Sovereign Credit Risk, Banks' Government Support, and Bank Stock Returns around the World: Discussion of Correa, Lee, Sapriza, and Suarez
Reint E. Gropp
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 46 (s1),
s1
2014
Abstract
In the years leading up to the 2008–09 financial crisis, many banks around the world greatly expanded their balance sheets to take advantage of cheap and abundantly available funding. Access to international funding markets, in particular, made it possible for banks to reach a size that in some cases was a large multiple of their home countries’ gross domestic product (GDP). In Iceland, for example, assets of the banking system reached up to 900% of GDP in 2007. Similarly, by the end of 2008, assets in UK and Swiss banks exceeded 500% of their countries’ GDPs, respectively. Banks may also have grown rapidly because they may have wanted to reach too-big-to-fail status in their country, implying even lower funding cost (Penas and Unal 2004).
The depth and severity of the 2008–09 financial crisis and the subsequent debt crisis in Europe, however, have cast doubts on the ability of governments to bail out banks when they experience severe difficulties, in particular, in financially fragile environments and faced with large budget imbalances. This has resulted in as what some observers have dubbed a “doom loop”: the combination of weak public finances and weak banks results in a vicious cycle, in which the funding cost of banks increases, as the ability of governments to bail out banks is called into question, in turn increasing the funding cost of these banks and making the likelihood that the government will actually have to step in even higher, which in turn increases funding cost to the government and so forth.
Against this background, the paper by Correa et al. (2014) explores the link between sovereign rating changes and bank stock returns. They show large negative reactions of stock returns in response to sovereign ratings downgrades for banks that are expected to receive government support in case of failure. They find the strongest effects in developed economies, where the credibility of government bail outs is higher ex ante, while the effects are smaller in developing and emerging economies. In my view, the paper makes a number of important contributions to the extant literature.
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Financial Factors in Macroeconometric Models
Sebastian Giesen
Volkswirtschaft, Ökonomie,
2013
Abstract
The important role of credit has long been identified as a key factor for economic development (see e.g. Wicksell (1898), Keynes (1931), Fisher (1933) and Minsky (1957, 1964)). Even before the financial crisis most researchers and policy makers agreed that financial frictions play an important role for business cycles and that financial turmoils can result in severe economic downturns (see e.g. Mishkin (1978), Bernanke (1981, 1983), Diamond (1984), Calomiris (1993) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). However, in practice researchers and policy makers mostly used simplified models for forecasting and simulation purposes. They often neglected the impact of financial frictions and emphasized other non financial market frictions when analyzing business cycle fluctuations (prominent exceptions include Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)). This has been due to the fact that most economic downturns did not seem to be closely related to financial market failures (see Eichenbaum (2011)). The outbreak of the subprime crises ― which caused panic in financial markets and led to the default of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 ― then led to a reconsideration of such macroeconomic frameworks (see Caballero (2010) and Trichet (2011)). To address the economic debate from a new perspective, it is therefore necessary to integrate the relevant frictions which help to explain what we have experienced during recent years.
In this thesis, I analyze different ways to incorporate relevant frictions and financial variables in macroeconometric models. I discuss the potential consequences for standard statistical inference and macroeconomic policy. I cover three different aspects in this work. Each aspect presents an idea in a self-contained unit. The following paragraphs present more detail on the main topics covered.
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Smuggling Illegal Goods Across the US–Mexico Border: A Political-economy Perspective
A. Buehn, Stefan Eichler
Applied Economics Letters,
No. 12,
2012
Abstract
We analyse the impact that political business cycles and party preferences have on smuggling illegal goods across the US–Mexico border during the years 1980–2004. We find that smuggling is significantly reduced prior to Congressional elections – but only if the incumbent President is Republican.
