We examine the characteristics of the individuals who become entrepreneurs when local opportunities arise. We identify local demand shocks by linking fluctuations in global commodity prices to municipality-level agricultural endowments in Brazil. We find that the firm creation response is mostly driven by young and skilled individuals. The characteristics of these responsive entrepreneurs are significantly different from those of average entrepreneurs in the economy. By structurally estimating a novel two-sector model of a local economy, we highlight how the demographic composition of the local population can significantly affect the entrepreneurial responsiveness of the economy.

This paper investigates whether wage losses after job displacement are driven by lost firm wage premiums or worker productivity depreciations. We estimate losses in wages and firm wage premiums, the latter being measured as firm effects from a two-way fixed-effects wage decomposition. Using new German administrative data on displacements from small and large employers, we find that wage losses are to a large extent explained by losses in firm wage premiums and that premium losses are largely permanent. We show that losses strongly increase with pre-displacement employer size. This provides an explanation for large and persistent wage losses reported in previous displacement studies typically focusing on large employers, only.

My dissertation consists of three studies, all viewing aggregate productivity as driven by the individual decisions of firms and the inventors that work for them. I use microeconometric analysis to study why firms innovate and economic theory to link these decisions to macroeconomic outcomes. The first paper in this dissertation studies how German manufacturing firms adjust their productivity in response to an increase in competition from foreign markets. German firms only increase their productivity if their new competitors come from other industrialized economies. This productivity increase is not driven by innovation. Instead, firms cut input expenses and prices while maintaining their output. The second paper traces the matching decisions of firms and inventors on the labor markets of developed economies. It adapts empirical techniques used in labor economics to this special segment of the labor market and shows that assortative matching has been increasing from 1974 to 2012: High quality inventors go to high quality firms more often than was the case in previous decades. This cannot be explained by changes in the patent invention function: The productivity of a match between a firm and an inventor of constant quality remains roughly unchanged. The third paper develops an endogenous growth model with inventor labor markets and two types of innovation: disruptive inventions that change the underlying technology of firms’ products and incremental improvements over existing products. Firms acquire expertise in certain technologies by hiring the inventors who are experts in these fields. This gives them a strong incentive to prevent disruptive inventions: If the underlying technology changes, their investment in these inventors becomes worthless. Large firms inhibit aggregate growth by poaching inventors from firms engaged in disruptive innovation.

We provide an overview of productivity development and other related indicators in Asia and Pacific (APAC) countries, with comparisons with the Europe region. We use the seventh vintage firm-level data from the Productivity Research Network in the APAC region and CompNet in Europe for our study. The overall results show that the productivity growth in developed APAC countries (Australia, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea) is significantly ahead of the growth in developing APAC countries (India and the People’s Republic of China) and on par with the EU’s growth. There is an ongoing process of bottom firms catching up with top firms in the Republic of Korea and the richest EU countries. Regarding employment and labor skills, employment growth has generally been quite stagnant in all regions. Labor skills, for which we use the wage premium as a proxy, are quite similar across most regions, with the richest EU countries showing a higher premium than the rest. Our test of the productivity–employment link indicates that the size of employment tends to have a greater impact on productivity in APAC countries, while labor skills have greater emphasis in the EU.

We estimate the wage effects of shared governance, or codetermination, in the form of a mandate of one-third of corporate board seats going to worker representatives. We study a reform in Germany that abruptly abolished this mandate for stock corporations incorporated after August 1994, while it locked the mandate for the slightly older cohorts. Our research design compares firm cohorts incorporated before the reform and after; in a robustness check we draw on the analogous difference in unaffected firm types (LLCs). We find no effects of board-level codetermination on wages and the wage structure, even in firms with particularly flexible wages. The degree of rent sharing and the labor share are also unaffected. We reject that disinvestment could have offset wage effects through the canonical hold-up channel, as shared governance, if anything, increases capital formation.

