The Appropriateness of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure for Central and Eastern European Countries
Geraldine Dany-Knedlik, Martina Kämpfe, Tobias Knedlik
Empirica,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
The European Commission’s Scoreboard of Macroeconomic Imbalances is a rare case of a publicly released early warning system. It was published first time in 2012 by the European Commission as a reaction to public debt crises in Europe. So far, the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure takes a one-size-fits-all approach with regard to the identification of thresholds. The experience of Central and Eastern European Countries during the global financial crisis and in the resulting public debt crises has been largely different from that of other European countries. This paper looks at the appropriateness of scoreboard of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure of the European Commission for this group of catching-up countries. It is shown that while some of the indicators of the scoreboard are helpful to predict crises in the region, thresholds are in most cases set too narrow since it largely disregarded the specifics of catching-up economies, in particular higher and more volatile growth rates of various macroeconomic variables.
Artikel Lesen
Optimizing Policymakers’ Loss Functions in Crisis Prediction: Before, Within or After?
Peter Sarlin, Gregor von Schweinitz
Macroeconomic Dynamics,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
Recurring financial instabilities have led policymakers to rely on early-warning models to signal financial vulnerabilities. These models rely on ex-post optimization of signaling thresholds on crisis probabilities accounting for preferences between forecast errors, but come with the crucial drawback of unstable thresholds in recursive estimations. We propose two alternatives for threshold setting with similar or better out-of-sample performance: (i) including preferences in the estimation itself and (ii) setting thresholds ex-ante according to preferences only. Given probabilistic model output, it is intuitive that a decision rule is independent of the data or model specification, as thresholds on probabilities represent a willingness to issue a false alarm vis-à-vis missing a crisis. We provide real-world and simulation evidence that this simplification results in stable thresholds, while keeping or improving on out-of-sample performance. Our solution is not restricted to binary-choice models, but directly transferable to the signaling approach and all probabilistic early-warning models.
Artikel Lesen
Surges and Instability: The Maturity Shortening Channel
Xiang Li, Dan Su
IWH-Diskussionspapiere,
Nr. 23,
2020
Abstract
Capital inflow surges destabilise the economy through a maturity shortening mechanism. Our main findings are threefold. First, surges are not just scaled-up normal flows, as they change the shape of the interest rate term structure. Second, corporate debt maturity shortens substantially during surges, especially for firms with foreign bank relationships. Third, the probability of a crisis following surges with a widened term spread is at least twice that after surges without one. Our work suggests that financial globalisation is not merely an equalisation of interest rate differentials, and debt maturity is key to understanding the consequences of capital inflow bonanzas.
Artikel Lesen
Decentralisation of Collective Bargaining: A Path to Productivity?
Daniele Aglio, Filippo di Mauro
IWH-CompNet Discussion Papers,
Nr. 3,
2020
Abstract
Productivity developments have been rather divergent across EU countries and particularly between Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and elsewhere in the continent (non-CEE). How is such phenomenon related to wage bargaining institutions? Starting from the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) shock, we analyse whether the specific set-up of wage bargaining prevailing in non-CEE may have helped their respective firms to sustain productivity in the aftermath of the crisis. To tackle the issue, we merge the CompNet dataset – of firm-level based productivity indicators – with the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) survey on wage bargaining institutions. We show that there is a substantial difference in the institutional set-up between the two above groups of countries. First, in CEE countries the bulk of the wage bargaining (some 60%) takes place outside collective bargaining schemes. Second, when a collective bargaining system is adopted in CEE countries, it is prevalently in the form of firm-level bargaining (i. e. the strongest form of decentralisation), while in non-CEE countries is mostly subject to multi-level bargaining (i. e. an intermediate regime, only moderately decentralised). On productivity impacts, we show that firms’ TFP in the non-CEE region appears to have benefitted from the chosen form of decentralisation, while no such effects are detectable in CEE countries. On the channels of transmission, we show that decentralisation in non-CEE countries is also negatively correlated with dismissals and with unit labour costs, suggesting that such collective bargaining structure may have helped to better match workers with firms’ needs.
Artikel Lesen
Do Conventional Monetary Policy Instruments Matter in Unconventional Times?
Manuel Buchholz, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
Journal of Banking & Finance,
September
2020
Abstract
This paper investigates how declines in the deposit facility rate set by the ECB affect euro area banks’ incentives to hold reserves at the central bank. We find that, in the face of lower deposit rates, banks with a more interest-sensitive business model are more likely to reduce reserve holdings and allocate freed-up liquidity to loans. The result is driven by banks in the non-GIIPS countries of the euro area. This reveals that conventional monetary policy instruments have limited effects in restoring monetary policy transmission during times of crisis.
