In this paper, we discuss how environmental damage and emission reduction policies affect the conduct of monetary policy in a two-sector (clean and dirty) dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. In particular, we examine the optimal response of the interest rate to changes in sectoral inflation due to standard supply shocks, conditional on a given environmental policy. We then compare the performance of a nonstandard monetary rule with sectoral inflation targets to that of a standard Taylor rule. Our main results are as follows: first, the optimal monetary policy is affected by the existence of environmental policy (carbon taxation), as this introduces a distortion in the relative price level between the clean and dirty sectors. Second, compared with a standard Taylor rule targeting aggregate inflation, a monetary policy rule with asymmetric responses to sector-specific inflation allows for reduced volatility in the inflation gap, output gap, and emissions. Third, a nonstandard monetary policy rule allows for a higher level of welfare, so the two goals of welfare maximization and emission minimization can be aligned.

Die grüne Transformation, verstanden als ein Prozess, Energie zunehmend treibhausgasneutral zu erzeugen, kann mit marktwirtschaftlichen Instrumenten und dafür erforderlichen Rahmenbedingungen kostengünstiger umgesetzt werden als mit staatlicher Steuerung des Energieverbrauchs und der Energieerzeugung. Kosteneffizienz ist von entscheidender Bedeutung für die Bereitschaft und Fähigkeit der Bevölkerung, die Lasten der Transformation zu tragen, und für eine gerechte Verteilung der Lasten.

Large emitters reduced their carbon emissions by around 11-15% after the 2015 Paris Agreement (“the Agreement”) relative to public firms that are less in the limelight. We show that this effect is predominantly driven by divestments. Large emitters are 9 p.p. more likely to divest pollutive assets in the post-Agreement period, an increase of over 75%. This divestment effect comes from asset sales and not from closures of pollutive facilities. There is no evidence for increased engagements in other emission reduction activities. Our results indicate significant global asset reallocation effects after the Agreement, shifting emissions out of the limelight.