Measuring innovation is challenging both for researchers and for national statisticians, and it is increasingly important in light of the ongoing digital revolution. National accounts and many other economic statistics were designed before the emergence of the digital economy and the growing importance of intangible capital. They do not yet fully capture the wide range of innovative activity that is observed in modern economies.
This volume examines how to measure innovation, track its effects on economic activity and prices, and understand how it has changed the structure of production processes, labor markets, and organizational form and operation in business. The contributors explore new approaches to, and data sources for, measurement—such as collecting data for a particular innovation as opposed to a firm, and the use of trademarks for tracking innovation. They also consider the connections between university-based R&D and business startups, and the potential impacts of innovation on income distribution.
The research suggests potential strategies for expanding current measurement frameworks to better capture innovative activity, such as more detailed tracking of global value chains to identify innovation across time and space, and expanding the measurement of the GDP impacts of innovation in fields such as consumer content delivery and cloud computing.

Measuring innovation is challenging both for researchers and for national statisticians, and it is increasingly important in light of the ongoing digital revolution. National accounts and many other economic statistics were designed before the emergence of the digital economy and the growing importance of intangible capital. They do not yet fully capture the wide range of innovative activity that is observed in modern economies. This volume examines how to measure innovation, track its effects on economic activity and prices, and understand how it has changed the structure of production processes, labor markets, and organizational form and operation in business. The contributors explore new approaches to, and data sources for, measurement—such as collecting data for a particular innovation as opposed to a firm, and the use of trademarks for tracking innovation. They also consider the connections between university-based R&D and business startups, and the potential impacts of innovation on income distribution. The research suggests potential strategies for expanding current measurement frameworks to better capture innovative activity, such as more detailed tracking of global value chains to identify innovation across time and space, and expanding the measurement of the GDP impacts of innovation in fields such as consumer content delivery and cloud computing.

New Zealand has experienced poor productivity performance over the last two decades. Factors often cited as reasons behind this are the small size of the domestic market and distance to international partners and markets. While the distance reason is one that is fairly insurmountable, there are a number of other small advanced economies that also face similar domestic market constraints. This study compares the relative performance of New Zealand’s firms to those economies using novel cross-country microdata from CompNet. We present stylised facts for New Zealand relative to the economies of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands and Sweden based on average productivity levels, as well as benchmarking laggard, median and frontier firms. This research also employs an analytical framework of technology diffusion to evaluate the extent of productivity convergence, and the impact of the productivity frontier on non-frontier firm performance. Additionally, both labour and capital resource allocation are compared between New Zealand and the other small advanced economies. Results show that New Zealand’s firms have comparatively low productivity levels and that its frontier firms are not benefiting from the diffusion of best technologies outside the nation. Furthermore, there is evidence of labour misallocation in New Zealand based on less labour-productive firms having disproportionally larger employment shares than their more productive counterparts. Counter-factual analysis illustrates that improving both technology diffusion from abroad toward New Zealand’s frontier firms, and labour allocation across firms within New Zealand will see sizable productivity gains in New Zealand.

Young entrepreneurial firms are of critical importance for innovation. But to bring their new ideas to the market, these startups depend on investors who understand and are willing to accept the risk associated with a new firm. Perhaps the key reason as to why the US has succeeded in producing nearly all the most successful new firms of the 21st century is the economy’s ability to supply vast sums of capital to promising startups. The volume of venture capital (VC) invested in the US is more than 60 times that of Germany. In this policy note, we argue that differences in the regulatory and structural context of institutional investors, in particular life insurance companies, is a central driver of the relative lack of VC - and thereby successful startups - in Germany.

Economies of scale can explain compensation differentials over time, across firms of different size, different hierarchy-levels, and different industries. Consequently, the most talented individuals tend to match with the largest firms in industries where marginal returns to their talent are greatest. We explore a new dimension of this size-pay nexus by showing that marginal returns also differ across activities within firms and industries. Using hand-collected data on managers in European banks well below the level of executive directors, we find that the size-pay nexus is strongest for investment banking business units and for banks with a market-based business model. Thus, managerial compensation is most sensitive to size increases for activities that can easily be scaled up.