Sharing Competences: The Impact of Local Institutional Settings on Voter Turnout
Claus Michelsen, Peter Bönisch, Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
Abstract
Institutions are common predictors of voter turnout. Most research in this field focuses on cross-country comparisons of voting systems, like the impact of compulsory voting or registration systems. Fewer efforts have been devoted to understand the role of local institutions and their impact on political participation. Especially the impact of divided competences in relation to public good provision and its impact on voter turnout has been widely ignored. In the present paper, we analyze the effects of different institutional settings for inter-municipal cooperation on voter turnout. We use data from local elections in Germany, held in 2003 and 2004. Overall, we analyze aggregate voter turnout of 1661 municipalities and find strong evidence for our hypothesis that local institutional settings are influential in this context. Further, our results indicate that the better competences correspond to the spatial dimension of local public goods, the higher should be the voter turnout.
Read article
Monopolistic Competition and Costs in the Health Care Sector
Ingmar Kumpmann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 17,
2009
Abstract
Competition among health insurers is widely considered to be a means of enhancing efficiency and containing costs in the health care system. In this paper, it is argued that this could be unsuccessful since health care providers hold a strong position on the market for health care services. Physicians exert a type of monopolistic power which can be described by Chamberlin’s model of monopolistic competition. If many health insurers compete with one another, they cannot counterbalance the strong bargaining position of the physicians. Thus, health care expenditure is higher, financing either extra profits for physicians or a higher number of them. In addition, health insurers do not have an incentive to contract selectively with health care providers as long as there are no price differences between physicians. A monopolistic health insurer is able to counterbalance the strong position of physicians and to achieve lower costs.
Read article
Are Public Debts of the German Federal States Influencing their Financial Scope?
Sabine Freye
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 12,
2009
Abstract
The German Federal States have little impact on their budget. Both, revenues and ex-penditures, are basically determined by federal and European law. For a long time, this situation has been causing increasing debts. Today, public debts are again a top issue. The planned federal “debt brake” includes a gradual reduction and an interdiction of structural debts as from 2020. In a short perspective, this means an additional financial limitation to the public budgets. With regard to the described situation, the main question of this paper is: Do the German states actually have financial scope to realize the implementation of the planned “debt brake”? The analyses show that the financial scope for reducing their structural debts is particularly small in the five Federal States benefitting from additional transfers as from 2010. The highest budget restrictions do show the city states Berlin and Bremen.
Read article