fiel die Lohnquote in der Gesamtproduktion der deutschen Industrie zwischen 1995 und 2014.
Die Zahl der Insolvenzen von Personen- und Kapitalgesellschaften bleibt im Juli trotz schwierigem Umfeld niedrig, zeigt die aktuelle Analyse des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH).
Die kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen in Sachsen-Anhalt verzeichneten im 1. Halbjahr 2022 noch einmal eine gute Geschäftslage. Die von der Corona-Welle im Winter 2021/22 unterbrochene Konjunkturerholung hat sich somit zunächst fortgesetzt. Das geht aus der gemeinsamen Umfrage von Creditreform und Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) hervor, an der sich rund 460 Unternehmen aus Sachsen-Anhalt beteiligt haben.
Die Zahl der Insolvenzen von Personen- und Kapitalgesellschaften liegt im Juni leicht unter dem Niveau der Vormonate, zeigt die aktuelle Analyse des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH).
Die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Versorgungslücke mit Erdgas im Fall eines Stopps russischer Lieferungen ist gegenüber April deutlich gesunken. Zu diesem Ergebnis kommt eine aktualisierte Simulationsrechnung der an der Gemeinschaftsdiagnose beteiligten Institute. Trotz mittlerweile deutlich besser gefüllter Speicher sind damit aber noch nicht alle Risiken für die Gasversorgung der Industrie im Winterhalbjahr 2022/2023 gebannt. Es ist daher ratsam, zeitnah die Preissignale bei den Verbrauchern ankommen zu lassen.
Die Zahl der Insolvenzen von Personen- und Kapitalgesellschaften lag laut IWH-Insolvenztrend im Juli bei 710. Das sind so viele Fälle wie im Juni, aber 11% mehr als im Vorjahresmonat (Stand: 1. August 2022).
In den größten 10% der Unternehmen, deren Insolvenz im Juli gemeldet wurde, waren 4 400 Jobs betroffen. Das ist unter dem Niveau der Vormonate und des Vorjahres 2021. Der Anteil der Arbeitsplätze in der Industrie liegt im Juli mit 46% deutlich über dem Niveau der Vorjahre. Damit setzt sich ein Trend fort, der Ende 2021 begonnen hat (Stand: 1. August 2022).
IWH-Sommerprognose: Das deutsche Bruttoinlandsprodukt wird im Jahr 2022 um 1,5% zunehmen (2021: 2,9%). Quellen: Statistisches Bundesamt; Berechnungen und Darstellung des IWH; ab 2. Quartal 2022: Prognose des IWH. Datenstand: 20.06.2022.
Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt stieg im ersten Quartal 2022 nur leicht um 0,2%. Die geringe Dynamik dürfte vorrangig pandemiegetrieben sein. Die Folgen der kriegsbedingten Sanktionen dürften ab dem zweiten Quartal spürbar werden. Erneute harte Lockdowns in China verschärfen die Lieferkettenprobleme und erzeugen weltweiten Inflationsdruck. In den nächsten beiden Quartalen ist daher kaum mehr als eine Stagnation zu erwarten. Quellen: Statistisches Bundesamt; ab II. Quartal 2022: Prognose des IWH-Flash-Indikators. Stand: 9. Mai 2022.
Heute gehen die Deutschen im Schnitt zwei Jahre später in Rente als vor zwanzig Jahren, leben aber auch zwei Jahre länger. Seit einigen Jahren steigt zudem die Zahl der Neurentner. Quellen: Statistisches Bundesamt; Berechnungen und Darstellung des IWH.
Die Abbildung zeigt eine Projektion der Ausgaben für Beamtenpensionen bis zum Jahr 2080. Dargestellt ist (für zwei verschiedene Szenarien S1 und S2) der Anteil dieser Ausgaben an den Steuereinnahmen für Bund, Länder und Gemeinden in %. Dieser wird sich nicht dramatisch erhöhen – vorausgesetzt, dass mit rückläufiger Bevölkerung auch die Anzahl der Beamten reduziert wird. Quellen: Statistisches Bundesamt; Bundesministerium der Finanzen; Berechnungen und Darstellung des IWH.
Anzahl der Unternehmensgründungen pro 100 000 Einwohner (EW) für Ost- und Westdeutschland zwischen 1995 und 2018. Bis zum Jahr 2018 sank die Rate in Ost- wie in Westdeutschland um mehr als 100 Neugründungen pro 100 000 Einwohner. Quelle: Diegmann, André: Aktuelle Trends: Entwicklung der Firmengründungen in Deutschland, in: IWH, Wirtschaft im Wandel, Jg. 26 (1), 2020, 4.
Veränderung der Unternehmensgründungen pro 100 000 Einwohner zwischen 2000 und 2018. Je dunkler die Farbe, desto größer der Rückgang. Quelle: Diegmann, André: Aktuelle Trends: Entwicklung der Firmengründungen in Deutschland, in: IWH, Wirtschaft im Wandel, Jg. 26 (1), 2020, 4.
1/3: Circa 600 000 Jobs wären indirekt durch einen harten Brexit gefährdet, davon etwa 100 000 in Deutschland. Quelle: Brautzsch, Hans-Ulrich, Holtemöller, Oliver: Potential International Employment Effects of a Hard Brexit. IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 4, 2019. Halle (Saale) 2019.
