Economic Preferences for Risk-Taking and Financing Costs
Manthos D. Delis, Iftekhar Hasan, Maria Iosifidi, Chris Tsoumas
Journal of Corporate Finance,
June
2023
Abstract
We hypothesize and empirically establish that economic preferences for risk-taking in different subnational regions affect firm financing costs. We study this hypothesis by hand-matching firms' regions worldwide with the corresponding regional economic risk-taking preferences. We first show that higher regional risk-taking is positively associated with several measures of firm risk and investments. Subsequently, our baseline results show that credit and bond pricing increase when risk-taking preferences increase. For the loan of average size and maturity a one-standard-deviation increase in regional risk-taking increases interest expense by $0.54 million USD. We also find that these results are demand (firm)-driven and stronger for firms with more local shareholders.
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Finanzstabilität
Finanzsysteme: Die Anatomie der Marktwirtschaft Wie ist das Finanzsystem aufgebaut, wie funktioniert es, wie...
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Executive Equity Risk-Taking Incentives and Firms’ Choice of Debt Structure
Iftekhar Hasan, Walid Saffar, Yangyang Chen, Leon Zolotoy
Journal of Banking and Finance,
December
2021
Abstract
We examine how executive equity risk-taking incentives affect firms’ choice of debt structure. Using a longitudinal sample of U.S. firms, we document that when executive compensation is more sensitive to stock volatility (i.e., has higher vega), firms reduce their reliance on bank debt financing. We utilize the passage of the Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R option-expensing regulation as an exogenous shock to management option compensation to account for potential endogeneity. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the documented effect of vega is amplified among firms with higher growth opportunities and more opaque financial information; we also find vega's effect is mitigated in firms with limited abilities to tap into public debt market. Supplemental analyses suggest that firms with higher vega face more stringent bank loan covenants. We conclude that, by encouraging risk-taking, higher vega reduces firms’ reliance on bank debt financing in order to avoid more stringent bank monitoring.
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Warum Boni im Bankenbereich scheitern (müssen)
Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 3,
2021
Abstract
In der Finanzkrise sind Boni für Bankmanager in die Kritik geraten. Bonussysteme stehen im Verdacht, Anreize für eine zu riskante Kreditvergabe zu setzen. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht am Beispiel einer großen internationalen Geschäftsbank, wie sich ein Bonussystem, das ein hohes Volumen neu vergebener Kredite belohnt und den Ausfall von Krediten bestraft, auf das Verhalten von Kreditsachbearbeitern auswirkt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Kreditsachbearbeiter die Anbahnung neuer und die Überwachung bestehender Kredite verstärken, wenn sie ihren monatlichen Bonus zu verlieren drohen. Eine genauere Prüfung von Kreditanträgen findet dagegen nicht statt. Kreditsachbearbeiter passen ihr Verhalten besonders gegen Monatsende an, wenn die Bonuszahlung herannaht. Langjährige Mitarbeiter reagieren stärker auf das System als jüngere Kollegen. Komplexe Produktivitätsaspekte wie die Teamfähigkeit können mit Bonussystemen nicht erfasst werden.
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Entry into Self-employment and Individuals’ Risk-taking Propensities
Matthias Brachert, Walter Hyll, Abdolkarim Sadrieh
Small Business Economics,
Nr. 4,
2020
Abstract
Most of the existing empirical literature on self-employment decisions assumes that individuals’ risk-taking propensities are stable over time. We allow for endogeneity on both sides when examining the relationship between individual risk-taking propensities and entry into self-employment. We confirm that a greater risk-taking propensity is associated with a higher probability of entering self-employment. However, we also find evidence that entering self-employment is associated with a significant and substantial increase in an individual’s propensity to take risks. Our findings add to the growing evidence that risk-taking propensities are not only inborn, but also determined by environmental factors.
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What Does Peer-to-Peer Lending Evidence Say About the Risk-taking Channel of Monetary Policy?
