The Value of Firm Networks: A Natural Experiment on Board Connections
Ester Faia, Maximilian Mayer, Vincenzo Pezone
SAFE Working Papers,
Nr. 269,
2022
Abstract
We present causal evidence on the effect of boardroom networks on firm value and compensation policies. We exploit a ban on interlocking directorates of Italian financial and insurance companies as exogenous variation and show that firms that lose centrality in the network experience negative abnormal returns around the announcement date. The key driver of our results is the role of boardroom connections in reducing asymmetric information. The complementarities with the input-output and cross-ownership networks are consistent with this channel. Using hand-collected data, we also show that network centrality has a positive effect on directors’ compensation, providing evidence of rent sharing.
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Lena Tonzer
PolEconFin Initiative,
2021
Abstract
The regulatory architecture of the financial system has significantly changed after the global financial crisis of 2008/09. In Europe, the introduction of the Single Rulebook has been a major change and provides the legal foundation for the European Banking Union (EBU). The Single Rulebook consists of a regulation, the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), and three main directives targeting capital regulation and compensation of managers, harmonization of deposit insurance schemes, as well as resolution and restructuring rules (Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV), Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD), Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)).
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Financial Incentives and Loan Officer Behavior: Multitasking and Allocation of Effort under an Incomplete Contract
Patrick Behr, Alejandro H. Drexler, Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
Nr. 4,
2020
Abstract
We investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a nonlinear compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance. Using a unique data set provided by a large international commercial bank, we examine the main activities that loan officers perform: loan prospecting, screening, and monitoring. We find that when loan officers are at risk of losing their bonuses, they increase prospecting and monitoring. We further show that loan officers adjust their behavior more toward the end of the month when bonus payments are approaching. These effects are more pronounced for loan officers with longer tenures at the bank.
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The Value of Firm Networks: A Natural Experiment on Board Connections
Ester Faia, Maximilian Mayer, Vincenzo Pezone
CEPR Discussion Papers,
Nr. 14591,
2020
Abstract
This paper presents causal evidence of the effects of boardroom networks on firm value and compensation policies. We exploit exogenous variation in network centrality arising from a ban on interlocking directorates of Italian financial and insurance companies. We leverage this shock to show that firms whose centrality in the network rises after the reform experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement date and are better hedged against shocks. Information dissemination plays a central role: results are driven by firms that have higher idiosyncratic volatility, low analyst coverage, and more uncertainty surrounding their earnings forecasts. Firms benefit more from boardroom centrality when they are more central in the input-output network, hence more susceptible to upstream shocks, when they are less central in the cross-ownership network, or when they have low profitability or low growth opportunities. Network centrality also results in higher directors' compensation, due to rent sharing and improved executives' outside option, and more similar compensation policies between connected firms.
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Executive Compensation and Labor Expenses
Stefano Colonnello
B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy,
Nr. 1,
2020
Abstract
Using data on US public firms, I uncover a strong and positive correlation between executive compensationand labor expenses. On average, a 1% increase in the wage bill translates into a 0.3% raise in total executivepay. This association is driven by wages rather than by employment growth, is stronger for the incentive thanfor the salary component of executive compensation, and is particularly pronounced in the financial sector.
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