IWH-FDI-Mikrodatenbank
IWH-FDI-Mikrodatenbank Die IWH-FDI-Mikrodatenbank (FDI = Foreign Direct Investment)...
Zur Seite
Lack of Selection and Limits to Delegation: Firm Dynamics in Developing Countries
Ufuk Akcigit, Harun Alp, Michael Peters
American Economic Review,
Nr. 1,
2021
Abstract
Delegating managerial tasks is essential for firm growth. Most firms in developing countries, however, do not hire outside managers but instead rely on family members. In this paper, we ask if this lack of managerial delegation can explain why firms in poor countries are small and whether it has important aggregate consequences. We construct a model of firm growth where entrepreneurs have a fixed time endowment to run their daily operations. As firms grow large, the need to hire outside managers increases. Firms’ willingness to expand therefore depends on the ease with which delegation can take place. We calibrate the model to plant-level data from the U.S. and India. We identify the key parameters of our theory by targeting the experimental evidence on the effect of managerial practices on firm performance from Bloom et al. (2013). We find that inefficiencies in the delegation environment account for 11% of the income per capita difference between the U.S. and India. They also contribute to the small size of Indian producers, but would cause substantially more harm for U.S. firms. The reason is that U.S. firms are larger on average and managerial delegation is especially valuable for large firms, thus making delegation efficiency and other factors affecting firm growth complements.
Artikel Lesen
Executive Compensation, Macroeconomic Conditions, and Cash Flow Cyclicality
Stefano Colonnello
Finance Research Letters,
November
2020
Abstract
I model the joint effects of debt, macroeconomic conditions, and cash flow cyclicality on risk-shifting behavior and managerial wealth-for-performance sensitivity. The model shows that risk-shifting incentives rise during recessions and that the shareholders can eliminate such adverse incentives by reducing the equity-based compensation in managerial contracts. Moreover, this reduction should be larger in highly procyclical firms. These novel, testable predictions provide insights into optimal shareholder responses to agency costs of debt throughout the business cycle.
Artikel Lesen
Managerial Effect or Firm Effect: Evidence from the Private Debt Market
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Yun Zhu
Financial Review,
Nr. 1,
2020
Abstract
This paper provides evidence that the managerial effect is a key determinant of firms’ cost of capital, in the context of private debt contracting. Applying the novel empirical method developed by an earlier study to a large sample that tracks the job movement of top managers, we find that the managerial effect is a critical and significant factor that explains a large part of the variation in loan contract terms more accurately than firm fixed effects. Additional evidence shows that banks “follow” managers when they change jobs and offer loan contracts with preferential terms to their new firms.
Artikel Lesen
Wage Delegation in the Field
Sabrina Jeworrek, Vanessa Mertins
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,
Nr. 4,
2019
Abstract
By conducting a natural field experiment, we analyze the managerial policy of delegating the wage choice to employees. We find that this policy enhances performance significantly, which is remarkable since allocated wage premiums of the same size have no effect at all. Observed self‐imposed wage restraints and absence of negative peer effects speak in favor of wage delegation, although the chosen wage premium levels severely dampen its net value. Additional experimental and survey data provide important insights into employees' underlying motivations.
Artikel Lesen
Motivating High‐impact Innovation: Evidence from Managerial Compensation Contracts
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Zenu Sharma, Maya Waisman
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments,
Nr. 3,
2019
Abstract
We investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation and firm innovation and find that long‐term incentives in the form of options, especially unvested options, and protection from managerial termination in the form of golden parachutes are positively related to corporate innovation, and particularly to high‐impact, exploratory (new knowledge creation) invention. Conversely, non‐equity pay has a detrimental effect on the input, output and impact of innovation. Tests using the passage of an option expensing regulation (FAS 123R) as an exogenous shock to option compensation suggest a causal interpretation for the link between long‐term pay incentives, patents and citations. Furthermore, we find that the decline in option pay following the implementation of FAS 123R has led to a significant reduction in exploratory innovation and therefore had a detrimental effect on innovation output. Overall, our findings support the idea that compensation contracts that protect from early project failure and incentivize long‐term commitment are more suitable for inducing high‐impact corporate innovation.
Artikel Lesen
Can Lenders Discern Managerial Ability from Luck? Evidence from Bank Loan Contracts
Dien Giau Bui, Yan-Shing Chen, Iftekhar Hasan, Chih-Yung Lin
Journal of Banking and Finance,
2018
Abstract
We investigate the effect of managerial ability versus luck on bank loan contracting. Borrowers showing a persistently superior managerial ability over previous years (more likely due to ability) enjoy a lower loan spread, while borrowers showing a temporary superior managerial ability (more likely due to luck) do not enjoy any spread reduction. This finding suggests that banks can discern ability from luck when pricing a loan. Firms with high-ability managers are more likely to continue their prior lower loan spread. The spread-reduction effect of managerial ability is stronger for firms with weak governance structures or poor stakeholder relationships, corroborating the notion that better managerial ability alleviates borrowers’ agency and information risks. We also find that well governed banks are better able to price governance into their borrowers’ loans, which helps explain why good governance enhances bank value.
Artikel Lesen
Managerial Stability and the Pricing of New Equity Issuances: The Effects of State Enforcement of Noncompetition Agreements
Yin-chi Liao, Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Haizhi Wang
International Review of Entrepreneurship,
Nr. 2,
2017
Abstract
In this paper, we empirically investigate the relationship between managerial stability induced by the legal enforcement of noncompetition agreements and the pricing of new equity issuances. Making use of the variation in the enforceability of noncompetition contracts across states in the U.S., we find that managerial stability is negatively related to underpricing and price revision for our sample of new equity issuing firms. Our results demonstrate that the stability of management is important for an issuing firm to convey its intrinsic value credibly to the market.
Artikel Lesen
Internal Governance and Creditor Governance: Evidence from Credit Default Swaps
Stefano Colonnello
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 6,
2017
Abstract
I study the relation between internal governance and creditor governance. A deterioration in creditor governance may increase the agency costs of debt and managerial opportunism at the expense of shareholders. I exploit the introduction of credit default swaps (CDS) as a negative shock to creditor governance. I provide evidence consistent with shareholders pushing for a substitution effect between internal governance and creditor governance. Following CDS introduction, CDS firms reduce managerial risk-taking incentives relative to other firms. At the same time, after the start of CDS trading, CDS firms increase managerial wealth-performance sensitivity, board independence, and CEO turnover performance-sensitivity relative to other firms.
Artikel Lesen
Relative Peer Quality and Firm Performance
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Sureshbabu Mani, Pengfei Ye
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 1,
2016
Abstract
We examine the performance impact of the relative quality of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO)’s compensation peers (peers to determine a CEO's overall compensation) and bonus peers (peers to determine a CEO's relative-performance-based bonus). We use the fraction of peers with greater managerial ability scores (Demerjian, Lev, and McVay, 2012) than the reporting firm to measure this CEO's relative peer quality (RPQ). We find that firms with higher RPQ earn higher stock returns and experience higher profitability growth than firms with lower RPQ. Learning among peers and the increased incentive to work harder induced by the peer-based tournament contribute to RPQ's performance effect.
Artikel Lesen
