Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala
Review of Finance,
No. 4,
2004
Abstract
The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that deposit insurance may reduce moral hazard, if deposit insurance credibly leaves out non-deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the share of insured deposits in banks' liabilities.
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Analysing UDROP: An instrument for stabilizing the international financial architecture
Axel Lindner
International Finance,
No. 1,
2001
Abstract
This paper analyses implications of a proposal, called UDROP, to reform the standards of international debt contracts. The idea is to give borrowers a roll-over option at maturity for a specified length of time. Using recently developed models of financial crises, the paper shows for which type of crisis UDROP is beneficial. Moral hazard of the borrower is one of the problems UDROP faces which can be addressed by appropriately designing the debt contract.
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