2/3: Die Beschäftigungsraten von Malta und Irland wären besonders stark getroffen. Quelle: Brautzsch, Hans-Ulrich, Holtemöller, Oliver: Potential International Employment Effects of a Hard Brexit. IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 4, 2019. Halle (Saale) 2019.
3/3: Landkreise, in denen Autos und Autoteile produziert werden (Wolfsburg, Dingolfing-Landau), wären besonders stark betroffen.
Im Krisenjahr 2009 lag die Nichtbesetzungsquote lediglich bei etwa 16%. Bis zum Jahr 2018 hat sie sich deutlich mehr als verdoppelt. Dabei sind Höhe und Entwicklung der Nichtbesetzungsquote in Ostdeutschland und Westdeutschland ähnlich. Quelle: Steffen Müller, Aktuelle Trends: Fachkräftemangel hat in den letzten zehn Jahren in Ost und West stark zugenommen, in: IWH, Wirtschaft im Wandel — Jg. 25 (3), 2019, 48.
Beim Vergleich der Wirtschaftskraft deutscher Regionen vor den politischen Umbrüchen des 20. Jahrhunderts zeigt sich: Aus historischer Sicht sehen manche Tendenzen, etwa der Berlin-Boom und die höhere Wachstumsdynamik in Sachsen, wie eine Normalisierung aus, die sich mit einiger Wahrscheinlichkeit auch fortsetzen dürfte. Quelle: Axel Lindner: Zur Wirtschaftskraft deutscher Regionen aus langfristiger Perspektive: Alte Muster werden in Ostdeutschland langsam wieder sichtbar, in: IWH, Wirtschaft im Wandel — Jg. 25 (3), 2019, 49.
In Westdeutschland kam es in denjenigen Betrieben, die die vergleichsweise geringsten Löhne zahlen (hier 10. Perzentil), im gesamten Betrachtungszeitraum zu Lohneinbußen. Am aktuellen Rand liegen die Einbußen bei etwa 2% im Vergleich zu 1997, während die Löhne am Median leicht gestiegen sind. In Ostdeutschland verlief die Entwicklung vor allem seit 2013 deutlich positiver. Am aktuellen Rand sind im Osten für alle Perzentile deutliche Lohnzuwächse zu beobachten, am Median etwa 10%.
Ein Investment von 1000 Euro, angelegt am 1. Juli 1988, dem Eröffnungstag des DAX, wäre heute über 6000 Euro wert, hätte sich also versechsfacht. Der DAX hat demnachlangfristig alle anderen Anlage- und Sparoptionen übertroffen, die bei deutschen Haushalten üblich sind (Bundesanleihen, Wohnimmobilien, Sparkonten). Quelle: Gropp, Reint E.: Kommentar: 30 Jahre DAX, in: IWH, Wirtschaft im Wandel, Jg. 24 (3), 2018.
Belgien, Litauen, Polen und Slowenien haben viel Zeit bis zur Umsetzung der EU-Richtlinien in nationales Recht verstreichen lassen. Deutschland und Österreich haben die Richtlinien am schnellsten übernommen. Quelle: Koetter, Michael; Krause, Thomas; Tonzer, Lena: "Welche Faktoren verzögern die Umsetzung der Bankenunion?", in: IWH, Wirtschaft im Wandel, Jg. 24 (1), 2018.
1/3: Im Szenario "Inflationsausgleich" wird für jede Alterskohorte, die aus dem Erwerbsleben ausscheidet, das Rentenniveau bei 48,1% des zuletzt empfangenen Arbeitsentgelts fixiert und bleibt dann real konstant, die Rentenbezüge nehmen also mit der Inflationsrate zu. Die Rentenhöhe kann hierdurch stabilisiert werden. Alle zukünftigen Generationen erhalten eine vergleichbare Absicherung. Quelle: Holtemöller, Oliver; Zeddies, Götz: Zur Stabilisierung von Rentenniveau und Rentenversicherungsbeitrag. IWH Online 2/2017. Halle (Saale) 2017.
2/3: Eine Kopplung der laufenden Renten an die Verbraucherpreise kann ein Element zur Dämpfung des Ausgabenanstiegs bei der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung infolge des demographischen Wandels sein, da die Renten nicht mehr so stark wie die Löhne steigen, sondern nur noch die Inflation ausgleichen. Quelle: Holtemöller, Oliver; Zeddies, Götz: Zur Stabilisierung von Rentenniveau und Rentenversicherungsbeitrag. IWH Online 2/2017. Halle (Saale) 2017.