Yiping Huang, Xiang Li, Chu Wang
Abstract
This paper uses loan application-level data from a Chinese peer-to-peer lending platform to study the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. By employing a direct ex-ante measure of risk-taking and estimating the simultaneous equations of loan approval and loan amount, we are the first to provide quantitative evidence of the impact of monetary policy on the risk-taking of nonbank financial institution. We find that the search-for-yield is the main workhorse of the risk-taking effect, while we do not observe consistent findings of risk-shifting from the liquidity change. Monetary policy easing is associated with a higher probability of granting loans to risky borrowers and a greater riskiness of credit allocation, but these changes do not necessarily relate to a larger loan amount on average.
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What Does Peer-to-Peer Lending Evidence Say About the Risk-taking Channel of Monetary Policy?
Yiping Huang, Xiang Li, Chu Wang
Abstract
This paper uses loan application-level data from a peer-to-peer lending platform to study the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. By employing a direct ex-ante measure of risk-taking and estimating the simultaneous equations of loan approval and loan amount, we are the first to provide quantitative evidence of the impact of monetary policy on the risk-taking of nonbank financial institution. We find that the search-for-yield is the main workhorse of the risk-taking effect, while we do not observe consistent findings of risk-shifting from the liquidity change. Monetary policy easing is associated with a higher probability of granting loans to risky borrowers and a greater riskiness of credit allocation, but these changes do not necessarily relate to a larger loan amount on average.
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National Culture and Risk-taking: Evidence from the Insurance Industry
Chrysovalantis Gaganis, Iftekhar Hasan, Panagiota Papadimitri, Menelaos Tasiou
Journal of Business Research,
April
2019
Abstract
The gravity of insurance within the financial sector is constantly increasing. Reasonably, after the events of the recent financial turmoil, the domain of research that examines the factors driving the risk-taking of this industry has been signified. The purpose of the present study is to investigate the interplay between national culture and risk of insurance firms. We quantify the cultural overtones, measuring national culture considering the dimensions outlined by the Hofstede model and risk-taking using the ‘Z-score’. In a sample consisting of 801 life and non-life insurance firms operating across 42 countries over the period 2007–2016, we find a strong and significant relationship among insurance firms' risk-taking and cultural characteristics, such as individualism, uncertainty avoidance and power distance. Results remain robust to a variety of firm and country-specific controls, alternative measures of risk, sample specifications and tests designed to alleviate endogeneity.
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Moral und Aktienerträge: Die Rolle von Dividenden und ethischen Bedenken bei der Bewertung von „Sin Stocks“
Stefano Colonnello, Talina Sondershaus
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 3,
2018
Abstract
Forschungsergebnisse aus den letzten Jahren zeigen: Renditen von so genannten „Sin Stocks“, das heißt Aktien von Unternehmen, die aus Sicht der Investoren moralisch verwerflichen Tätigkeiten nachgehen, sind durchschnittlich höher als Renditen anderer Unternehmen. Aber warum gibt es hier einen Unterschied, und was könnten die Faktoren sein, die diesen Unterschied hervorrufen? Ein neues Arbeitspapier des IWH zeigt theoretisch und datenbasiert, wodurch unterschiedliche Renditen hervorgerufen werden. Dabei werden bisherige Erklärungsversuche, die auf dem so genannten „Boykott-Risiko“ basieren, um neue Ansätze ergänzt. Es werden zunächst in einem theoretischen Rahmen Situationen beschrieben, in denen die Möglichkeit, ethische Ansprüche der Investoren durch höhere Dividendenzahlungen zu ersetzen, sowie die Risikobereitschaft der Investoren die zentrale Rolle für unterschiedliche Renditen spielen. Im zweiten Teil werden diese hypothetischen Szenarien anhand von Daten zu US-Firmen über 50 Jahre getestet. Es zeigt sich, dass insbesondere Investoren, die sehr risikoscheu sind und lieber höhere Dividendenzahlungen von Unternehmen erhalten würden, die ihren ethischen Ansprüchen genügen, für ihr eingegangenes Risiko mittels höherer Erträge kompensiert werden wollen.
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