We study the aggregate, distributional, and welfare effects of fiscal policy responses to Germany’s energy crisis using a novel Ten-Agents New-Keynesian (TENK) model. The energy crisis, compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, led to sharp increases in energy prices, inflation, and significant consumption disparities across households. Our model, calibrated to Germany’s income and consumption distribution, evaluates key policy interventions, including untargeted and targeted transfers, a value-added tax cut, energy tax reductions, and an energy cost brake. We find that untargeted transfers had the largest short-term aggregate impact, while targeted transfers were most cost-effective in supporting lower-income households. Other instruments, as the prominent energy cost brake, yielded comparably limited welfare gains. These results highlight the importance of targeted fiscal measures in addressing distributional effects and stabilizing consumption during economic crises.

This study examines how antitrust law adoptions affect horizontal merger and acquisition (M&A) outcomes. Using the staggered introduction of competition laws in 20 countries, we find antitrust regulation decreases acquirers’ five-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding horizontal merger announcements. A decrease in deal value, target book assets, and industry peers' announcement returns are consistent with the market power hypothesis. Exploiting antitrust law adoptions addresses a downward bias to an estimated effect of antitrust enforcement (Baker (2003)). The potential bias from heterogeneous treatment effects does not nullify our results. Overall, antitrust policies seem to deter post-merger monopolistic gains, potentially improving customer welfare.

In this paper, we discuss how environmental damage and emission reduction policies affect the conduct of monetary policy in a two-sector (clean and dirty) dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. In particular, we examine the optimal response of the interest rate to changes in sectoral inflation due to standard supply shocks, conditional on a given environmental policy. We then compare the performance of a nonstandard monetary rule with sectoral inflation targets to that of a standard Taylor rule. Our main results are as follows: first, the optimal monetary policy is affected by the existence of environmental policy (carbon taxation), as this introduces a distortion in the relative price level between the clean and dirty sectors. Second, compared with a standard Taylor rule targeting aggregate inflation, a monetary policy rule with asymmetric responses to sector-specific inflation allows for reduced volatility in the inflation gap, output gap, and emissions. Third, a nonstandard monetary policy rule allows for a higher level of welfare, so the two goals of welfare maximization and emission minimization can be aligned.