29.07.2021 • 20/2021
Kommunikation statt Konflikt – was weibliche CEOs für Hedgefonds interessant macht
Der Wert weiblich geführter Unternehmen wird durch die Intervention aktivistischer Investoren stärker erhöht als der von Unternehmen mit männlichen CEOs. Das geht aus einer aktuellen Veröffentlichung von Iftekhar Hasan (Fordham University und IWH) und Qiang Wu (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, RPI) am Leibniz Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) hervor. „Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass weibliche CEOs aufgrund ihrer starken kommunikativen und zwischenmenschlichen Fähigkeiten besonders von der Intervention von aktivistischen Hedgefonds profitieren“, erklärt Iftekhar Hasan. Denn im Durchschnitt erhöht das Eingreifen eines aktivistischen Hedgefonds den Wert des Unternehmens ex post. Um das zu erreichen, setzen aktivistische Hedgefonds wie Carl Icahn, Trian Fundmanagement oder Elliott bevorzugt auf Kommunikation und Kooperation mit dem Management.
DPE Course Programme Archive
DPE Course Programme Archive 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018...
Executives with Customer Experience and Firm Performance in the B2B Context
European Journal of Marketing,
This paper aims to examine the presence of an executive with customer experience (ECE) in a supplier firm’s top management team (TMT). The role of ECE presence remains understudied in the marketing literature. This study attempts to examine the relationship between ECE presence and firm performance.
This paper draws on the resource-based view of the firm and adopts a panel firm fixed effects estimator to test the proposed hypotheses. The empirical analysis uses a sample of 1,974 firm-year observations with 489 unique supplier firms. Selection-induced endogeneity is mitigated through the Heckman procedure.
ECE presence improves firm performance. Additionally, firms benefit less from ECE presence if a board member with customer experience (BCE) is also present, if a chief executive officer commands a higher pay slice (compared to other executives), and if a TMT is more functionally diversified. However, ECE presence is particularly beneficial if the overall economy is in contraction. Comparing the functional positions held by ECEs reveals that ECE in the marketing function (as a chief marketing officer) offers the largest benefit to an average supplier firm. ECE presence is also associated with other firm outcomes (e.g. bankruptcy odds, innovation and customer orientation).
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IWH Doctoral Programme in Economics
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Unethical Employee Behavior Against Coworkers Following Unkind Management Treatment: An Experimental Analysis
Managerial and Decision Economics,
We study unethical behavior toward unrelated coworkers as a response to managerial unkindness with two experiments. In our lab experiment, we do not find that subjects who experienced unkindness are more likely to cheat in a subsequent competition against another coworker who simultaneously experienced mistreatment. A subsequent survey experiment suggests that behavior in the lab can be explained by individuals' preferences for norm adherence, because unkind management behavior does not alter the perceived moral appropriateness of cheating. However, having no shared experience of managerial unkindness opens up some moral wiggle room for employees to misbehave at the costs of others.
Are Credit Rating Disagreements Priced in the M&A Market?
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money,
This paper examines the effect of credit rating disagreements on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions. We show that acquirers with split ratings prefer to use stock to finance their acquisitions. More importantly, we find that acquirers with split ratings experience lower announcement returns. Further analysis shows that overpayment by acquirers with split ratings is concentrated in acquirers with entrenched managers. Our results are robust to alternative identification strategies. Overall, our evidence indicates that credit rating disagreements are heavily priced in the M&A market.
Brown Bag Seminar
Brown Bag Seminar Financial Markets Department In der Seminarreihe "Brown...
Financial Analysts' Career Concerns and the Cost of Private Debt
Journal of Corporate Finance,
Career-concerned analysts are averse to firm risk. Not only does higher firm risk require more effort to analyze the firm, thus constraining analysts' ability to earn more remuneration through covering more firms, but it also jeopardizes their research quality and career advancement. As such, career concerns incentivize analysts to pressure firms to undertake risk-management activities, thus leading to a lower cost of debt. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a negative association between analyst career concerns and bank loan spreads. In addition, our mediation analysis suggests that this association is achieved through the channel of reducing firm risk. Additional tests suggest that the effect of analyst career concerns on loan spreads is more pronounced for firms with higher analyst coverage. Our study is the first to identify the demand for risk management as a key channel through which analysts help reduce the cost of debt.
The State Expropriation Risk and the Pricing of Foreign Earnings
Journal of International Accounting Research,
We examine the pricing of U.S. multinational firms' foreign earnings in regard to their risk of expropriation and unfair treatment by the governments of the countries in which their international subsidiaries are located. Using 8,891 firm-years observations during the 2001–2013 period, we find that the value relevance of foreign earnings increases with the improvement of the protection from state expropriation risk in the subsidiary host-countries. Our results are not driven by the earnings management practice, investor distraction, country informativeness, and political and trade relationship of a foreign country with the U.S. Furthermore, our results are robust to the confounding effects of country factors, measurement error in the variable of the risk of expropriation, the influence of private contracting institutions, and endogeneity in the decision of the location of subsidiaries.