The Impact of Institutions on the Employment Performance in European Labour Markets
Herbert S. Buscher, Christian Dreger, Raúl Ramos, Jordi Surinach
Discussion Paper No. 1732,
2005
Abstract
The paper investigates the role of institutions for labor market performance across European countries. As participation rates have been rather stable over the past, the unemployment problem is mainly caused by shortages in labor demand. Labor demand is expressed by its structural parameters, such as the elasticities of employment to output and factor prices. Institutional variables include employment protection legislation, the structure of wage bargaining, measures describing the tax and transfer system and active labor market policies. As cointegration between employment, output and factor prices is detected, labor demand equations are fitted in levels by efficient estimation techniques. Then, labor demand elasticities are explained by institutions using panel fixed effects regressions. The results suggest that higher flexibility and incentives of households to work appear to be appropriate strategies to improve the employment record. The employment response to economic conditions is stronger in a more deregulated environment, and the absorption of shocks can be relieved.
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Monetary Policy Shocks and Heterogeneous Finance Decisions: A Model of Hidden Effort Choice and Financial Intermediation
Diemo Dietrich
German Economic Review,
2003
Abstract
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Bank Concentration and Retail Interest Rates
S. Corvoisier, Reint E. Gropp
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 11,
2002
Abstract
The recent wave of mergers in the euro area raises the question whether the increase in concentration has offset the increase in competition in European banking through deregulation. We test this question by estimating a simple Cournot model of bank pricing. We construct country and product specific measures of bank concentration and find that for loans and demand deposits increasing concentration may have resulted in less competitive pricing by banks, whereas for savings and time deposits, the model is rejected, suggesting increases in contestability and/or efficiency in these markets. Finally, the paper discusses some implications for tests of the effect of concentration on monetary policy transmission.
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Long term appointment of central bankers: Costs and benefits
Axel Lindner
European Journal of Political Economy,
No. 4,
2000
Abstract
Why do independent central bank boards have a reputation for more moderate policy than do elected governments, even if the board's members have been appointed by the current or former government? This paper gives an explanation for the case of a political world with ‘zeitgeist shocks’ on the electorate's preferences. If the median position of preferences inside the board determines the monetary policy, a trade-off concerning member term length arises: a longer term entails more moderation, while enhancing the likelihood of detachment from contact to the electorate's current preferences.
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