Do Larger Firms Exert More Market Power? Markups and Markdowns along the Size Distribution
Matthias Mertens, Bernardo Mottironi
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 1,
2023
Abstract
Several models posit a positive cross-sectional correlation between markups and firm size, which characterizes misallocation, factor shares, and gains from trade. Accounting for labor market power in markup estimation, we find instead that larger firms have lower product markups but higher wage markdowns. The negative markup-size correlation turns positive when conditioning on markdowns, suggesting interactions between product and labor market power. Our findings are robust to common criticism (e.g., price bias, non-neutral technology) and hold across 19 European countries. We discuss possible mechanisms and resulting implications, highlighting the importance of studying input and output market power in a unified framework.
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20.12.2022 • 31/2022
No deep recession despite energy crisis and rise in interest rates
High energy prices and deteriorating financial conditions are weighing on the German economy. However, the period of weakness over the winter is likely to be moderate, partly because the energy price brakes are supporting private incomes. The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) forecasts that due to the recovery from the pandemic in the first three quarters, gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have increased by 1.8% in 2022. Due to high energy prices, however, GDP will slightly decline in the winter months and stagnate on average in 2023. Inflation will fall from 7.8% in 2022 to 6.5% in 2023.
Oliver Holtemöller
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European Real Estate Markets During the Pandemic: Is COVID-19 also a Case for House Price Concerns?
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
IWH Policy Notes,
No. 3,
2022
Abstract
We use a new database on European real estate purchase and rental prices – the IWH European Real Estate Index – to document the relationship between staggered COVID-19 dynamics and real estate prices in 14 EU countries between January 2020 and December 2021. For most countries, we find no statistically significant response of monthly purchase and rental prices due to an increase of regional COVID-19 cases. For the UK we find that more COVID-19 cases depressed both purchase and rental prices significantly, but the economic magnitude of effects was mild during this sample period. In contrast, rents in Italy increased in response to hiking COVID-19 cases, illustrating the importance to consider heterogeneous crisis patterns across the EU when designing policies. Overall, COVID-19 dynamics did not affect real estate values significantly during the pandemic, thereby mitigating potential financial stability concerns via a mortgage lending channel at the time.
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Wirtschaftliche Folgen des Gaspreisanstiegs für die deutsche Industrie
Matthias Mertens, Steffen Müller
IWH Policy Notes,
No. 2,
2022
Abstract
Diese Analyse nutzt amtliche Mikrodaten für die deutsche Industrie. Auf Ebene fein untergliederter Produkte werden der Verbrauch an Erdgas und der heimische Produktumsatz mit Daten der Vereinten Nationen zu Exporten und Importen verknüpft. Es zeigt sich, dass die 300 Produkte mit dem höchsten Gasverbrauch innerhalb der deutschen Industrie für knapp 90% des Gasverbrauchs der Industrie stehen, dass bei Gaspreiserhöhungen um das Vierfache gegenüber den Jahren 2015-2017 die Kosten für das durchschnittliche Produkt um 12 Cent pro Euro Umsatz steigen und dass ein Produktionsstopp der Produkte, die sowohl überdurchschnittlich gasintensiv sind als auch überdurchschnittlich leicht durch Importe substituiert werden können, 26% des Gesamtgasverbrauchs der Industrie einspart, aber weniger als 3% des Umsatzes der Industrie kostet.
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Carbon Transition Risk and Corporate Loan Securitization
Isabella Müller, Huyen Nguyen, Trang Nguyen
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 22,
2022
Abstract
We examine how banks manage carbon transition risk by selling loans given to polluting borrowers to less regulated shadow banks in securitization markets. Exploiting the election of Donald Trump as an exogenous shock that reduces carbon risk, we find that banks’ securitization decisions are sensitive to borrowers’ carbon footprints. Banks are more likely to securitize brown loans when carbon risk is high but swiftly change to keep these loans on their balance sheets when carbon risk is reduced after Trump’s election. Importantly, securitization enables banks to offer lower interest rates to polluting borrowers but does not affect the supply of green loans. Our findings are more pronounced among domestic banks and banks that do not display green lending preferences. We discuss how securitization can weaken the effectiveness of bank climate policies through reducing banks’ incentives to price carbon risk.
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Wirtschaftliche Folgen des Gaspreisanstiegs für die deutsche Industrie
Matthias Mertens, Steffen Müller
Sachverständigenrat Wirtschaft,
No. 4,
2022
Abstract
Diese Analyse nutzt amtliche Mikrodaten für die deutsche Industrie. Auf Ebene fein untergliederter Produkte werden der Verbrauch an Erdgas und der heimische Produktumsatz mit Daten der Vereinten Nationen zu Exporten und Importen verknüpft. Es zeigt sich, dass die 300 Produkte mit dem höchsten Gasverbrauch innerhalb der deutschen Industrie für knapp 90% des Gasverbrauchs der Industrie stehen, dass bei Gaspreiserhöhungen um das Vierfache gegenüber den Jahren 2015-2017 die Kosten für das durchschnittliche Produkt um 12 Cent pro Euro Umsatz steigen und dass ein Produktionsstopp der Produkte, die sowohl überdurchschnittlich gasintensiv sind als auch überdurchschnittlich leicht durch Importe substituiert werden können, 26% des Gesamtgasverbrauchs der Industrie einspart, aber weniger als 3% des Umsatzes der Industrie kostet.
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29.09.2022 • 24/2022
The East German economy expanded strongly in the first half of 2022, but falls into recession in the second half of the year ‒ Implications of the Joint Economic Forecast Autumn 2022 and of Länder data from recent publications of the Statistical Office
The energy crisis is pushing the German economy into recession. This also affects the economy in East Germany. According to the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), East German production will expand at a slightly stronger rate of 1.5% than in Germany as a whole. For the coming year, the decline in East Germany is expected to be less pronounced than in the west at 0.1% (Germany: ‒0.4%). For 2024, the economists forecast a growth of 1.7% (Germany: 1.9%).
Oliver Holtemöller
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08.09.2022 • 22/2022
Energy crisis in Germany
Dwindling gas supplies from Russia and soaring prices for gas and electricity are leading to massive real income losses and a recession in Europe and Germany. The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) forecasts that German gross domestic product (GDP) will increase by 1.1% in 2022 and decrease by 1.4% in 2023. Consumer prices are expected to rise by 7.9% in 2022 and 9.5% in 2023.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Identifying Rent-sharing Using Firms‘ Energy Input Mix
Matthias Mertens, Steffen Müller, Georg Neuschäffer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 19,
2022
Abstract
We present causal evidence on the rent-sharing elasticity of German manufacturing firms. We develop a new firm-level Bartik instrument for firm rents that combines the firms‘ predetermined energy input mix with national energy carrier price changes. Reduced-form evidence shows that higher energy prices depress wages. Instrumental variable estimation yields a rent-sharing elasticity of approximately 0.20. Rent-sharing induced by energy price variation is asymmetric and driven by energy price increases, implying that workers do not benefit from energy price reductions but are harmed by price increases. The rent-sharing elasticity is substantially larger in small (0.26) than in large (0.17) firms.
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17.08.2022 • 19/2022
Labour mobility is part of structural change
The coal phase-out will also change the affected regions in that part of the workforce will migrate. Politicians should take this process into account in structural policy, because it cannot be completely prevented. A study published by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) illustrates this with a historical example.
Oliver Holtemöller
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