3/3: Der erforderliche Beitragssatz in der Rentenversicherung im Szenario „Inflationsausgleich“ fällt deutlich niedriger aus und sinkt ab 2035 sogar wieder, während er im Szenario „Status quo“ weiter ansteigt. Durch den Inflationsausgleich kann also ein stabiles Rentenniveau bei Renteneintritt gewährleistet und gleichzeitig eine Dämpfung der Rentenausgaben erreicht werden, wenn die Bevölkerung altert. Quelle: Holtemöller, Oliver; Zeddies, Götz: Zur Stabilisierung von Rentenniveau und Rentenversicherungsbeitrag. IWH Online 2/2017. Halle (Saale) 2017.
in: Journal of the European Economic Association, im Erscheinen
This paper derives a European Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration index from 15 micro-aggregated country datasets. In the last decade, European concentration rose due to a reallocation of economic activity toward large and concentrated industries. Over the same period, productivity gains from an increasing allocative efficiency of the European market accounted for 50% of European productivity growth while markups stayed constant. Using country-industry variation, we show that changes in concentration are positively associated with changes in productivity and allocative efficiency. This holds across most sectors and countries and supports the notion that rising concentration in Europe reflects a more efficient market environment rather than weak competition and rising market power.
in: Review of World Economics, im Erscheinen
Russian monetary policy has been challenged by large and continuous private capital outflows and a sharp drop in oil prices during 2014. Both contributed to significant depreciation pressures on the ruble and led the central bank to give up its exchange rate management strategy. Against this background, this work estimates a small open economy model for Russia, featuring an oil price sector and extended by a specification of the foreign exchange market to correctly account for systematic central bank interventions. We find that shocks to the oil price and private capital flows substantially affect domestic variables such as inflation and output. Simulations for the estimated actual strategy and alternative regimes suggest that the vulnerability of the Russian economy to external shocks can substantially be lowered by adopting some form of inflation targeting. Strategies to target the nominal exchange rate or the ruble price of oil prove to be inferior.
in: Journal of Comparative Economics, im Erscheinen
East German manufacturers’ revenue productivity is substantially below West German levels, even three decades after German unification. Using firm-product-level data with product quantities and prices, we analyze the role of product specialization and show that the prominent “extended work bench hypothesis” cannot explain these sustained productivity differences. Eastern firms specialize in simpler product varieties generating less consumer value and being manufactured with less or cheaper inputs. Yet, such specialization cannot explain the productivity gap because Eastern firms are physically less productive for given product prices. Hence, there is a genuine price-adjusted physical productivity disadvantage of Eastern compared to Western firms.
in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, im Erscheinen
Abstract In Germany, employers used to pay union members and non-members in a plant the same union wage in order to prevent workers from joining unions. Using recent administrative data, we investigate which workers in firms covered by collective bargaining agreements still individually benefit from these union agreements, which workers are not covered anymore and what this means for their wages. We show that about 9 per cent of workers in plants with collective agreements do not enjoy individual coverage (and thus the union wage) anymore. Econometric analyses with unconditional quantile regressions and firm-fixed-effects estimations demonstrate that not being individually covered by a collective agreement has serious wage implications for most workers. Low-wage non-union workers and those at low hierarchy levels particularly suffer since employers abstain from extending union wages to them in order to pay lower wages. This jeopardizes unions' goal of protecting all disadvantaged workers.
in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, im Erscheinen
This paper documents the behavior of key macro aggregates in the wake of the Covid epidemic. We show that a unique feature of the Covid recession is that the peak-to-trough decline is roughly the same for consumption, investment, and output. In contrast to the 2008 recession, there was only a short-lived rise in financial stress that quickly subsided. Finally, there was mild deflation between the peak and the trough of the Covid recession. We argue that a New Keynesian model that explicitly incorporates epidemic dynamics captures these qualitative features of the Covid recession. A key feature of the model is that Covid acts like a negative shock to the demand for consumption and the supply of labor.
in: Review of Economics and Statistics, im Erscheinen
This paper develops a novel dataset of weekly economic conditions indices for the 50 U.S. states going back to 1987 based on mixed-frequency dynamic factor models with weekly, monthly, and quarterly variables that cover multiple dimensions of state economies. We find considerable cross-state heterogeneity in the length, depth, and timing of business cycles. We illustrate the usefulness of these state-level indices for quantifying the main contributors to the economic collapse caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and for evaluating the effectiveness of the Paycheck Protection Program. We also propose an aggregate indicator that gauges the overall weakness of the U.S. economy.
in: Economic Inquiry, im Erscheinen
This paper analyzes how firm-specific forecast errors derived from survey data of German manufacturing firms over 2007–2011 relate to firms' investment propensity. Our findings reveal that asymmetries arise depending on the size and direction of the forecast error. The investment propensity declines if the realized situation is worse than expected. However, firms do not adjust investment if the realized situation is better than expected suggesting that the uncertainty component of the forecast error counteracts good surprises of unexpectedly favorable business conditions. This asymmetric mechanism can be one explanation behind slow recovery following crises.
in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, im Erscheinen
Do lenders securitize or price loans in response to credit risk? Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk due to foreclosure law differences along US state borders, we find that lenders securitize mortgages that are eligible for sale to the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) rather than price regional credit risk. For non-GSE-eligible mortgages with no GSE buyback provision, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate surrounding the GSEs' buyback provisions, the constant interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk increases the GSEs' debt holdings.
in: Journal of Human Resources, im Erscheinen
Using administrative data for West Germany, this paper investigates whether part of the urban wage premium stems from greater competition in denser labor markets. We show that employers possess less wage-setting power in denser markets. We further document that an important part of the observed urban wage premia can be explained by greater competition in denser labor markets.
