Real estate is a capstone connection between various economic agents and markets. It is the main store of household wealth, serves as collateral for mortgage loans in the banking system, aids the transmission of monetary policy, and can propagate financial crises when overvalued. Yet comparable house-price data across the European Union (EU) and the euro area is unavailable, which hinders the design and evaluation of common monetary and economic policy that operates across heterogeneous housing markets. We derive monthly subnational European Real Estate Indicators (EREI) from online residential property advertisements in 16 European countries. The release covers April 2024 to June 2026 and contains 48,168 region-month-segment observations for 1,154 NUTS 3 regions, aggregating more than 43 million listing observations across the monthly sale and rental cross-sections. Each region-month segment reports the number of advertisements and summary statistics for asking prices per square meter and listing durations. The release also includes sale-segment indices for Europe, the euro area, and individual countries. Thirteen covered countries are EU members, which represented 85% of EU-27 gross domestic product in 2024. EREI data support research on a wide range of socio-economic phenomena associated with real estate dynamics, such as the evaluation of monetary policy or macroprudential policy effects on financial stability.

We analyze how the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) relates to patterns in banks’ lending activities, risk outcomes, and granular risks within the banking system. Using data on euro area banks from 2010 to 2021, we estimate idiosyncratic shocks to banks’ loan growth to construct a measure of loan growth volatility and to compute the “Banking Granular Residual.” Banks under SSM supervision exhibit lower volatility in loan portfolio growth, indicating more stable lending dynamics. Furthermore, the implementation of the SSM is associated with positive spillover effects on non-SSM banks’ lending and a weaker relationship between granular banking shocks and economic growth.

We study how deposit competition affects a bank's decision to securitize mortgages. Exploiting the state-specific removal of deposit market caps across the U.S. as a source of competition, we find a 7.1 percentage point increase in the probability that banks securitize mortgage loans. This result is driven by an 11 basis point increase in deposit costs and corresponding reductions in banks' deposit holdings. Our results are strongest among banks that rely more on deposit funding. These findings highlight a hitherto undocumented and unintended regulatory cause that motivates banks to adopt the originate-to-distribute model.

Syndicated loan data provided by DealScan is an essential input in banking research to answer urging questions on bank lending, e.g., in the presence of financial or geopolitical shocks or climate change. However, many data options raise the question of how to choose the estimation sample. We employ a standard regression framework analyzing bank lending during the financial crisis of 2007/08 to study how conventional but varying usages of DealScan affect the estimates. The key finding is that the direction of coefficients remains relatively robust. However, statistical significance depends on the data and sampling choice, and we provide guidelines for applied research.

We exploit staggered real estate transaction tax (RETT) hikes across German states to identify the effect on the growth rates of regional house prices and outstanding mortgage loans by all local German banks. The results show that a RETT hike by one percentage point reduces regional house prices by 3%–4%. Furthermore, IV-regressions yield that a 1 percentage point drop in regional house prices induced by a RETT increase leads to a 0.3% decline in regional mortgage lending, particularly among low-capitalized banks in rural regions.

This paper examines how supplier IPO events affect their key customers’ cost of debt. The evidence reveals that average loan spreads for customers increase by roughly 20% (23.7 basis points) following suppliers’ IPO events. This negative spillover effect is more pronounced when suppliers make significant relationship-specific investments (high switching cost), when suppliers face less concentrated customer bases, or when customers face more concentrated supplier bases. Our results show that customers receive less favourable trade terms and are forced to pay more for inputs after their suppliers go public, all of which increase customers’ operational costs, risk and subsequent borrowing costs. Furthermore, we document that customer loan contracts become significantly more restrictive after a supplier's IPO. Finally, we find that the observed negative spillover effect is also present in customers’ access to the public bond market.