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The Political Setting of Social Security Contributions in Europe in the Business Cycle
Toralf Pusch, Ingmar Kumpmann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2011
Abstract
Social security revenues are influenced by business cycle movements. In order to
support the working of automatic stabilizers it would be necessary to calculate social insurance contribution rates independently from the state of the business cycle. This paper investigates whether European countries set social contribution rates according to such a rule. By means of VAR estimations, country-specific effects can be analyzed – in contrast to earlier studies which used a panel design. As a result, some countries under investigation seem to vary their social contribution rates in a procyclical way.
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Macroeconomic Challenges in the Euro Area and the Acceding Countries
Katja Drechsel
Dissertation, Online-Publikation,
2010
Abstract
The conduct of effective economic policy faces a multiplicity of macroeconomic challenges, which requires a wide scope of theoretical and empirical analyses. With a focus on the European Union, this doctoral dissertation consists of two parts which make empirical and methodological contributions to the literature on forecasting real economic activity and on the analysis of business cycles in a boom-bust framework in the light of the EMU enlargement. In the first part, we tackle the problem of publication lags and analyse the role of the information flow in computing short-term forecasts up to one quarter ahead for the euro area GDP and its main components. A huge dataset of monthly indicators is used to estimate simple bridge equations. The individual forecasts are then pooled, using different weighting schemes. To take into consideration the release calendar of each indicator, six forecasts are compiled successively during the quarter. We find that the sequencing of information determines the weight allocated to each block of indicators, especially when the first month of hard data becomes available. This conclusion extends the findings of the recent literature. Moreover, when combining forecasts, two weighting schemes are found to outperform the equal weighting scheme in almost all cases. In the second part, we focus on the potential accession of the new EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe to the euro area. In contrast to the discussion of Optimum Currency Areas, we follow a non-standard approach for the discussion on abandonment of national currencies the boom-bust theory. We analyse whether evidence for boom-bust cycles is given and draw conclusions whether these countries should join the EMU in the near future. Using a broad range of data sets and empirical methods we document credit market imperfections, comprising asymmetric financing opportunities across sectors, excess foreign currency liabilities and contract enforceability problems both at macro and micro level. Furthermore, we depart from the standard analysis of comovements of business cycles among countries and rather consider long-run and short-run comovements across sectors. While the results differ across countries, we find evidence for credit market imperfections in Central and Eastern Europe and different sectoral reactions to shocks. This gives favour for the assessment of the potential euro accession using this supplementary, non-standard approach.
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Bank Credit Standards, Demand, Pro-cyclicality and the Business Cycle: A Comment
Á. Maddaloni, J. L. Peydró Alcalde, J. Suárez, Reint E. Gropp
Moneda y crédito,
No. 230,
2010
Abstract
We analyze the determinants fo standards and demand for loans to firms and house-holds over the last business cycle using the comprehensive and confidential Bank Lending Survery from the Euro area. There is significant variation of standards and demand over the cycle. Standards for business loans vary more during the business cycle than the lending standards for households, whereas credit demand from households varies more than demand from firms. Lending standards vary mainly due to charges in perception of borrower risk, bank balance sheet positions and competitive pressures. In particular, we find that higher GDP growth softens lending standards for all loans, i. e. lending standards are pro-cyclical. However, we also find pro-cyclicality in credit demand.
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Estimation Uncertainty in Credit Risk Assessment: Comparison of Credit Risk Using Bootstrapping and an Asymptotic Approach
Henry Dannenberg
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2009
Abstract
For credit risk assessment, probability of default and correlation have to be estimated simultaneously. However, these estimates are uncertain. To assess this uncertainty the literature has discussed the use of asymptotic confidence regions. This kind of region though needs a long credit history for exact assessment. An alternative method to generate a confidence region for a short credit history is bootstrapping. Hence, it could be more appropriate to assess estimation uncertainty with bootstrapping than with asymptotic methods if only a short credit history is available. Based on a simulation study, it is analyzed how many periods should be available for assessing credit risk – taking account of estimation uncertainty – if bootstrapping and a Wald confidence region shall achieve similar results. This article shows that more than 100 cycles have to be available for similar results.
