Deleveraging and Consumer Credit Supply in the Wake of the 2008–09 Financial Crisis
Reint E. Gropp, J. Krainer, E. Laderman
International Journal of Central Banking,
No. 3,
2019
Abstract
We explore the sources of the decline in household nonmortgage debt following the collapse of the housing market in 2006. First, we use data from the Federal Reserve Board's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey to document that, post-2006, banks tightened consumer lending standards more in counties that experienced a more pronounced house price decline (the pre-2006 "boom" counties). We then use the idea that renters did not experience an adverse wealth or collateral shock when the housing market collapsed to identify a general consumer credit supply shock. Our evidence suggests that a tightening of the supply of non-mortgage credit that was independent of the direct effects of lower housing collateral values played an important role in households' non-mortgage debt reduction. Renters decreased their non-mortgage debt more in boom counties than in non-boom counties, but homeowners did not. We argue that this wedge between renters and homeowners can only have arisen from a general tightening of banks' consumer lending stance. Using an IV approach, we trace this effect back to a reduction in bank capital of banks in boom counties.
Read article
Gute Absicht – böses Ende: Die US-Wohnungspolitik als Brandbeschleuniger der Weltfinanzkrise
Reint E. Gropp, Vahid Saadi
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2019
Abstract
Der Boom auf dem US-amerikanischen Eigenheimmarkt in den frühen 2000er Jahren führte zur schwersten Finanzkrise der vergangenen Jahrzehnte. Wissenschaftler haben unterschiedliche Faktoren dokumentiert, die zum rasanten Anstieg der Immobilienpreise beigetragen haben. Kaum beleuchtet wurde bisher die Rolle der US-Wohnungspolitik, insbesondere die Förderung des privaten Wohneigentums durch den Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Geschichte dieses Bundesgesetzes und seine Auswirkungen auf den Markt für Hypotheken und Wohneigentum seit den späten 1990er Jahren. Infolge des CRA wurden seit 1998 deutlich mehr Hypotheken aufgenommen. Der Anstieg der Immobilienpreise in der Boomphase beruhte zum Teil auf diesem politisch induzierten Anstieg der Hypothekenvergabe. Der CRA ermöglichte es auch Kreditnehmern mit geringerer Kreditwürdigkeit, eine Hypothek aufzunehmen – in der Folge kam es zu vermehrten Zahlungsausfällen. Der CRA hat also zum Boom-Bust-Zyklus auf dem amerikanischen Immobilienmarkt beigetragen. Er kann als Beispiel einer wohlmeinenden Politik gelten, die unbeabsichtigt wohlfahrtsmindernde Wirkungen zeitigt.
Read article
The Income Elasticity of Mortgage Loan Demand
Manthos D. Delis, Iftekhar Hasan, Chris Tsoumas
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments,
Special Issue: 2016 Portsmouth – Fordham Conferenc
2019
Abstract
One explanation for the emergence of the housing market bubble and the subprime crisis is that increases in individuals’ income led to higher increases in the amount of mortgage loans demanded, especially for the middle class. This hypothesis translates to an increase in the income elasticity of mortgage loan demand before 2007. Using applicant‐level data, we test this hypothesis and find that the income elasticity of mortgage loan demand in fact declines in the years before 2007, especially for the mid‐ and lower‐middle income groups. Our finding implies that increases in house prices were not matched by increases in loan applicants’ income.
Read article
Market Power and Risk: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Market
Carola Müller, Felix Noth
Economics Letters,
2018
Abstract
We use mortgage loan application data of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) to shed light on the role of banks’ market power on their presumably insufficient risk screening activities in the U.S. mortgage market in the pre-crisis era. We find that banks with higher market power protect their charter value. The effect is stronger for banks that have more information about local markets.