in: Review of Economics and Statistics, im Erscheinen
We evaluate alternative indicators of global economic activity and other market funda-mentals in terms of their usefulness for forecasting real oil prices and global petroleum consumption. World industrial production is one of the most useful indicators. However, by combining measures from several different sources we can do even better. Our analysis results in a new index of global economic conditions and measures for assessing future energy demand and oil price pressures. We illustrate their usefulness for quantifying the main factors behind the severe contraction of the global economy and the price risks faced by shale oil producers in early 2020.
in: Journal of the European Economic Association, im Erscheinen
This paper derives a European Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration index from 15 micro-aggregated country datasets. In the last decade, European concentration rose due to a reallocation of economic activity toward large and concentrated industries. Over the same period, productivity gains from an increasing allocative efficiency of the European market accounted for 50% of European productivity growth while markups stayed constant. Using country-industry variation, we show that changes in concentration are positively associated with changes in productivity and allocative efficiency. This holds across most sectors and countries and supports the notion that rising concentration in Europe reflects a more efficient market environment rather than weak competition and rising market power.
in: Review of World Economics, im Erscheinen
Russian monetary policy has been challenged by large and continuous private capital outflows and a sharp drop in oil prices during 2014. Both contributed to significant depreciation pressures on the ruble and led the central bank to give up its exchange rate management strategy. Against this background, this work estimates a small open economy model for Russia, featuring an oil price sector and extended by a specification of the foreign exchange market to correctly account for systematic central bank interventions. We find that shocks to the oil price and private capital flows substantially affect domestic variables such as inflation and output. Simulations for the estimated actual strategy and alternative regimes suggest that the vulnerability of the Russian economy to external shocks can substantially be lowered by adopting some form of inflation targeting. Strategies to target the nominal exchange rate or the ruble price of oil prove to be inferior.
in: Journal of Comparative Economics, im Erscheinen
East German manufacturers’ revenue productivity is substantially below West German levels, even three decades after German unification. Using firm-product-level data with product quantities and prices, we analyze the role of product specialization and show that the prominent “extended work bench hypothesis” cannot explain these sustained productivity differences. Eastern firms specialize in simpler product varieties generating less consumer value and being manufactured with less or cheaper inputs. Yet, such specialization cannot explain the productivity gap because Eastern firms are physically less productive for given product prices. Hence, there is a genuine price-adjusted physical productivity disadvantage of Eastern compared to Western firms.
in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, im Erscheinen
Abstract In Germany, employers used to pay union members and non-members in a plant the same union wage in order to prevent workers from joining unions. Using recent administrative data, we investigate which workers in firms covered by collective bargaining agreements still individually benefit from these union agreements, which workers are not covered anymore and what this means for their wages. We show that about 9 per cent of workers in plants with collective agreements do not enjoy individual coverage (and thus the union wage) anymore. Econometric analyses with unconditional quantile regressions and firm-fixed-effects estimations demonstrate that not being individually covered by a collective agreement has serious wage implications for most workers. Low-wage non-union workers and those at low hierarchy levels particularly suffer since employers abstain from extending union wages to them in order to pay lower wages. This jeopardizes unions' goal of protecting all disadvantaged workers.
in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, im Erscheinen
This paper documents the behavior of key macro aggregates in the wake of the Covid epidemic. We show that a unique feature of the Covid recession is that the peak-to-trough decline is roughly the same for consumption, investment, and output. In contrast to the 2008 recession, there was only a short-lived rise in financial stress that quickly subsided. Finally, there was mild deflation between the peak and the trough of the Covid recession. We argue that a New Keynesian model that explicitly incorporates epidemic dynamics captures these qualitative features of the Covid recession. A key feature of the model is that Covid acts like a negative shock to the demand for consumption and the supply of labor.
in: Review of Economics and Statistics, im Erscheinen
This paper develops a novel dataset of weekly economic conditions indices for the 50 U.S. states going back to 1987 based on mixed-frequency dynamic factor models with weekly, monthly, and quarterly variables that cover multiple dimensions of state economies. We find considerable cross-state heterogeneity in the length, depth, and timing of business cycles. We illustrate the usefulness of these state-level indices for quantifying the main contributors to the economic collapse caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and for evaluating the effectiveness of the Paycheck Protection Program. We also propose an aggregate indicator that gauges the overall weakness of the U.S. economy.
in: Economic Inquiry, im Erscheinen
This paper analyzes how firm-specific forecast errors derived from survey data of German manufacturing firms over 2007–2011 relate to firms' investment propensity. Our findings reveal that asymmetries arise depending on the size and direction of the forecast error. The investment propensity declines if the realized situation is worse than expected. However, firms do not adjust investment if the realized situation is better than expected suggesting that the uncertainty component of the forecast error counteracts good surprises of unexpectedly favorable business conditions. This asymmetric mechanism can be one explanation behind slow recovery following crises.
in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, im Erscheinen
Do lenders securitize or price loans in response to credit risk? Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk due to foreclosure law differences along US state borders, we find that lenders securitize mortgages that are eligible for sale to the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) rather than price regional credit risk. For non-GSE-eligible mortgages with no GSE buyback provision, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate surrounding the GSEs' buyback provisions, the constant interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk increases the GSEs' debt holdings.
in: Journal of Human Resources, im Erscheinen
Using administrative data for West Germany, this paper investigates whether part of the urban wage premium stems from greater competition in denser labor markets. We show that employers possess less wage-setting power in denser markets. We further document that an important part of the observed urban wage premia can be explained by greater competition in denser labor markets.
in: Review of Economics and Statistics, im Erscheinen
We evaluate alternative indicators of global economic activity and other market funda-mentals in terms of their usefulness for forecasting real oil prices and global petroleum consumption. World industrial production is one of the most useful indicators. However, by combining measures from several different sources we can do even better. Our analysis results in a new index of global economic conditions and measures for assessing future energy demand and oil price pressures. We illustrate their usefulness for quantifying the main factors behind the severe contraction of the global economy and the price risks faced by shale oil producers in early 2020.
