Do economic incentives govern information diffusion in markets? Using international banks’ advisory activities in corporate takeovers as their source of private information, we show in supervisory data that banks with closer ties to the target, but not the acquirer, advisor trade profitably in the target’s stock prior to the deal announcement. This trading behavior is associated with a higher premium paid by the acquirer without compromising the deal success. As the incentives of informed traders are aligned only with those of the target shareholders, which are represented by the target advisor, our evidence suggests strategic information transmission among these banks.

We study the interaction of expansionary rate-based monetary policy and quantitative easing, despite their concurrent implementation, by exploiting heterogeneous banks and the introduction of negative monetary-policy rates in a fragmented euro area. Quantitative easing increases credit supply less, translating into weaker employment growth, when banks’ funding costs do not decrease. Using administrative data from Germany, we uncover that among banks selling their securities, central-bank reserves remain disproportionately with high-deposit banks that are constrained due to sticky customer deposits at the zero lower bound. Affected German banks lend relatively less to firms while increasing their interbank exposure in the euro area.

We assemble data about executives on the boards of national supervisory authorities (NSA) in European banking, which reveal that 40% have an employment history in the financial industry. Appointment patterns to NSA boards differ substantially across countries. Generally, the appointment of former finance professionals as prudential supervisors is inconsequential for banks‘ valuations, capitalization, and asset growth. The exception are positive, but short-lived valuation effects for those banks whose alumni are appointed as executives of directly responsible NSA boards. Circumstantial evidence suggests that a “proximity bias“ is a more likely driver of this effect instead of superior financial expertise or intrinsic skills of the designated NSA executives.

We build a granular dataset of residential property yields using rental and sale listings from a major German real estate platform. With more than 1.5 million property-level rent-to-price ratios, we document a novel heterogeneity puzzle. About two-fifths of yield dispersion remains unexplained after controlling for extensive observable property characteristics and postal code-level time-varying factors using fixed effects. When we absorb finer neighborhood amenities through richer fixed effects, the unexplained share remains close to one-third. This evidence points to the importance of investors’ beliefs and preferences—rather than several alternative explanations we test—as sources of heterogeneity in risk premia.

Using the adoption of Zombie Property Laws (ZL) across several US states, we show that requiring lenders to maintain properties in the foreclosure process affects mortgage lending decisions and standards. Difference-in-differences estimations using a state border design show that ZL incentivizes lenders to screen mortgage applications more carefully: they deny more applications and impose higher interest rates on originated loans, especially risky loans. In turn, these loans exhibit higher ex post performance. ZL also affects lender behavior after borrowers become distressed, causing them to strategically keep delinquent mortgages alive. Our findings inform the debate on policy responses to foreclosure crises.

Does debt overhang distort only investment? This paper analyzes the subsequent effects of debt overhang on firm-level outcomes. Using an event study for German firms from 2004 to 2021, we find that, relative to comparable firms in the same industry and year, highly indebted firms do not merely invest less, which is the classic overhang result. They also hire less, and the two margins together translate into slower sales growth. The composition of the adjustment, however, depends on the firm’s growth regime. Highly indebted firms that keep expanding slow their hiring but raise capital per worker over the long run, substituting capital for labour along a flatter expansion path. Highly indebted firms that contract shed workers with no offsetting change in capital intensity: they scale down rather than restructure. These patterns hold in normal times as well as in crises and are concentrated among small and medium-sized limited-liability firms. Debt overhang is therefore not a pure investment wedge but a persistent drag on firm scale, whose incidence across inputs is determined by whether the firm is growing or shrinking.

We show that online listing prices closely approximate transaction prices across Europe. Our validation uses the IWH European Real Estate Index (EREI), a near-real-time database of monthly purchase prices, rents, listing counts, and time on market for 1,154 NUTS-3 regions in 16 countries since April 2024. With publication lags as short as one month, validated listing prices offer a timely, comparable complement to official house price statistics. Purchase price levels correlate between 0.94 and 0.97 with transaction prices in the five most populous markets, while calibration slopes range from 0.95 to 1.00. Aggregate listing prices exceed benchmark transaction prices by 13% to 22%.

This paper examines whether common institutional ownership is associated with CEO connectedness across firms. We document that higher common ownership between two same-industry firms predicts a greater likelihood that a newly appointed CEO has preexisting social ties to the incumbent CEO of the peer firm. To address endogeneity, we use mergers among institutional investors in a stacked difference-in-differences design. In a hiring-firm-peer panel that carries connection status forward from the most recent appointment, exposure to a merger-induced common blockholder approximately doubles the probability that the pair is observed in a connected-CEO state. In a broader firm-pair panel, it increases the probability of CEO connections by 48.7%. We further document that gaining CEO connections through another firm’s CEO appointment is associated with improvements in peer firms’ returns on assets and Tobin’s Q, in both OLS and IV specifications. Peer firms that gain such a connection also experience positive abnormal returns around other firms’ CEO hiring announcements, corresponding to an average increase of $112.5 million in shareholder value. These performance patterns suggest that CEO connections may be valuable from a portfolio-level perspective. Consistent with this interpretation, the association between common ownership and CEO connections is concentrated among product-similar and organizationally complex firms and strengthens after the 2008–2009 financial crisis, when connections appear more valuable. Our findings point to CEO connection as a potential governance channel through which common institutional ownership is linked to firm outcomes, complementing prior work on executive compensation, shareholder voting, and board interlocks.

Firms increasingly rely on markets for technology to acquire innovations developed outside their boundaries, yet acquiring intellectual property rights alone often does not guarantee successful implementation. Many technologies depend on tacit know-how that must be supplied by the provider after the transaction is completed. This paper examines whether common ownership between a technology provider and a potential adopter mitigates this implementation problem. I develop a model in which overlapping institutional investors cause the provider to partially internalize the adopter’s gains from successful implementation, strengthening incentives to transfer tacit know-how. This mechanism operates only when know-how is unverifiable – absent this friction, common ownership leaves matching and outcomes unchanged. Under moral hazard, the model predicts that common ownership increases the likelihood of technology transfer to a given adopter, that this effect is stronger when tacit know-how is more important, and that common ownership improves post-transfer outcomes conditional on adoption. I test these predictions using U.S. patent reassignments between publicly traded firms. Using within-deal variation across competing potential adopters and plausibly exogenous variation from passive index-fund holdings, I show that common ownership increases the likelihood that a firm acquires a technology, particularly when the transferred bundle is more tacit. Common ownership predicts stronger subsequent innovation and higher future firm value, especially when ownership overlap is concentrated among investors with stronger incentives to monitor the provider. These findings show how ownership structure shapes interfirm technology transfer by affecting not only who acquires a technology, but also how much value is created.

When monetary policy is constrained, how large a scal transfer substitutes for a given interest rate cut? Using full-population Danish administrative data, we estimate household consumption responses to adjustable-rate mortgage resets and to unanticipated cash inheritances. A 1 percentage point rate cut maps to uniform transfers of approximately $1,000 per person over 5 years, totaling 1.3% of GDP. These macro-equivalent policies operate through distinct balance-sheet channels with dierent distributional incidence: rate cuts disproportionately stimulate high-income mortgage holders, while transfers are progressive. Marginal propensities to consume vary only modestly across income and liquid-wealth distributions, limiting eciency gains from targeting.