We examine how banks manage carbon transition risk by selling loans given to polluting borrowers to less regulated shadow banks in securitization markets. Exploiting the election of Donald Trump as an exogenous shock that reduces carbon risk, we find that banks’ securitization decisions are sensitive to borrowers’ carbon footprints. Banks are more likely to securitize brown loans when carbon risk is high but swiftly change to keep these loans on their balance sheets when carbon risk is reduced after Trump’s election. Importantly, securitization enables banks to offer lower interest rates to polluting borrowers but does not affect the supply of green loans. Our findings are more pronounced among domestic banks and banks that do not display green lending preferences. We discuss how securitization can weaken the effectiveness of bank climate policies through reducing banks’ incentives to price carbon risk.

We investigate how global banks’ macroeconomic expectations for borrower countries influence their credit supply. Utilizing granular data on varying expectations among banks lending to the same firm at the same time, combined with an instrumental variable approach, we find that more optimistic GDP growth expectations for a borrower country are strongly linked to increased credit supply. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in a lender’s GDP growth expectation for the borrower’s country corresponds to an increase of 8.46 percentage points in the loan share, equivalent to approximately 0.75 standard deviations of the loan share and $75.35 million in loan amount. In contrast, global banks’ short-term inflation expectations do not show a significant impact on their credit supply.

We study the corporate-loan pricing decisions of a major, systemic bank during the Greek financial crisis. A unique aspect of our data set is that we observe both the actual interest rate and the “break-even rate” (BE rate) of each loan, as computed by the bank’s own loan-pricing department (in effect, the loan’s marginal cost). We document that low-BE-rate (safer) borrowers are charged significant markups, whereas high-BE-rate (riskier) borrowers are charged smaller and even negative markups. We rationalize this de facto cross-subsidization through the lens of a dynamic model featuring depressed collateral values, impaired capital-market access, and limit pricing.

We study whether and how EU banks comply with tighter macroprudential policy (MPP). Observing contractual details for more than one million securitized loans, we document an elusive risk-shifting response by EU banks in reaction to tighter loan-to-value (LTV) restrictions between 2009 and 2022. Our staggered difference-in-differences reveals that banks respond to these MPP measures at the portfolio level by issuing new loans after LTV shocks that are smaller, have shorter maturities, and show a higher collateral valuation while holding constant interest rates. Instead of contracting aggregate lending as intended by tighter MPP, banks increase the number and total volume of newly issued loans. Importantly, new loans finance especially properties in less liquid markets identified by a new European Real Estate Index (EREI), which we interpret as a novel, elusive form of risk-shifting.

Banks have been operating in a low interest rate environment paired with booming housing markets. For the largest banks in the euro area and the period 2015-2022, we assess whether banks reallocate their foreign loan portfolio backed by real estate as a response to differences in local lending spreads across the home and destination country and conditional on reduced information frictions due to borrowing-country exposures. The main result is that the relative share of foreign real estate backed lending increases in case of return opportunities, and this sensitivity depends on local exposures towards the borrowing country. The result is driven by subsamples for which neither the home nor the borrowing country have implemented macroprudential regulation targeting real estate lending, or for which there is a misalignment in macroprudential policies. Nevertheless, we find limited evidence that the riskiness of real estate backed loans goes up during our sample period, and we discuss potential reasons for this result including the possibility of hidden losses.

Our results reveal that higher lending spreads between foreign and home markets redirect real estate backed lending towards foreign markets offering a higher interest rate, which provides evidence for "search for yield" behavior. This re-allocation is found especially for banks with more expertise on the foreign market due to a higher local activity and holds for commercial and residential real estate backed loans. Furthermore, "search for yield" behavior and a resulting increase in foreign real estate backed lending is found when macroprudential regulation is missing or misaligned between a bank’s country of residence and the destination country. When turning to the question of whether the detected search for yield behavior results in more risk, we find that especially better capitalized banks report higher forbearance ratios as they might face less stigma effects compared to low capitalized banks.

Abstract This paper examines the effect of dislocations in foreign currency (FX) swap markets ("CIP deviations") on bank lending. Using data from UK banks we show that when the cost of obtaining swap-based funds in a particular foreign currency increases, banks reduce the supply of cross-border credit in that currency. This effect is increasing in the degree of banks' reliance on swap-based FX funding. Access to foreign relatives matters as banks employ internal capital markets to shield their cross-border FX lending supply from the described channel. Partial substitution occurs from banks outside the UK not affected by changes in synthetic funding costs.