Die Zahl der Insolvenzen von Personen- und Kapitalgesellschaften lag laut IWH-Insolvenztrend im Juli bei 710. Das sind so viele Fälle wie im Juni, aber 11% mehr als im Vorjahresmonat (Stand: 1. August 2022).
In den größten 10% der Unternehmen, deren Insolvenz im Juli gemeldet wurde, waren 4 400 Jobs betroffen. Das ist unter dem Niveau der Vormonate und des Vorjahres 2021. Der Anteil der Arbeitsplätze in der Industrie liegt im Juli mit 46% deutlich über dem Niveau der Vorjahre. Damit setzt sich ein Trend fort, der Ende 2021 begonnen hat (Stand: 1. August 2022).
IWH-Sommerprognose: Das deutsche Bruttoinlandsprodukt wird im Jahr 2022 um 1,5% zunehmen (2021: 2,9%). Quellen: Statistisches Bundesamt; Berechnungen und Darstellung des IWH; ab 2. Quartal 2022: Prognose des IWH. Datenstand: 20.06.2022.
Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt stieg im ersten Quartal 2022 nur leicht um 0,2%. Die geringe Dynamik dürfte vorrangig pandemiegetrieben sein. Die Folgen der kriegsbedingten Sanktionen dürften ab dem zweiten Quartal spürbar werden. Erneute harte Lockdowns in China verschärfen die Lieferkettenprobleme und erzeugen weltweiten Inflationsdruck. In den nächsten beiden Quartalen ist daher kaum mehr als eine Stagnation zu erwarten. Quellen: Statistisches Bundesamt; ab II. Quartal 2022: Prognose des IWH-Flash-Indikators. Stand: 9. Mai 2022.
Heute gehen die Deutschen im Schnitt zwei Jahre später in Rente als vor zwanzig Jahren, leben aber auch zwei Jahre länger. Seit einigen Jahren steigt zudem die Zahl der Neurentner. Quellen: Statistisches Bundesamt; Berechnungen und Darstellung des IWH.
Die Abbildung zeigt eine Projektion der Ausgaben für Beamtenpensionen bis zum Jahr 2080. Dargestellt ist (für zwei verschiedene Szenarien S1 und S2) der Anteil dieser Ausgaben an den Steuereinnahmen für Bund, Länder und Gemeinden in %. Dieser wird sich nicht dramatisch erhöhen – vorausgesetzt, dass mit rückläufiger Bevölkerung auch die Anzahl der Beamten reduziert wird. Quellen: Statistisches Bundesamt; Bundesministerium der Finanzen; Berechnungen und Darstellung des IWH.
Anzahl der Unternehmensgründungen pro 100 000 Einwohner (EW) für Ost- und Westdeutschland zwischen 1995 und 2018. Bis zum Jahr 2018 sank die Rate in Ost- wie in Westdeutschland um mehr als 100 Neugründungen pro 100 000 Einwohner. Quelle: Diegmann, André: Aktuelle Trends: Entwicklung der Firmengründungen in Deutschland, in: IWH, Wirtschaft im Wandel, Jg. 26 (1), 2020, 4.
Veränderung der Unternehmensgründungen pro 100 000 Einwohner zwischen 2000 und 2018. Je dunkler die Farbe, desto größer der Rückgang. Quelle: Diegmann, André: Aktuelle Trends: Entwicklung der Firmengründungen in Deutschland, in: IWH, Wirtschaft im Wandel, Jg. 26 (1), 2020, 4.
1/3: Circa 600 000 Jobs wären indirekt durch einen harten Brexit gefährdet, davon etwa 100 000 in Deutschland. Quelle: Brautzsch, Hans-Ulrich, Holtemöller, Oliver: Potential International Employment Effects of a Hard Brexit. IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 4, 2019. Halle (Saale) 2019.
2/3: Die Beschäftigungsraten von Malta und Irland wären besonders stark getroffen. Quelle: Brautzsch, Hans-Ulrich, Holtemöller, Oliver: Potential International Employment Effects of a Hard Brexit. IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 4, 2019. Halle (Saale) 2019.
3/3: Landkreise, in denen Autos und Autoteile produziert werden (Wolfsburg, Dingolfing-Landau), wären besonders stark betroffen.
