Evidence for the Existence of Downward Real-Activity Earnings Management
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Lingxiang Li
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance,
Nr. 2,
2016
Abstract
Prior studies of real-activity earnings management (REM) focus on earnings-inflating abnormal activities. We seek to establish the existence of downward REM by investigating several corporate events in which managers have incentives to temporarily deflate market valuations. Specifically, we focus on, and find downward REM before, share repurchases, management buyouts (MBOs), and CEO option awards. Large-sample evidence of downward REM is also found in our general analysis of earnings smoothing. Downward REM becomes much smaller or nonexistent when there is a lack of managerial incentives in those events, such as non-carry-through repurchases, incomplete MBOs, and unexpected option awards. Following the research design of Zang, we find that various REM and accrual-based earnings management (AEM) cost factors consistently influence the magnitude of downward REM and AEM around the three corporate events.
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Shareholder Bargaining Power and the Emergence of Empty Creditors
Stefano Colonnello, M. Efing, Francesca Zucchi
Abstract
Credit default swaps (CDSs) can create empty creditors who potentially force borrowers into inefficient bankruptcy but also reduce shareholders‘ incentives to default strategically. We show theoretically and empirically that the presence and the effects of empty creditors on firm outcomes depend on the distribution of bargaining power among claimholders. Firms are more likely to have empty creditors if these would face powerful shareholders in debt renegotiation. The empirical evidence confirms that more CDS insurance is written on firms with strong shareholders and that CDSs increase the bankruptcy risk of these same firms. The ensuing effect on firm value is negative.
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The Impact of Credit Default Swap Trading on Loan Syndication
Daniel Streitz
Review of Finance,
Nr. 1,
2016
Abstract
We analyze the impact of credit default swap (CDS) trading on bank syndication activity. Theoretically, the effect of CDS trading is ambiguous: on the one hand, CDS can improve risk-sharing and hence be a more flexible risk management tool than loan syndication; on the other hand, CDS trading can reduce bank monitoring incentives. We document that banks are less likely to syndicate loans and retain a larger loan fraction once CDS are actively traded on the borrower’s debt. We then discern the risk management and the moral hazard channel. We find no evidence that the reduced likelihood to syndicate loans is a result of increased moral hazard problems.
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Team Building and Hidden Costs of Control
Gerhard Riener, Simon Wiederhold
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
March
2016
Abstract
In a laboratory experiment, we investigate the interaction of two prominent firm strategies to increase worker effort: team building and control. We compare a team-building treatment where subjects initially play a coordination game to gain common experience (CE) with an autarky treatment where subjects individually perform a task (NCE). In both treatments, subjects then play two-player control games where agents provide costly effort and principals can control to secure a minimum effort. CE agents always outperform NCE agents. Conditional on control, however, CE agents’ effort is crowded out more strongly, with the effect being most pronounced for agents who successfully coordinated in the team-building exercise. Differential reactions to control perceived as excessive is one explanation for our findings.
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College Choice and the Selection of Mechanisms: A Structural Empirical Analysis
J.-R. Carvalho, T. Magnac, Qizhou Xiong
Abstract
We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry to study the interaction between the revelation of college preferences through exams and the selection of allocation mechanisms. We propose a method in which preferences and expectations of students are identified from data on choices and multiple exam grades. Counterfactuals we consider balance costs arising from congestion and exam organization. Moving to deferred acceptance or inverting the timing of choices and exams are shown to increase welfare. Redistribution among students or schools is sizeable in all counterfactual experiments.
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Real Effective Exchange Rate Misalignment in the Euro Area: A Counterfactual Analysis
Makram El-Shagi, Axel Lindner, Gregor von Schweinitz
Review of International Economics,
Nr. 1,
2016
Abstract
The European debt crisis has revealed severe imbalances within the Euro area, sparking a debate about the magnitude of those imbalances, in particular concerning real effective exchange rate misalignments. We use synthetic matching to construct a counterfactual economy for each member state in order to identify the degree of these misalignments. We find that crisis countries are best described as a combination of advanced and emerging economies. Comparing the actual real effective exchange rate with those of the counterfactuals gives evidence of misalignments before the outbreak of the crisis: all peripheral countries appear strongly and significantly overvalued.
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Determinants of the Size of the Sovereign Credit Default Swap Market
Tobias Berg, Daniel Streitz
Journal of Fixed Income,
Nr. 3,
2016
Abstract
We analyze the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) market for 57 countries, using a novel dataset comprising weekly positions and turnover data. We document that CDS markets—measured relative to a country’s debt—are larger for smaller countries, countries with a rating just above the investment-grade cutoff, and countries with weaker creditor rights. Analyzing changes in credit risk, we find that rating changes matter but only for negative rating events (downgrades and negative outlooks). In particular, weeks with downgrades and negative outlooks are associated with a significantly higher turnover in the sovereign CDS market, even after controlling for changes in sovereign CDS spreads. We conclude that agencies’ ratings are a major determinant of the size of the sovereign CDS market.
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Exit Expectations and Debt Crises in Currency Unions
Alexander Kriwoluzky, G. J. Müller, M. Wolf
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 18,
2015
Abstract
Membership in a currency union is not irreversible. Exit expectations may emerge during sovereign debt crises, because exit allows countries to reduce their liabilities through a currency redenomination. As market participants anticipate this possibility, sovereign debt crises intensify. We establish this formally within a small open economy model of changing policy regimes. The model permits explosive dynamics of debt and sovereign yields inside currency unions and allows us to distinguish between exit expectations and those of an outright default. By estimating the model on Greek data, we quantify the contribution of exit expectations to the crisis dynamics during 2009 to 2012.
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