Read article
Mortgage Companies and Regulatory Arbitrage
Yuliya Demyanyk, Elena Loutskina
Journal of Financial Economics,
No. 2,
2016
Abstract
Mortgage companies (MCs) do not fall under the strict regulatory regime of depository institutions. We empirically show that this gap resulted in regulatory arbitrage and allowed bank holding companies (BHCs) to circumvent consumer compliance regulations, mitigate capital requirements, and reduce exposure to loan-related losses. Compared to bank subsidiaries, MC subsidiaries of BHCs originated riskier mortgages to borrowers with lower credit scores, lower incomes, higher loan-to-income ratios, and higher default rates. Our results imply that precrisis regulations had the capacity to mitigate the deterioration of lending standards if consistently applied and enforced for all types of intermediaries.
Read article
Banks’ Financial Distress, Lending Supply and Consumption Expenditure
H. Evren Damar, Reint E. Gropp, Adi Mordel
Abstract
We employ a unique identification strategy linking survey data on household consumption expenditure to bank-level data to estimate the effects of bank financial distress on consumer credit and consumption expenditures. We show that households whose banks were more exposed to funding shocks report lower levels of non-mortgage liabilities. This, however, does not result in lower levels of consumption. Households compensate by drawing down liquid assets to smooth consumption in the face of a temporary adverse lending supply shock. The results contrast with recent evidence on the real effects of finance on firms’ investment and employment decisions.
Read article
Financial Factors in Macroeconometric Models
Sebastian Giesen
Volkswirtschaft, Ökonomie,
2013
Abstract
The important role of credit has long been identified as a key factor for economic development (see e.g. Wicksell (1898), Keynes (1931), Fisher (1933) and Minsky (1957, 1964)). Even before the financial crisis most researchers and policy makers agreed that financial frictions play an important role for business cycles and that financial turmoils can result in severe economic downturns (see e.g. Mishkin (1978), Bernanke (1981, 1983), Diamond (1984), Calomiris (1993) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). However, in practice researchers and policy makers mostly used simplified models for forecasting and simulation purposes. They often neglected the impact of financial frictions and emphasized other non financial market frictions when analyzing business cycle fluctuations (prominent exceptions include Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)). This has been due to the fact that most economic downturns did not seem to be closely related to financial market failures (see Eichenbaum (2011)). The outbreak of the subprime crises ― which caused panic in financial markets and led to the default of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 ― then led to a reconsideration of such macroeconomic frameworks (see Caballero (2010) and Trichet (2011)). To address the economic debate from a new perspective, it is therefore necessary to integrate the relevant frictions which help to explain what we have experienced during recent years.
In this thesis, I analyze different ways to incorporate relevant frictions and financial variables in macroeconometric models. I discuss the potential consequences for standard statistical inference and macroeconomic policy. I cover three different aspects in this work. Each aspect presents an idea in a self-contained unit. The following paragraphs present more detail on the main topics covered.
Read article
Does the ECB Act as a Lender of Last Resort During the Subprime Lending Crisis?: Evidence from Monetary Policy Reaction Models
Stefan Eichler, K. Hielscher
Journal of International Money and Finance,
No. 3,
2012
Abstract
We investigate whether the ECB aligns its monetary policy with financial crisis risk in EMU member countries. We find that since the outbreak of the subprime crisis the ECB has significantly increased net lending and reduced interest rates when banking and sovereign debt crisis risk in vulnerable EMU countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) increases, while no significant effect is identified for the pre-crisis period and relatively tranquil EMU countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands). These findings suggest that the ECB acts as a Lender of Last Resort for vulnerable EMU countries.
Read article
The Impact of Banking and Sovereign Debt Crisis Risk in the Eurozone on the Euro/US Dollar Exchange Rate
Stefan Eichler
Applied Financial Economics,
No. 15,
2012
Abstract
I study the impact of financial crisis risk in the eurozone on the euro/US dollar exchange rate. Using daily data from 3 July 2006 to 30 September 2010, I find that the euro depreciates against the US dollar when banking or sovereign debt crisis risk increases in the eurozone. While the external value of the euro is more sensitive to changes in sovereign debt crisis risk in vulnerable member countries than in stable member countries, the impact of banking crisis risk is similar for both country blocs. Moreover, rising default risk of medium and large eurozone banks leads to a depreciation of the euro while small banks’ default risk has no significant impact, showing the relevance of systemically important banks with regards to the exchange rate.
Read article