Im Krisenjahr 2009 lag die Nichtbesetzungsquote lediglich bei etwa 16%. Bis zum Jahr 2018 hat sie sich deutlich mehr als verdoppelt. Dabei sind Höhe und Entwicklung der Nichtbesetzungsquote in Ostdeutschland und Westdeutschland ähnlich. Quelle: Steffen Müller, Aktuelle Trends: Fachkräftemangel hat in den letzten zehn Jahren in Ost und West stark zugenommen, in: IWH, Wirtschaft im Wandel — Jg. 25 (3), 2019, 48.
Beim Vergleich der Wirtschaftskraft deutscher Regionen vor den politischen Umbrüchen des 20. Jahrhunderts zeigt sich: Aus historischer Sicht sehen manche Tendenzen, etwa der Berlin-Boom und die höhere Wachstumsdynamik in Sachsen, wie eine Normalisierung aus, die sich mit einiger Wahrscheinlichkeit auch fortsetzen dürfte. Quelle: Axel Lindner: Zur Wirtschaftskraft deutscher Regionen aus langfristiger Perspektive: Alte Muster werden in Ostdeutschland langsam wieder sichtbar, in: IWH, Wirtschaft im Wandel — Jg. 25 (3), 2019, 49.
In Westdeutschland kam es in denjenigen Betrieben, die die vergleichsweise geringsten Löhne zahlen (hier 10. Perzentil), im gesamten Betrachtungszeitraum zu Lohneinbußen. Am aktuellen Rand liegen die Einbußen bei etwa 2% im Vergleich zu 1997, während die Löhne am Median leicht gestiegen sind. In Ostdeutschland verlief die Entwicklung vor allem seit 2013 deutlich positiver. Am aktuellen Rand sind im Osten für alle Perzentile deutliche Lohnzuwächse zu beobachten, am Median etwa 10%.
Ein Investment von 1000 Euro, angelegt am 1. Juli 1988, dem Eröffnungstag des DAX, wäre heute über 6000 Euro wert, hätte sich also versechsfacht. Der DAX hat demnachlangfristig alle anderen Anlage- und Sparoptionen übertroffen, die bei deutschen Haushalten üblich sind (Bundesanleihen, Wohnimmobilien, Sparkonten). Quelle: Gropp, Reint E.: Kommentar: 30 Jahre DAX, in: IWH, Wirtschaft im Wandel, Jg. 24 (3), 2018.
Belgien, Litauen, Polen und Slowenien haben viel Zeit bis zur Umsetzung der EU-Richtlinien in nationales Recht verstreichen lassen. Deutschland und Österreich haben die Richtlinien am schnellsten übernommen. Quelle: Koetter, Michael; Krause, Thomas; Tonzer, Lena: "Welche Faktoren verzögern die Umsetzung der Bankenunion?", in: IWH, Wirtschaft im Wandel, Jg. 24 (1), 2018.
1/3: Im Szenario "Inflationsausgleich" wird für jede Alterskohorte, die aus dem Erwerbsleben ausscheidet, das Rentenniveau bei 48,1% des zuletzt empfangenen Arbeitsentgelts fixiert und bleibt dann real konstant, die Rentenbezüge nehmen also mit der Inflationsrate zu. Die Rentenhöhe kann hierdurch stabilisiert werden. Alle zukünftigen Generationen erhalten eine vergleichbare Absicherung. Quelle: Holtemöller, Oliver; Zeddies, Götz: Zur Stabilisierung von Rentenniveau und Rentenversicherungsbeitrag. IWH Online 2/2017. Halle (Saale) 2017.
2/3: Eine Kopplung der laufenden Renten an die Verbraucherpreise kann ein Element zur Dämpfung des Ausgabenanstiegs bei der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung infolge des demographischen Wandels sein, da die Renten nicht mehr so stark wie die Löhne steigen, sondern nur noch die Inflation ausgleichen. Quelle: Holtemöller, Oliver; Zeddies, Götz: Zur Stabilisierung von Rentenniveau und Rentenversicherungsbeitrag. IWH Online 2/2017. Halle (Saale) 2017.
3/3: Der erforderliche Beitragssatz in der Rentenversicherung im Szenario „Inflationsausgleich“ fällt deutlich niedriger aus und sinkt ab 2035 sogar wieder, während er im Szenario „Status quo“ weiter ansteigt. Durch den Inflationsausgleich kann also ein stabiles Rentenniveau bei Renteneintritt gewährleistet und gleichzeitig eine Dämpfung der Rentenausgaben erreicht werden, wenn die Bevölkerung altert. Quelle: Holtemöller, Oliver; Zeddies, Götz: Zur Stabilisierung von Rentenniveau und Rentenversicherungsbeitrag. IWH Online 2/2017. Halle (Saale) 2017.
in: Journal of the European Economic Association, im Erscheinen
This paper derives a European Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration index from 15 micro-aggregated country datasets. In the last decade, European concentration rose due to a reallocation of economic activity toward large and concentrated industries. Over the same period, productivity gains from an increasing allocative efficiency of the European market accounted for 50% of European productivity growth while markups stayed constant. Using country-industry variation, we show that changes in concentration are positively associated with changes in productivity and allocative efficiency. This holds across most sectors and countries and supports the notion that rising concentration in Europe reflects a more efficient market environment rather than weak competition and rising market power.
