Dynamic Order Submission Strategies with Competition between a Dealer Market and a Crossing Network
Hans Degryse, Mark Van Achter, Gunther Wuyts
Journal of Financial Economics,
No. 3,
2009
Abstract
We analyze a dynamic microstructure model in which a dealer market (DM) and a crossing network (CN) interact for three informational settings. A key result is that coexistence of trading systems generates systematic patterns in order flow, which depend on the degree of transparency. Further, we study overall welfare, measured by the gains from trade of all agents, and compare it with the maximum overall welfare. The discrepancy between both measures is attributable to two inefficiencies. Due to these inefficiencies, introducing a CN next to a DM, as well as increasing the transparency level, not necessarily produces greater overall welfare.
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Competition between Financial Markets in Europe: What can be Expected from MiFID?
Hans Degryse
Financial Markets and Portfolio Management,
No. 1,
2009
Abstract
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) could be the foundation of new trading platforms in Europe. This contribution employs insights from the theoretical and empirical literature to highlight some of the possible implications of MiFID. In particular, we argue that more competition will lead to more liquid markets, reflected in lower bid–ask spreads and greater depth. It will also lead to innovation in incumbent markets and stimulate the design of new trading platforms. MiFID has already introduced more competition, as evidenced by the startup of Instinet Chi-X, the announcement of new initiatives, including Project Turquoise and BATS, and the reactions of incumbent exchanges.
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Globalisierung von Forschung und Entwicklung – der Technologiestandort Deutschland
Jutta Günther, Björn Jindra, Johannes Stephan
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2009
Abstract
Am 11. November 2008 fand am Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) zum zweiten Mal ein innovationspolitischer Workshop statt, diesmal zum Thema „Globalisierung von Forschung und Entwicklung – der Technologiestandort Deutschland“. Die Veranstaltung bildete zugleich einen Bestandteil des vom IWH koordinierten EU-Projekts U-Know („Understanding the Relationship between Knowledge and Competitiveness in the Enlarging EU“), das sich mit einer Reihe innovationsökonomischer Forschungsthemen beschäftigt. Der Workshop hatte zum Ziel, das Thema Globalisierung von Forschung und Entwicklung aus wissenschaftlicher, unternehmerischer und innovationspolitischer Perspektive zu beleuchten und die Position Deutschlands im internationalen Technologiewettbewerb zu diskutieren.
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Contestability, Technology and Banking
S. Corvoisier, Reint E. Gropp
ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 09-007,
No. 7,
2009
Abstract
We estimate the effect of internet penetration on retail bank margins in the euro area. Based on an adapted Baumol [1982] type contestability model, we argue that the internet has reduced sunk costs and therefore increased contestability in retail banking. We test this conjecture by estimating the model using semi-aggregated data for a panel of euro area countries. We utilise time series and cross-sectional variation in internet penetration. We find support for an increase in contestability in deposit markets, and no effect for loan markets. The paper suggests that for time and savings deposits, the presence of brick and mortar bank branches may no longer be of first order importance for the assessment of the competitive structure of the market.
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Race to the Market: Can Standards Survive the Acceleration of Innovation and Product Life Cycles?
Ulrich Blum
Spatial Dispersed Production and Network Governance, Papers Presented at the 11th Uddevalla Symposium, 15 – 17. May 2008, Kyoto, Research Report 2008,
2008
Abstract
Plagiarism of emerging market countries has for a considerable time been seen as the main challenge to the western approach of codifying and securing intellectual property rights (IPRs). This neglects the fact that historically all countries which tried to converge to the level of successful economies copied technology. The discussion shadows our view that the more imminent question is whether the steady increase in competition intensity which shortens product life cycles and puts pressure on the invention and innovation system, provides enough time to patent and to standardize. As patent activity not only provides incentives for sinking costs into R&D but is also a first step in the dissemination of technologies, and as standards, especially formal standards, generate level playing fields in broad and reliable markets, this may be critical in the long run. Furthermore, the migration of technologies as a result of a steady reorganization of the spatial division of labor may lead to the adverse situation that countries harboring technologies do not have appropriate institutions for knowledge codification.
