Bank Market Discipline and Indicators of Banking System Risk: The European Evidence
Reint E. Gropp
Market Discipline Across Countries and Industries,
2004
Abstract
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Why do banks hold capital in excess of regulatory requirements? A functional approach
Diemo Dietrich, Uwe Vollmer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 192,
2004
Abstract
This paper provides an explanation for the observation that banks hold on average a capital ratio in excess of regulatory requirements. We use a functional approach to banking based on Diamond and Rajan (2001) to demonstrate that banks can use capital ratios as a strategic tool for renegotiating loans with borrowers. As capital ratios affect the ability of banks to collect loans in a nonmonotonic way, a bank may be forced to exceed capital requirements. Moreover, high capital ratios may also constrain the amount a banker can borrow from investors. Consequently, the size of the banking sector may shrink.
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Measurement of Contagion in Banks' Equity Prices
Reint E. Gropp, G. Moerman
Journal of International Money and Finance,
No. 3,
2004
Abstract
This paper uses the co-incidence of extreme shocks to banks’ risk to examine within-country and across country contagion among large EU banks. Banks’ risk is measured by the first difference of weekly distances to default and abnormal returns. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the paper examines whether the observed frequency of large shocks experienced by two or more banks simultaneously is consistent with the assumption of a multivariate normal or a student t distribution. Further, the paper proposes a simple metric, which is used to identify contagion from one bank to another and identify “systemically important” banks in the EU.
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Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
Journal of Industrial Economics,
No. 1,
2004
Abstract
We show that competing banks relax overall competition by inducing borrowers to switch lenders. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclosing borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to poach their first-period market. Disclosure of borrower information increases the rival's second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market.
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On the stability of the banking systems in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary
Werner Gnoth
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2003
Abstract
The EU countries are interested in stable banking systems of candidate countries, because any kind of instability of the financial sector could have serious consequences to the financial and exchange rate system of the whole Community. In the article the state of stability of the banking systems is analyzed, based on several important indicators. At present the banking systems of candidate countries still look fairly stable: weak competition among the banks, a high inflation rate and a low intermediation rate in terms of total assets / GDP have enabled banks still to reach a sufficient net interest yield. So they have been able to stand a relatively high share of non- performing loans and also a relatively high amount of foreign exchange indebtedness. In order to ensure a problem-free integration of the banking systems of the candidate countries in the EU they must still meet several conditions. They need to widen and refine the supply of services and to lower the share of non-performing loans, mainly in the Czech Republic and Poland. The foreign exchange indebtedness of the banking and enterprises domains in Poland and Hungary needs to be restricted. Successful integration in EU competition requires in general increase in the banks own capital.
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Does Transparency of Central Banks Produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 178,
2003
Abstract
A recent strand of literature (see Morris and Shin 2001) shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information between traders. It is known that this approach works only if there is not too precise common knowledge in the market. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We present a model in which more transparency of the central bank means better private information, because each trader utilizes public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
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Markets for Bank Subordinated Debt and Equity in Basel Committee Member Countries
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala
BCBS Working Papers, No. 12,
No. 12,
2003
Abstract
This Basel Committee working paper is a study of the markets for banks' securities in ten countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States). It aims at contributing to the assessment of the potential effectiveness of direct and indirect market discipline. This is achieved through collecting a rich set of data on the detailed characteristics of the instruments used by banks to tap capital markets, the frequency and size of their issuance activity, and the share of issuing banks in national banking systems. Further, information is collected on the amounts of debt and equity outstanding and about trading volumes and liquidity. Developments over the period from 1990-2001 are evaluated.
The paper focuses on subordinated bonds among banks' debt instruments, because they are the prime class of uninsured instruments suited to generate market discipline and have been proposed by some observers as a mandatory requirement for banks.
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Cross-border Mergers in European Banking and Bank Efficiency: Discussion
Reint E. Gropp
Foreign Direct Investment in the Real and Financial Sector of Industrial Countries,
2003
Abstract
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Recent Developments and Risks in the Euro Area Banking Sector
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala
ECB Monthly Bulletin,
2002
Abstract
This article provides an overview of euro area banks’ exposure to risk and examines the effects of the cyclical downturn in 2001. It describes the extent to which euro area banks’ risk profile has changed as a result of recent structural developments, such as an increase in investment banking, mergers, securitisation and more sophisticated risk management techniques. The article stresses that the environment in which banks operated in 2001 was fairly complex due to the relatively weak economic performance of all major economies as well as the events of 11 September in the United States. It evaluates the effects of these adverse circumstances on banks’ stability and overall performance. The article provides bank balance sheet information as well as financial market prices, arguing that the latter may be useful when assessing the soundness of the banking sector in a forward-looking manner. It concludes with a review of the overall stability of euro area banks, pointing to robustness in the face of the adverse developments in 2001 and the somewhat improved forward-looking indicators of banks’ financial strength in early 2002.
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Bank-Firm Relationships and International Banking Markets
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
International Journal of the Economics of Business,
No. 3,
2002
Abstract
This paper reviews how long-term relationships between firms and banks shape the structure and integration of banking markets worldwide. Bank relationships arise to span informational asymmetries that are endemic in financial markets. Firm-bank relationships not only entail specific benefits and costs for both the engaged firms and banks, but also directly affect the structure of banking markets. In particular, the sunk cost of screening and monitoring activities and the 'informational capital' collected by the incumbent banks may act as a barrier to entry. The intensity of the existing firm-bank relationships will determine the height of this barrier and shape the structure of international banking markets. For example, in Scandinavia where firms maintain few and strong relationships, foreign banks may only be able to enter successfully through mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, Southern European firms maintain many bank relationships. Therefore, banks may consider entering Southern European banking markets through direct investment.
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