in: Review of World Economics, im Erscheinen
Russian monetary policy has been challenged by large and continuous private capital outflows and a sharp drop in oil prices during 2014. Both contributed to significant depreciation pressures on the ruble and led the central bank to give up its exchange rate management strategy. Against this background, this work estimates a small open economy model for Russia, featuring an oil price sector and extended by a specification of the foreign exchange market to correctly account for systematic central bank interventions. We find that shocks to the oil price and private capital flows substantially affect domestic variables such as inflation and output. Simulations for the estimated actual strategy and alternative regimes suggest that the vulnerability of the Russian economy to external shocks can substantially be lowered by adopting some form of inflation targeting. Strategies to target the nominal exchange rate or the ruble price of oil prove to be inferior.
in: Journal of Comparative Economics, im Erscheinen
East German manufacturers’ revenue productivity is substantially below West German levels, even three decades after German unification. Using firm-product-level data with product quantities and prices, we analyze the role of product specialization and show that the prominent “extended work bench hypothesis” cannot explain these sustained productivity differences. Eastern firms specialize in simpler product varieties generating less consumer value and being manufactured with less or cheaper inputs. Yet, such specialization cannot explain the productivity gap because Eastern firms are physically less productive for given product prices. Hence, there is a genuine price-adjusted physical productivity disadvantage of Eastern compared to Western firms.
in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, im Erscheinen
Abstract In Germany, employers used to pay union members and non-members in a plant the same union wage in order to prevent workers from joining unions. Using recent administrative data, we investigate which workers in firms covered by collective bargaining agreements still individually benefit from these union agreements, which workers are not covered anymore and what this means for their wages. We show that about 9 per cent of workers in plants with collective agreements do not enjoy individual coverage (and thus the union wage) anymore. Econometric analyses with unconditional quantile regressions and firm-fixed-effects estimations demonstrate that not being individually covered by a collective agreement has serious wage implications for most workers. Low-wage non-union workers and those at low hierarchy levels particularly suffer since employers abstain from extending union wages to them in order to pay lower wages. This jeopardizes unions' goal of protecting all disadvantaged workers.
in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, im Erscheinen
This paper documents the behavior of key macro aggregates in the wake of the Covid epidemic. We show that a unique feature of the Covid recession is that the peak-to-trough decline is roughly the same for consumption, investment, and output. In contrast to the 2008 recession, there was only a short-lived rise in financial stress that quickly subsided. Finally, there was mild deflation between the peak and the trough of the Covid recession. We argue that a New Keynesian model that explicitly incorporates epidemic dynamics captures these qualitative features of the Covid recession. A key feature of the model is that Covid acts like a negative shock to the demand for consumption and the supply of labor.
in: Review of Economics and Statistics, im Erscheinen
This paper develops a novel dataset of weekly economic conditions indices for the 50 U.S. states going back to 1987 based on mixed-frequency dynamic factor models with weekly, monthly, and quarterly variables that cover multiple dimensions of state economies. We find considerable cross-state heterogeneity in the length, depth, and timing of business cycles. We illustrate the usefulness of these state-level indices for quantifying the main contributors to the economic collapse caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and for evaluating the effectiveness of the Paycheck Protection Program. We also propose an aggregate indicator that gauges the overall weakness of the U.S. economy.
in: Economic Inquiry, im Erscheinen
This paper analyzes how firm-specific forecast errors derived from survey data of German manufacturing firms over 2007–2011 relate to firms' investment propensity. Our findings reveal that asymmetries arise depending on the size and direction of the forecast error. The investment propensity declines if the realized situation is worse than expected. However, firms do not adjust investment if the realized situation is better than expected suggesting that the uncertainty component of the forecast error counteracts good surprises of unexpectedly favorable business conditions. This asymmetric mechanism can be one explanation behind slow recovery following crises.
in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, im Erscheinen
Do lenders securitize or price loans in response to credit risk? Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk due to foreclosure law differences along US state borders, we find that lenders securitize mortgages that are eligible for sale to the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) rather than price regional credit risk. For non-GSE-eligible mortgages with no GSE buyback provision, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate surrounding the GSEs' buyback provisions, the constant interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk increases the GSEs' debt holdings.
in: Journal of Human Resources, im Erscheinen
Using administrative data for West Germany, this paper investigates whether part of the urban wage premium stems from greater competition in denser labor markets. We show that employers possess less wage-setting power in denser markets. We further document that an important part of the observed urban wage premia can be explained by greater competition in denser labor markets.
in: Review of Economics and Statistics, im Erscheinen
We evaluate alternative indicators of global economic activity and other market funda-mentals in terms of their usefulness for forecasting real oil prices and global petroleum consumption. World industrial production is one of the most useful indicators. However, by combining measures from several different sources we can do even better. Our analysis results in a new index of global economic conditions and measures for assessing future energy demand and oil price pressures. We illustrate their usefulness for quantifying the main factors behind the severe contraction of the global economy and the price risks faced by shale oil producers in early 2020.
in: Journal of the European Economic Association, im Erscheinen
This paper derives a European Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration index from 15 micro-aggregated country datasets. In the last decade, European concentration rose due to a reallocation of economic activity toward large and concentrated industries. Over the same period, productivity gains from an increasing allocative efficiency of the European market accounted for 50% of European productivity growth while markups stayed constant. Using country-industry variation, we show that changes in concentration are positively associated with changes in productivity and allocative efficiency. This holds across most sectors and countries and supports the notion that rising concentration in Europe reflects a more efficient market environment rather than weak competition and rising market power.