Artikel Lesen
The Cleansing Effect of Banking Crises
Reint E. Gropp, Steven Ongena, Jörg Rocholl, Vahid Saadi
IWH-Diskussionspapiere,
Nr. 12,
2020
Abstract
We assess the cleansing effects of the recent banking crisis. In U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks during the crisis, there is less restructuring in the real sector and the banking sector remains less healthy for several years after the crisis. Regions with less supervisory forbearance experience higher productivity growth after the crisis with more firm entries, job creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. Supervisory forbearance is greater for state-chartered banks and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks, while recapitalisation of distressed banks through TARP does not facilitate cleansing.
Artikel Lesen
The Cleansing Effect of Banking Crises
Reint E. Gropp, Steven Ongena, Jörg Rocholl, Vahid Saadi
Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Papers,
2020
Abstract
We assess the cleansing effects of the recent banking crisis. In U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks during the crisis, there is less restructuring in the real sector and the banking sector remains less healthy for several years after the crisis. Regions with less supervisory forbearance experience higher productivity growth after the crisis with more firm entries, job creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. Supervisory forbearance is greater for state-chartered banks and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks, while recapitalization of distressed banks through TARP does not facilitate cleansing.
Artikel Lesen
The Corona Recession and Bank Stress in Germany
Reint E. Gropp, Michael Koetter, William McShane
IWH Online,
Nr. 4,
2020
Abstract
We conduct stress tests for a large sample of German banks across different recoveries from the Corona recession. We find that, depending on how quickly the economy recovers, between 6% to 28% of banks could become distressed from defaulting corporate borrowers alone. Many of these banks are likely to require regulatory intervention or may even fail. Even in our most optimistic scenario, bank capital ratios decline by nearly 24%. The sum of total loans held by distressed banks could plausibly range from 127 to 624 billion Euros and it may take years before the full extent of this stress is observable. Hence, the current recession could result in an acute contraction in lending to the real economy, thereby worsening the current recession , decelerating the recovery, or perhaps even causing a “double dip” recession. Additionally, we show that the corporate portfolio of savings and cooperative banks is more than five times as exposed to small firms as that of commercial banks and Landesbanken. The preliminary evidence indicates small firms are particularly exposed to the current crisis, which implies that cooperative and savings banks are at especially high risk of becoming distressed. Given that the financial difficulties may seriously impair the recovery from the Covid-19 crisis, the pressure to bail out large parts of the banking system will be strong. Recent research suggests that the long run benefits of largely resisting these pressures may be high and could result in a more efficient economy.
Artikel Lesen
Corona Shutdown and Bankruptcy Risk
Oliver Holtemöller, Yaz Gulnur Muradoglu
IWH Online,
Nr. 3,
2020
Abstract
This paper investigates the consequences of shutdowns during the Corona crisis on the risk of bankruptcy for firms in Germany and United Kingdom. We use financial statements from the period 2014 to 2018 to predict how pervasive risk of bankruptcy becomes for micro, small, medium, and large firms due to shutdown measures. We estimate distress for firms using their capacity to service their debt. Our results indicate that under three months of shutdown almost all firms in shutdown industries face high risk of bankruptcy. In Germany, about 99% of firms in shutdown industries and in the UK about 98% of firms in shutdown industries are predicted to be under distress. The furlough schemes reduce the risk of bankruptcy only marginally to 97% of firms in shutdown industries in Germany and 95% of firms in shutdown industries in the United Kingdom in case of a three-month shutdown. In sectors that are not shutdown under conservative estimates of contagion of sales losses, our results indicate considerable risk of widespread bankruptcies ranging from 76% of firms in Germany to 69% of firms in the United Kingdom. These early findings suggest that the impact of corona crisis on corporate sector via shutdowns can be severe and subsequent policy should be designed accordingly.
Artikel Lesen
Firm Productivity Report
Annalisa Ferrando, Tibor Lalinsky, Phillip Meinen, Ottavia Papagalli, Roberta Serafini, Johannes Amlung, Tommaso Bighelli, Roman Blyzniuk, Marco Christophori, Jonathan Deist, Mirja Hälbig, Peter Haug, Matthias Mertens, Verena Plümpe, Filippo di Mauro, Sergio Inferrera, Marc Melitz
CompNet - The Competitive Research Network,
2020
Abstract
As we enter a second phase of the COVID-pandemic, in which we attempt to reopen economies and foster growth, investigating the efficiency and productivity of firms becomes essential if we wish to design the appropriate policies. The 2020 Flagship Firm Productivity report provides a comprehensive account of how productivity is changing –and what is driving those changes –in Europe, drawing from granular firm-level information.Although it was written before the crisis erupted, this report can therefore offer critical insights to current policymaking andprovides grounds for future research.
Artikel Lesen