Exogenous factors that – at least in the short run – cannot be influenced by the standardization bodies are the level of cooperation among interested parties (and mutual trust and institutional linkage), the competitiveness of the technology, the ability to generate externalities by knowledge codification, and the productivity of the technologies. The most important single success factor that standardization bodies can influence is the speed with which a committee proceeds to timely publish formal standards. With reference to a game-theoretical model and based on data for 1997 and 2007 on published formal standards, we show that until now, standardization bodies seem to have successfully coped with the situation.
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The Identification of Regional Industrial Clusters Using Qualitative Input-Output Analysis
Mirko Titze, Matthias Brachert, Alexander Kubis
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 13,
2008
Abstract
The ‘cluster theory’ has become one of the main concepts promoting regional competitiveness, innovation, and growth. As most studies focus on measures of concentration of one industrial branch in order to identify regional clusters, the appropriate analysis of specific vertical relations within a value-adding chain is developing in this discussion. This paper tries to identify interrelated sectors via national input-output tables with the help of Minimal Flow Analysis by Schnabl (1994). The regionalization of these national industry templates is carried out with the allocation of branch-specific production values on regional employment. As a result, the paper shows concentrations of vertical clusters in only 27 of 439 German NUTS-3 regions.
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Grenzen des Wettbewerbs im Gesundheitswesen
Ingmar Kumpmann
Sozialer Fortschritt,
2008
Abstract
Many health economists demand more competition in the health-care system. They focus on the competition between the individual health-insurance funds for those who want such insurance as well as on the competition between health-care providers for contracts with the health-insurance funds. However, they neglect the competition between health-care providers for patients; such competition is crucial for medical quality. This latter area of competition is in conflict with the two former ones. The empirical evidence on the effects of competition on cost and quality are also ambiguous. Thus, the mere appeal for „more competition“ does not do justice to the highly complex nature of the health-care system.
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Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets: A Correction
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse, Jorge Fernández-Ruiz, Miguel García-Cestona
Journal of Industrial Economics,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
In a recent article in this journal, Bouckaert and Degryse [2004] (denoted B&D) present a model in which banks strategically commit to disclosing borrower information. In this note, we point out an error in B&D and show that, although banks' information disclosure may indeed arise in equilibrium, it only does so if adverse selection is not too harsh.
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Globalisation Forces an Acceleration of Standardization Processes
Ulrich Blum, Henry Dannenberg
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2008
Abstract
The increase in the intensity of competition in recent years, especially in markets for industrial products, has increased the pressure for businesses to innovate. This finds expression in an accelerated introduction of new products and processes, leading to a shortening of product life cycles. Equally, the pressure to innovate also increased the pressure on research and development processes of businesses.
For this reason, the patent system and the standardization system get under pressure, because these systems for codifying and saving intellectual property rights need time for necessary inspections and to reach a consensus on different proposed specifications. This article focuses on the standardization system. Under the condition of temporal pressure, there are three possibilities for standardization: abstaining from standardization, switch to non consensus-based industrial standardization or accelerate the standardization process. This article examines if standardization organisations have successfully accelerated their processes to survive in the sandwich position between shortened product cycles and accelerated market introduction of products. It turns out that the acceleration has succeeded – through a series of institutional reforms, such as a prioritization of international before the national standards by the beginning and middle of the last decade agreements.
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On the Rationale of Leniency Programs: a Game-Theoretical Analysis
Ulrich Blum, Nicole Steinat, Michael A. Veltins
European Journal of Law and Economics,
2008
Abstract
In order to enhance the enforcement of Antitrust Law, leniency policies were introduced in nearly all industrialized countries. These programs aim at deterring and eliminating cartels. In this paper we analyze the rationale of the current European and German leniency regulation. We challenge the contemporary view that the standard leniency privilege is incentive-compatible with respect to its aim to enhance competition. Instead, we argue for it to be used as a preemptive strike against competitors under circumstances where cartels become unstable. This implies a tightening of markets in subsequent periods and, thus, a potential reduction in competition intensity. Given strategic reasoning by agents, the principal witness may assure an economically privileged position in the future. This consequence might not be intended by the bonus regulations. Nevertheless if the leniency policies lead to more competition in the market the results should be welcomed by the national cartel offices. We give anecdotal evidence of the German cement case and base our arguments on a game-theoretical model.
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