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Business Cycle Forecast: On the Edge?
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 9,
2008
Abstract
During the summer of 2008, the world economy was further slowing. The financial crisis affects the real economy by tightened credit standards in the US and in the European Union, and housing markets are now in a severe crisis not only in the US, but also in some countries in Western Europe. Finally, consumption of households is affected by stagnating real disposable incomes due to the energy price hike. The slowing world economy, however, has caused the oil price to fall since July, and most emerging markets economies are, up to now, quite resilient.
In Germany, sentiment has deteriorated significantly. Production appears to be about stagnating in the summer. During winter, the devaluation of the euro and a beginning pick up of demand since July will help producers of tradable goods in Germany. Domestic demand will be supported by lower energy prices and healthily growing wage incomes. All in all, gross domestic product (gdp) (adjusted for the number of working days) will increase by 1,8% this year and by 0,8% in 2009.
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Business Cycle Forecast, Summer 2008: Price Hikes and Financial Crisis Cloud Growth Prospects
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 7,
2008
Abstract
In the summer of 2008 the turmoil on financial markets and that on the markets for energy dim the prospects for the world economy. The acceleration of the oil price hike during the first half of the year has led to an increase in expected inflation and to higher interest rates on capital markets, while stock prices are going down. At the same time, the financial crisis is far from over, and banks in the US and in Western Europe continue in their efforts to consolidate their balance sheets. Thus, the expansion of credit supply will be scarcer in the next quarters. All this means that demand will slow in the developed economies during the next quarters. However, the massive fiscal stimulus will help the US economy to stabilize, and the world economy still benefits from the high growth dynamics in the emerging markets economies. All in all, the developed economies will not reach their potential growth rate before the second half of 2009. In Germany, the upswing comes to a temporary halt during summer of this year. Slowing foreign demand and the oil price hike induce firms to postpone investments, and private consumption, the soft spot of the upswing in Germany, is still sluggish due to high inflation rates that impair purchasing power. For the end of 2008, chances are good that growth in Germany accelerates again, because German exporters are still penetrating emerging markets as competitiveness does not diminish. All in all, the German economy will grow by 2.3% in 2008 (mainly due to the very high dynamics at the beginning of the year) and by 1.3% in 2009. A main risk of this forecast is that monetary policy fails in easing the high inflationary pressures. As to fiscal policy, efforts to reach sustainable public finances should not weaken.
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Business cycle forecast 2008: German upswing takes a break
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2008
Abstract
Economic growth in the industrial countries will be much more muted in 2008 than in the past year. One cause is the prolonged oil price hike during 2007. The second and more important cause is the intensification of tensions on world financial markets. Due to problems in the financial sector, credit expansion will slow next year in the euro area as well as in the US. This will dampen demand in the real economy. A significant downswing in the industrial countries, however, is not the most likely scenario: in the US, expansive economic policy and a weak dollar that gives production in the US a competitive edge will prevent the economy from sliding into recession. In the euro area, high profitability of firms and structural improvements in the working of labour markets will help the economy cope with the stronger euro and with higher costs of external financing due to the turmoil in the financial sector. In Germany, the upswing has still not reached the demand of private households. The main reason is that real wages were stagnating in 2007 and will not rise by much in 2008, since inflation has accelerated considerably at the end of last year. In addition, weaker dynamics of external demand will dampen export growth. This and the end of tax incentives for investment at the end of 2007 will dampen investment activity. All in all, the economy will slow down in the first half of 2008. However, chances are good that the upswing will only have taken a break: when the dampening external shocks have ceased, the driving powers of the upswing will prevail; dynamic employment growth is a reflection of the strong confidence of firms. A major risk for employment and for the German economy in general is, however, the possibility that the policy concerning the labour markets changes course; bad omens are the recent the introduction of minimum wages for postal services and the announced extension of unemployment benefits for persons older than 50.
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