Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital?
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
We study how banks use “regulatory adjustments” to inflate their regulatory capital ratios and whether this depends on forbearance on the part of national authorities. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that banks substantially inflated their levels of regulatory capital via a reduction in regulatory adjustments — without a commensurate increase in book equity and without a reduction in bank risk. We document substantial heterogeneity in regulatory capital inflation across countries, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.
Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital
The implementation of supranational regulations at the national level often provides national authorities with substantial room to engage in discretion and forbearance. Using evidence from a supranational increase in bank capital requirements, this column shows that national authorities may assist banks' efforts to inflate their regulatory capital to pass such supranational requirements. While supranational rules should be binding in theory, national discretion may effectively undermine them in practice.
Are Bank Capital Requirements Optimally Set? Evidence from Researchers’ Views
Journal of Financial Stability,
We survey 149 leading academic researchers on bank capital regulation. The median (average) respondent prefers a 10% (15%) minimum non-risk-weighted equity-to-assets ratio, which is considerably higher than the current requirement. North Americans prefer a significantly higher equity-to-assets ratio than Europeans. We find substantial support for the new forms of regulation introduced in Basel III, such as liquidity requirements. Views are most dispersed regarding the use of hybrid assets and bail-inable debt in capital regulation. 70% of experts would support an additional market-based capital requirement. When investigating factors driving capital requirement preferences, we find that the typical expert believes a five percentage points increase in capital requirements would “probably decrease” both the likelihood and social cost of a crisis with “minimal to no change” to loan volumes and economic activity. The best predictor of capital requirement preference is how strongly an expert believes that higher capital requirements would increase the cost of bank lending.
24.04.2017 • 22/2017
Höhere Kapitalforderungen: Am Ende leiden die Unternehmen
61 europäische Banken sollten bis 2012 ihre Kapitaldecke erhöhen, um ausreichend Puffer für zukünftige Krisen aufzubauen. Wie die Studie der Forschergruppe um Reint E. Gropp vom Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) zeigt, setzten die Banken diese Forderung auch in die Tat um – allerdings nicht, indem sie sich frisches Kapital beschafften, sondern indem sie ihr Kreditangebot verringerten. Die Folge: geringeres Bilanz-, Investitions- und Umsatzwachstum von Unternehmen, die größere Kredite von diesen Banken hielten.
International Banking and Cross-Border Effects of Regulation: Lessons from Canada
International Journal of Central Banking,
We study how changes in prudential requirements affect cross-border lending of Canadian banks by utilizing an index that aggregates adjustments in key regulatory instruments across jurisdictions. We show that when a destination country tightens local prudential measures, Canadian banks increase the growth rate of lending to that jurisdiction, and the effect is particularly significant when capital requirements are tightened and weaker if banks lend mainly via affiliates. Our evidence also suggests that Canadian banks adjust foreign lending in response to domestic regulatory changes. The results confirm the presence of heterogeneous spillover effects of foreign prudential requirements.
Why do banks hold capital in excess of regulatory requirements? A functional approach
IWH Discussion Papers,
This paper provides an explanation for the observation that banks hold on average a capital ratio in excess of regulatory requirements. We use a functional approach to banking based on Diamond and Rajan (2001) to demonstrate that banks can use capital ratios as a strategic tool for renegotiating loans with borrowers. As capital ratios affect the ability of banks to collect loans in a nonmonotonic way, a bank may be forced to exceed capital requirements. Moreover, high capital ratios may also constrain the amount a banker can borrow from investors. Consequently, the size of the banking sector may shrink.
Kapitalbedarf und Kapitaltransfer: Der Fall Osteuropa