, 302 skilled workers successfully concluded their education as a mechatroniker, microtechnologist, chemical laboratory assistant, physics laboratory assistant or varnish laboratory assistant within the scope of the model project "compound education in new professions of high technology" which was initiated by the Saxonian State Ministry of Economy and Labor. The model project and the scientific monitoring were promoted from means of the European Social Fund and complementary state means of the Free State of Saxony.
Some months after the completion of their education, the graduates were questioned by the scientific monitoring about different aspects concerning the model project and its evaluation, points of interests have for example been:
§ the retrospective assessment of the education and the model project,
§ the estimation of their chances in the job market,
§ the professional whereabouts as well as
§ the evaluation of their knowledge in terms of its suitability for daily use.
In this article, the results of the last both points in the view of the mechatroniker, which are the biggest group in the model project with 180 graduates, are picked out as a central theme. Because the mechatronikers should combine the branches of the mechanics and the electronics in the second part of the result representation the actual operational areas of the former trainee are examined.
ich hätte evtl. einiges anders formuliert: (der Satzbau klingt sonst so eingedeutscht)
The article mainly refers to the last two points. Also, the view is limited to the results of the mechatroniker. Covering 180 graduates, it has been the largest group within the model project.
The intention of the new occupational image of the mechatroniker was a bridging of mechanics and electronics. Therefore, it is examined in the second part of this article, to which extend this bridging is reflected in the actual operational areas of the former trainees.
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Monetary Policy and Bank Lending in Japan: An Agency-based Approach
Diemo Dietrich
Incentives and Economic Behaviour,
2005
Abstract
This paper studies the incentive effects on Japanese banks of a low interest rate policy by the Bank of Japan. It utilizes a simplified version of an overlapping principal-agent-style model of corporate finance originally developed in Dietrich (2003). This model is dedicated to study the monetary policy transmission mechanism by combining arguments of the broad credit channel and the bank lending channel taking into account that banks need to be provided with incentives to monitor entrepreneurs. We argue that stipulating banks to possess some amount of own capital generate these incentives. We denote this capital requirement to be market based and show that this requirement depends crucially on interest rates. After revealing some shortcomings of the credit crunch hypothesis, we apply this approach to the Japanese economy. As a result, a policy of very low interest rates may not only be inefficient but counterproductive to reactivate a stumbled economy via the usual credit channel.
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Bank Market Discipline
Reint E. Gropp, M. Schleicher
ECB Monthly Bulletin,
2005
Abstract
This article reviews the conceptual issues surrounding market discipline for banks and describes to what extent market discipline could complement supervisory activities. The potential of market discipline has been explicitly recognised in the New Basel Accord. In addition to capital requirements (Pillar I) and supervisory review (Pillar II), the Accord provides for a greater role of financial markets in complementing traditional supervisory activities by asking banks for increased transparency with regard to their operations (Pillar III). This article puts Pillar III in the broader context of direct and indirect market discipline. It is argued that both direct and indirect market discipline should be enhanced by the transparency requirements of the New Capital Accord, but that other conditions may also need to be met in order for market discipline to become more effective. Nevertheless, the article also shows that aggregated market prices can play a useful role in monitoring banking sector stability.
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