in: Review of World Economics, im Erscheinen
Russian monetary policy has been challenged by large and continuous private capital outflows and a sharp drop in oil prices during 2014. Both contributed to significant depreciation pressures on the ruble and led the central bank to give up its exchange rate management strategy. Against this background, this work estimates a small open economy model for Russia, featuring an oil price sector and extended by a specification of the foreign exchange market to correctly account for systematic central bank interventions. We find that shocks to the oil price and private capital flows substantially affect domestic variables such as inflation and output. Simulations for the estimated actual strategy and alternative regimes suggest that the vulnerability of the Russian economy to external shocks can substantially be lowered by adopting some form of inflation targeting. Strategies to target the nominal exchange rate or the ruble price of oil prove to be inferior.
in: Journal of Comparative Economics, im Erscheinen
East German manufacturers’ revenue productivity is substantially below West German levels, even three decades after German unification. Using firm-product-level data with product quantities and prices, we analyze the role of product specialization and show that the prominent “extended work bench hypothesis” cannot explain these sustained productivity differences. Eastern firms specialize in simpler product varieties generating less consumer value and being manufactured with less or cheaper inputs. Yet, such specialization cannot explain the productivity gap because Eastern firms are physically less productive for given product prices. Hence, there is a genuine price-adjusted physical productivity disadvantage of Eastern compared to Western firms.
in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, im Erscheinen
Abstract In Germany, employers used to pay union members and non-members in a plant the same union wage in order to prevent workers from joining unions. Using recent administrative data, we investigate which workers in firms covered by collective bargaining agreements still individually benefit from these union agreements, which workers are not covered anymore and what this means for their wages. We show that about 9 per cent of workers in plants with collective agreements do not enjoy individual coverage (and thus the union wage) anymore. Econometric analyses with unconditional quantile regressions and firm-fixed-effects estimations demonstrate that not being individually covered by a collective agreement has serious wage implications for most workers. Low-wage non-union workers and those at low hierarchy levels particularly suffer since employers abstain from extending union wages to them in order to pay lower wages. This jeopardizes unions' goal of protecting all disadvantaged workers.
in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, im Erscheinen
This paper documents the behavior of key macro aggregates in the wake of the Covid epidemic. We show that a unique feature of the Covid recession is that the peak-to-trough decline is roughly the same for consumption, investment, and output. In contrast to the 2008 recession, there was only a short-lived rise in financial stress that quickly subsided. Finally, there was mild deflation between the peak and the trough of the Covid recession. We argue that a New Keynesian model that explicitly incorporates epidemic dynamics captures these qualitative features of the Covid recession. A key feature of the model is that Covid acts like a negative shock to the demand for consumption and the supply of labor.
in: Review of Economics and Statistics, im Erscheinen
This paper develops a novel dataset of weekly economic conditions indices for the 50 U.S. states going back to 1987 based on mixed-frequency dynamic factor models with weekly, monthly, and quarterly variables that cover multiple dimensions of state economies. We find considerable cross-state heterogeneity in the length, depth, and timing of business cycles. We illustrate the usefulness of these state-level indices for quantifying the main contributors to the economic collapse caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and for evaluating the effectiveness of the Paycheck Protection Program. We also propose an aggregate indicator that gauges the overall weakness of the U.S. economy.
in: Economic Inquiry, im Erscheinen
This paper analyzes how firm-specific forecast errors derived from survey data of German manufacturing firms over 2007–2011 relate to firms' investment propensity. Our findings reveal that asymmetries arise depending on the size and direction of the forecast error. The investment propensity declines if the realized situation is worse than expected. However, firms do not adjust investment if the realized situation is better than expected suggesting that the uncertainty component of the forecast error counteracts good surprises of unexpectedly favorable business conditions. This asymmetric mechanism can be one explanation behind slow recovery following crises.
in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, im Erscheinen
Do lenders securitize or price loans in response to credit risk? Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk due to foreclosure law differences along US state borders, we find that lenders securitize mortgages that are eligible for sale to the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) rather than price regional credit risk. For non-GSE-eligible mortgages with no GSE buyback provision, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate surrounding the GSEs' buyback provisions, the constant interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk increases the GSEs' debt holdings.
in: Journal of Human Resources, im Erscheinen
Using administrative data for West Germany, this paper investigates whether part of the urban wage premium stems from greater competition in denser labor markets. We show that employers possess less wage-setting power in denser markets. We further document that an important part of the observed urban wage premia can be explained by greater competition in denser labor markets.
in: Review of Economics and Statistics, im Erscheinen
We evaluate alternative indicators of global economic activity and other market funda-mentals in terms of their usefulness for forecasting real oil prices and global petroleum consumption. World industrial production is one of the most useful indicators. However, by combining measures from several different sources we can do even better. Our analysis results in a new index of global economic conditions and measures for assessing future energy demand and oil price pressures. We illustrate their usefulness for quantifying the main factors behind the severe contraction of the global economy and the price risks faced by shale oil producers in early 2020.
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