Cross-border Banking and Transmission Mechanisms in Europe: Evidence from German Data
Claudia M. Buch
Applied Financial Economics,
No. 16,
2004
Abstract
International activities of commercial banks play a potential role for the transmission of shocks across countries. This paper presents stylized facts of the integration of European banking markets and analyses the potential of banks to transmit shocks across countries. Although the openness of banking systems has increased, bilateral financial linkages among EU countries are relatively small. The exceptions are claims of German banks on a number of smaller countries. These data are used for an analysis of the determinants of cross-border lending patterns.
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The Contestable Markets Theory - Efficient Advice for Economic Policy
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
External Publications,
2004
Abstract
During the nineties of the last century several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions be complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this „revised“ contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication sections local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, expected high entry lags and a probably short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks, which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non-contestable monopolistic networks.
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The influence of Vertical Integration and Property Rights on Network Access Charges in the German Electricity Markets
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
External Publications,
No. 6,
2004
Abstract
German Electricity markets were deregulated in the late nineties of the last century. In contrast to other European countries, the German government enacted negotiated third party access instead of installing a regulation authority. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers, which specify the calculation schemes for access charges. Local and regional suppliers are nevertheless able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, restricted only by the possibility of interference competition authorities. While some of those suppliers have been acquired by one of the four Transmission System Operators and become vertically integrated, the majority is still independent public utility companies. In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for different charging behaviour depending on the supplier’s economic independence or its level of vertical integration. Controlling for other coefficients as the so called structural features and related cost differences as well as the influence of competition law suits, multivariate estimations show significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers for at least one typical case.
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Financing FDI into developing economies and the international transmission of business cycle fluctuations
Diemo Dietrich
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics,
2004
Abstract
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Investment Behaviour of Financially Constrained Multinational Corporations: Consequences for the International Transmission of Business Cycle Fluctuations
Diemo Dietrich
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 165,
2002
Abstract
The paper investigates the investment decision of a financially constrained multinational
corporation (MNC) planning investment projects both at home and in a developing
country. The collateral values of the projects diverge because of country specific
transactions costs so that the willingness of banks to grant a loan depends not only on
the MNCs financial wealth but also on the share of FDI in total investment. It is shown
that i) variations in the MNCs financial standing affects FDI stronger than domestic
investment, ii) FDI is likely to decrease following a macroeconomic shock to the MNC
parent, and iii) domestic investment is likely to increase following a macroeconomic
shock to the MNC affiliate.
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Germany s dependence on the economic situation in the U.S. is less crucial than generally assumed
Klaus Weyerstraß
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2002
Abstract
In the context of the recent cyclical downturn in Germany it has often been argued that Germany depends more than other European countries on international economic developments. In this article it is investigated whether empirical support can be found for this proposition. Moreover, it is explored whether this relation has changed over time. For this purpose, vector autoregressive (VAR) models are applied to the output gaps of different economies.
It is shown that in the seventies and eighties, the transmission of business cycle shocks was more pronounced to Germany than to the other EU countries. Since the middle of the nineties, no such differences can be detected. Furthermore, since the middle of the nineties, the effects of shocks from abroad on the German business cycle have been significantly more short-lived than before.
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Bank Concentration and Retail Interest Rates
S. Corvoisier, Reint E. Gropp
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 11,
2002
Abstract
The recent wave of mergers in the euro area raises the question whether the increase in concentration has offset the increase in competition in European banking through deregulation. We test this question by estimating a simple Cournot model of bank pricing. We construct country and product specific measures of bank concentration and find that for loans and demand deposits increasing concentration may have resulted in less competitive pricing by banks, whereas for savings and time deposits, the model is rejected, suggesting increases in contestability and/or efficiency in these markets. Finally, the paper discusses some implications for tests of the effect of concentration on monetary policy transmission.
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