Der Staat und die Banken: Bankenregulierung im Kontext dynamischer Entwicklungen und unter Berücksichtigung indirekt betroffener Akteure
Melina Ludolph, Lena Tonzer
ifo Schnelldienst,
Nr. 7,
2024
Abstract
Finanzmarktkrisen verursachen in der Regel hohe Kosten. Banken müssen stabilisiert werden, um einen Zusammenbruch des Bankensystems zu verhindern, was immense Kosten für den Staat bedeuten kann. Ebenso kommt es im Zuge von Finanzmarktkrisen zu einem starken Rückgang der wirtschaftlichen Aktivität, der im Vergleich zu gewöhnlichen Rezessionen länger anhält. Die Finanzmarktkrise hat dies ein weiteres Mal verdeutlicht und eine Phase der signifikanten Verschärfung der Regulierung und Aufsicht von Banken eingeleitet. Die Legislative hat das »Window of Opportunity« gut genutzt, und sowohl auf nationaler als auch auf europäischer Ebene wurden neue gesetzliche Grundlagen für eine stärkere Regulierung des Bankensystems erfolgreich eingeführt. Ein erster Erfolg des neuen regulatorischen Umfelds zeigte sich während der Corona-Pandemie, in der das Bankensystem stabil blieb. Dies wird auch durch die aktuell steigenden Eigenkapitalquoten und vergleichsweise niedrigen Ausfallraten im Kreditportfolio der Banken deutlich. Hervorzuheben ist außerdem, dass nicht nur auf nationaler Ebene Anstrengungen unternommen wurden, das regulatorische Umfeld für Banken zu verbessern, sondern dass es auch auf Ebene der Europäischen Union (EU) gelungen ist, mit dem »Single Rulebook« einen einheitlichen regulatorischen Rahmen zu schaffen. Dies wirkt Verschiebungen von Risiken innerhalb der EU entgegen. Trotz dieser Erfolge und positiven Entwicklungen darf nicht übersehen werden, dass sich durch staatliches Eingreifen und die Einführung neuer Regulierungsvorschriften nicht nur der betroffene Sektor, also die Banken, anpassen. Es kann auch zu Auswirkungen auf verschiedenste Akteure kommen, die direkt oder indirekt mit dem Bankensystem interagieren. Zudem kann es im Anpassungsprozess zu dynamischen Effekten kommen. Im Beitrag gehen wir auf zwei ausgewählte Aspekte ein, welche in diesem Zusammenhang von der Legislative zu beachten sind.
Der Beitrag ist Teil des Artikels “Die Zukunft des europäischen Finanzsystems – zwischen Risiken und mangelnder Wettbewerbsfähigkeit?“, erschienen in: ifo Schnelldienst, 2024, 77, Nr. 07, 03-36.
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The Disciplining Effect of Supervisory Scrutiny in the EU-wide Stress Test
Christoffer Kok, Carola Müller, Steven Ongena, Cosimo Pancaro
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
January
2023
Abstract
Relying on confidential supervisory data related to the 2016 EU-wide stress test, this paper presents novel empirical evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated to stress testing has a disciplining effect on bank risk. We find that banks that participated in the 2016 EU-wide stress test subsequently reduced their credit risk relative to banks that were not part of this exercise. Relying on new metrics for supervisory scrutiny that measure the quantity, potential impact, and duration of interactions between banks and supervisors during the stress test, we find that the disciplining effect is stronger for banks subject to more intrusive supervisory scrutiny during the exercise. We also find that a strong risk management culture is a prerequisite for the supervisory scrutiny to be effective. Finally, we show that a similar disciplining effect is not exerted neither by higher capital charges nor by more transparency and related market discipline induced by the stress test.
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Climate Change-Related Regulatory Risks and Bank Lending
Isabella Müller, Eleonora Sfrappini
ECB Working Paper,
Nr. 2670,
2022
Abstract
We identify the effect of climate change-related regulatory risks on credit real-location. Our evidence suggests that effects depend borrower's region. Following an increase in salience of regulatory risks, banks reallocate credit to US firms that could be negatively impacted by regulatory interventions. Conversely, in Europe, banks lend more to firms that could benefit from environmental regulation. The effect is moderated by banks' own loan portfolio composition. Banks with a portfolio tilted towards firms that could be negatively a affected by environmental policies increasingly support these firms. Overall, our results indicate that financial implications of regulation associated with climate change appear to be the main drivers of banks' behavior.
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Capital Requirements, Market Structure, and Heterogeneous Banks
Carola Müller
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 15,
2022
Abstract
Bank regulators interfere with the efficient allocation of resources for the sake of financial stability. Based on this trade-off, I compare how different capital requirements affect default probabilities and the allocation of market shares across heterogeneous banks. In the model, banks‘ productivity determines their optimal strategy in oligopolistic markets. Higher productivity gives banks higher profit margins that lower their default risk. Hence, capital requirements indirectly aiming at high-productivity banks are less effective. They also bear a distortionary cost: Because incumbents increase interest rates, new entrants with low productivity are attracted and thus average productivity in the banking market decreases.
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Are Bank Capital Requirements Optimally Set? Evidence from Researchers’ Views
Gene Ambrocio, Iftekhar Hasan, Esa Jokivuolle, Kim Ristolainen
Journal of Financial Stability,
October
2020
Abstract
We survey 149 leading academic researchers on bank capital regulation. The median (average) respondent prefers a 10% (15%) minimum non-risk-weighted equity-to-assets ratio, which is considerably higher than the current requirement. North Americans prefer a significantly higher equity-to-assets ratio than Europeans. We find substantial support for the new forms of regulation introduced in Basel III, such as liquidity requirements. Views are most dispersed regarding the use of hybrid assets and bail-inable debt in capital regulation. 70% of experts would support an additional market-based capital requirement. When investigating factors driving capital requirement preferences, we find that the typical expert believes a five percentage points increase in capital requirements would “probably decrease” both the likelihood and social cost of a crisis with “minimal to no change” to loan volumes and economic activity. The best predictor of capital requirement preference is how strongly an expert believes that higher capital requirements would increase the cost of bank lending.
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What’s slowing down the European Banking Union?
Simon Grothe, Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
LSE Business Review,
2020
Abstract
Differences in national bank regulation and supervision hamper the process; political factors play a minor role, write Simon Grothe, Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, and Lena Tonzer
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Drivers of Systemic Risk: Do National and European Perspectives Differ?
Claudia M. Buch, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
Journal of International Money and Finance,
March
2019
Abstract
With the establishment of the Banking Union, the European Central Bank has been granted the power to impose stricter regulations than the national regulator if systemic risks are not adequately addressed at the national level. We ask whether there is a cross-border externality in the sense that a bank’s systemic risk differs when applying a national versus a European perspective. On average, banks’ contribution to systemic risk is similar at the two regional levels, and so is the ranking of banks. Generally, larger banks and banks with a lower share of loans are more systemically important. The effects of these variables are qualitatively but not quantitatively similar at the national versus the European level.
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