Strategien der neuen Bundesländer im Rahmen der Gemeinschaftsaufgabe „Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur“ – Ein Vergleich –
Mirko Titze
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 14,
2007
Abstract
Die Gemeinschaftsaufgabe gehört zu den wichtigsten Instrumenten beim „Aufbau Ost“. Die Bundesländer haben hier einen relativ hohen Gestaltungsspielraum, gezielt industriepolitische Anreize zu setzen. Der vorliegende Beitrag ist auf die neuen Bundesländer fokussiert, da sie immer noch durch strukturelle Defizite gekennzeichnet sind. Vor dem Hintergrund sinkender Fördervolumina stehen die Länder mehr denn je unter Druck, ihre Subventionen effizient einzusetzen. Das kann beispielsweise durch eine regionale sowie sektorale Fokussierung geschehen. Der Beitrag zeigt, dass Brandenburg das einzige der neuen Bundesländer ist, das diese Fokussierung in seinen Richtlinien verankert hat.
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What Determines the Efficiency of Regional Innovation Systems?
Michael Fritsch, Viktor Slavtchev
Jena Economic Research Papers, Nr. 2007-006,
Nr. 6,
2007
Abstract
We assess the efficiency of regional innovation systems (RIS) in Germany by means of a knowledge production function. This function relates private sector research and development (R&D) activity in a region to the number of inventions that have been registered by residents of that region. Different measures and estimation approaches lead to rather similar assessments. We find that both spillovers within the private sector as well as from universities and other public research institutions have a positive effect on the efficiency of private sector R&D in the respective region. It is not the mere presence and size of public research institutions, but rather the intensity of interactions between private and public sector R&D that leads to high RIS efficiency. We find that relationship between the diversity of a regions’ industry structure and the efficiency of its innovation system is inversely u-shaped. Regions dominated by large establishments tend to be less efficient than regions with a lower average establishment size.
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Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
Nr. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
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