How Does Economic Policy Uncertainty Affect Corporate Debt Maturity?
Xiang Li
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 5,
2022
Abstract
This paper investigates whether and how economic policy uncertainty affects corporate debt maturity. Using a large firm-level dataset for four European countries, we find that an increase in economic policy uncertainty is significantly associated with a shortened debt maturity. Moreover, the impacts are stronger for innovation-intensive firms. We use firms’ flexibility in changing debt maturity and the deviation to leverage target to gauge the causal relationship, and identify the reduced investment and steepened term structure as the transmission mechanisms.
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Stock Liquidity and Corporate Labor Investment
Mong Shan Ee, Iftekhar Hasan, He Huang
Journal of Corporate Finance,
February
2022
Abstract
Labor is among the most crucial factors of production that maintain a firm's competitiveness. Given its economic importance, drivers of firms' labor investment policy have gained increasing attention in the financial economics literature. This study investigates the relation between stock liquidity and labor investment efficiency. We establish a causal relation between the two phenomena using an exogenous shock to liquidity: the 2001 decimalization of stock trading. We find that labor investment efficiency improves following an increase in stock liquidity, and the effect is prevalent in firms experiencing overinvestment in labor. Our findings further support the argument that stock liquidity improves the efficiency of labor investment by enhancing governance through shareholder exit threat.
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Partisan Professionals: Evidence from Credit Rating Analysts
Elisabeth Kempf, Margarita Tsoutsoura
Journal of Finance,
Nr. 6,
2021
Abstract
Partisan perception affects the actions of professionals in the financial sector. Linking credit rating analysts to party affiliations from voter records, we show that analysts not affiliated with the U.S. president's party downward-adjust corporate credit ratings more frequently. Since we compare analysts with different party affiliations covering the same firm in the same quarter, differences in firm fundamentals cannot explain the results. We also find a sharp divergence in the rating actions of Democratic and Republican analysts around the 2016 presidential election. Our results show that analysts' partisan perception has price effects and may influence firms' investment policies.
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Stock Liquidity, Empire Building, and Valuation
Sris Chatterjee, Iftekhar Hasan, Kose John, An Yan
Journal of Corporate Finance,
2021
Abstract
We conjecture that high stock liquidity negatively affects firm valuation by inducing inefficient investment. Using takeovers of public targets to study the empire-building motive, we find that a liquid firm is more likely than an illiquid firm to acquire a public firm. Such a takeover by a bidder with higher stock liquidity destroys bidder value to a larger degree. These patterns occur in both stock and cash acquisitions and hold after we use decimalization of tick size as a quasi-exogenous shock to stock liquidity. Finally, we show that financial constraints and corporate governance play important roles in the effects of stock liquidity on empire building in mergers and acquisitions.
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Labor in the Boardroom
Jörg Heining, Simon Jäger, Benjamin Schoefer
Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Nr. 2,
2021
Abstract
We estimate the wage effects of shared governance, or codetermination, in the form of a mandate of one-third of corporate board seats going to worker representatives. We study a reform in Germany that abruptly abolished this mandate for stock corporations incorporated after August 1994, while it locked the mandate for the slightly older cohorts. Our research design compares firm cohorts incorporated before the reform and after; in a robustness check we draw on the analogous difference in unaffected firm types (LLCs). We find no effects of board-level codetermination on wages and the wage structure, even in firms with particularly flexible wages. The degree of rent sharing and the labor share are also unaffected. We reject that disinvestment could have offset wage effects through the canonical hold-up channel, as shared governance, if anything, increases capital formation.
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Do Affiliated Bankers on Board Enhance Corporate Social Responsibility? US Evidence
Iftekhar Hasan, Hui Li, Haizhi Wang, Yun Zhu
Sustainability,
Nr. 6,
2021
Abstract
In this study, we examine whether and to what extent affiliated bankers on board may affect firms’ corporate social performance. Using a propensity score-matched sample from 2002 to 2016, we find that board directors from affiliated banks exert significantly positive influence on firms’ corporate social performance. Furthermore, board of directors from affiliated banks are negatively associated with firm investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities when firms experience financial distress. Finally, we find that the effect of affiliated bankers on board on firms’ CSR performance depends on the affiliated banks’ CSR orientation, as affiliated banker directors from banks with higher CSR orientation have a stronger influence on firms’ investments in CSR activities. The results suggest that improving firm’s CSR performance is consistent with the affiliated banks’ interests.
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Managerial Ability and Value Relevance of Earnings
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Ibrahim Siraj, Qiang Wu
China Accounting and Finance Review,
Nr. 4,
2019
Abstract
We examine how management ability affects the extent to which capital markets rely on earnings to value equity. Using a measure of ability that captures a management team’s capacity for generating revenues with a given level of resources compared to other industry peers, we find a strong positive association between managerial ability and the value relevance of earnings. Additional tests show that our results are robust to controlling for earnings attributes and investment efficiency. We use propensity score matching and the 2SLS instrumental variable approach to deal with the issue of endogeneity. For further identification, we examine CEO turnover and find that newly hired CEOs with better managerial abilities than the replaced CEOs increase the value relevance of earnings. We identify weak corporate governance and product market power as the two important channels through which superior management practices play an important role in the corporate decision-making process that positively influence the value relevance of earnings. Overall, our findings suggest that better managers make accounting information significantly more relevant in the market valuation of equity.
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A Capital Structure Channel of Monetary Policy
Benjamin Grosse-Rueschkamp, Sascha Steffen, Daniel Streitz
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 2,
2019
Abstract
We study the transmission channels from central banks’ quantitative easing programs via the banking sector when central banks start purchasing corporate bonds. We find evidence consistent with a “capital structure channel” of monetary policy. The announcement of central bank purchases reduces the bond yields of firms whose bonds are eligible for central bank purchases. These firms substitute bank term loans with bond debt, thereby relaxing banks’ lending constraints: banks with low tier-1 ratios and high nonperforming loans increase lending to private (and profitable) firms, which experience a growth in investment. The credit reallocation increases banks’ risk-taking in corporate credit.
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Banks Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence from a Quasi-natural Experiment
Reint E. Gropp, Thomas Mosk, Steven Ongena, Carlo Wix
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 1,
2019
Abstract
We study the impact of higher capital requirements on banks’ balance sheets and their transmission to the real economy. The 2011 EBA capital exercise is an almost ideal quasi-natural experiment to identify this impact with a difference-in-differences matching estimator. We find that treated banks increase their capital ratios by reducing their risk-weighted assets, not by raising their levels of equity, consistent with debt overhang. Banks reduce lending to corporate and retail customers, resulting in lower asset, investment, and sales growth for firms obtaining a larger share of their bank credit from the treated banks.
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