Taxing Banks: An Evaluation of the German Bank Levy
Claudia M. Buch, Björn Hilberg, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
Bank distress can have severe negative consequences for the stability of the financial system, the real economy, and public finances. Regimes for restructuring and restoring banks financed by bank levies and fiscal backstops seek to reduce these costs. Bank levies attempt to internalize systemic risk and increase the costs of leverage. This paper evaluates the effects of the German bank levy implemented in 2011 as part of the German bank restructuring law. Our analysis offers three main insights. First, revenues raised through the bank levy are minimal, because of low tax rates and high thresholds for tax exemptions. Second, the bulk of the payments were contributed by large commercial banks and the head institutes of savings banks and credit unions. Third, the levy had no effect on the volume of loans or interest rates for the average German bank. For the banks affected most by the levy, we find evidence of fewer loans, higher lending rates, and lower deposit rates.
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The Impact of Public Guarantees on Bank Risk-taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Reint E. Gropp, C. Gruendl, Andre Guettler
Review of Finance,
Nr. 2,
2014
Abstract
In 2001, government guarantees for savings banks in Germany were removed following a lawsuit. We use this natural experiment to examine the effect of government guarantees on bank risk-taking. The results suggest that banks whose government guarantee was removed reduced credit risk by cutting off the riskiest borrowers from credit. Using a difference-in-differences approach we show that none of these effects are present in a control group of German banks to whom the guarantee was not applicable. Furthermore, savings banks adjusted their liabilities away from risk-sensitive debt instruments after the removal of the guarantee, while we do not observe this for the control group. We also document that yield spreads of savings banks’ bonds increased significantly right after the announcement of the decision to remove guarantees, while the yield spread of a sample of bonds issued by the control group remained unchanged. The evidence implies that public guarantees may be associated with substantial moral hazard effects.
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Subsidized Vocational Training: Stepping Stone or Trap? – Assessing Empirical Effects using Matching Techniques
Eva Dettmann, Jutta Günther
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics,
Nr. 4,
2013
Abstract
Using replacement matching on the basis of a statistical distance function we try to answer the question of whether subsidized vocational training is related to a negative image effect for the graduates. The results show that young people with equal qualifications acquired during subsidized vocational training are disadvantaged solely due to the kind of education they have received. The probability of finding adequate employment is lower than in the control group. Besides the 'general effect' of support we also find less favorable job opportunities for those who attended 'external' as compared to 'workplace-related' training.
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Do Banks Benefit from Internationalization? Revisiting the Market Power–Risk Nexus
Claudia M. Buch, C. T. Koch, Michael Koetter
Review of Finance,
Nr. 4,
2013
Abstract
We analyze the impact of bank internationalization on domestic market power (Lerner index) and risk for German banks. Risk is measured by the official declaration of regulatory authorities that a bank is distressed. We distinguish the volume of foreign assets, the number of foreign countries, and different modes of foreign entry. Our analysis has three main results. First, higher market power is associated with lower risk. Second, holding assets in many countries reduce market power at home, but banks with a higher share of foreign assets exhibit higher market power. Third, bank internationalization is only weakly related to bank risk.
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Geoadditive Models for Regional Count Data: An Application to Industrial Location
Davide Castellani
ERSA conference papers,
2012
Abstract
We propose a geoadditive negative binomial model (Geo-NB-GAM) for regional count data which allows us to simultaneously address some important methodological issues, such as spatial clustering, nonlinearities and overdispersion. We apply this model to study location determinants of inward greenfield investments occurred over the 2003-2007 period in 249 European regions. The inclusion of a geoadditive component (a smooth spatial trend surface) permits us to control for spatial unobserved heterogeneity which induces spatial clustering. Allowing for nonlinearities reveals, in line with theoretical predictions, that the positive effect of agglomeration economies fades as the density of economic activities reaches some limit value. However, no matter how dense the economic activity becomes, our results suggest that congestion costs would never overcome positive agglomeration externalities.
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Hidden Gems and Borrowers with Dirty Little Secrets: Investment in Soft Information, Borrower Self-Selection and Competition
Reint E. Gropp, C. Gruendl, Andre Guettler
Abstract
This paper empirically examines the role of soft information in the competitive interaction between relationship and transaction banks. Soft information can be interpreted as a private signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank. We show that borrowers self-select to relationship banks depending on whether their privately observed soft information is positive or negative. Competition affects the investment in learning the private signal from firms by relationship banks and transaction banks asymmetrically. Relationship banks invest more; transaction banks invest less in soft information, exacerbating the selection effect. Finally, we show that firms where soft information was important in the lending decision were no more likely to default compared to firms where only financial information was used.
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Did TARP Distort Competition Among Sound Banks?
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Abstract
This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. Loan rates were higher, and the risk premium required by depositors was lower for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks.
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Fachkräftemangel – was ist dran? Bericht zum 9. IWH-IAB-Workshop zur Arbeitsmarktpolitik
Herbert S. Buscher, C. Harendt, A. Smigiel
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 11,
2012
Abstract
Ein möglicher Fachkräftemangel und seine Auswirkungen sind seit geraumer Zeit ein Kernthema wirtschafts- und arbeitsmarktpolitischer Debatten. Im Rahmen des 9. Workshops zur Arbeitsmarktpolitik des IWH und des Instituts für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB) in Halle (Saale) diskutierten Wissenschaftler und Vertreter aus Politik und Wirtschaft über die Problematik in den kommenden Jahren möglicherweise fehlender qualifizierter Arbeitskräfte. In diesem Kontext wurden demographische, unternehmensbezogene und regionalspezifische Aspekte des Problems beleuchtet. Der Fachkräftemangel ist empirisch schwer zu erfassen. Als temporäre, berufs- und regionalspezifische Phänomene sind Fachkräfteengpässe jedoch zu beobachten. Unabhängig von der Feststellung eines tatsächlichen Fachkräftemangels sind Maßnahmen zur Fachkräftesicherung aus Gründen der Wohlfahrtssteigerung zu empfehlen.
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Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany
Lammertjan Dam, Michael Koetter
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 8,
2012
Abstract
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking industry lead to additional risk taking. To identify the moral hazard effect of bailout expectations on bank risk, we exploit the fact that regional political factors explain bank bailouts but not bank risk. The sample includes all observed capital preservation measures and distressed exits in the German banking industry during 1995–2006. A change of bailout expectations by two standard deviations increases the probability of official distress from 6.6% to 9.4%, which is economically significant.
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Size, Productivity, and International Banking
Claudia M. Buch, C. T. Koch, Michael Koetter
Journal of International Economics,
Nr. 2,
2011
Abstract
Heterogeneity in size and productivity is central to models that explain which manufacturing firms export. This study presents descriptive evidence on similar heterogeneity among international banks as financial services providers. A novel and detailed bank-level data set reveals the volume and mode of international activities for all German banks. Only a few, large banks have a commercial presence abroad, consistent with the size pecking order documented for manufacturing firms. However, the relationship between internationalization and productivity also yields two inconsistencies with recent trade models. First, virtually all banks hold at least some foreign assets, irrespective of size or productivity. Second, some fairly unproductive banks maintain commercial presences abroad.
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