Maximilian Mayer, Ph.D.

Maximilian Mayer, Ph.D.
Aktuelle Position

seit 9/22

Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter der Abteilung Strukturwandel und Produktivität

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

Forschungsschwerpunkte

  • Corporate Finance
  • Arbeitsmarktökonomik

Maximilian Mayer ist seit September 2022 wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter in der Abteilung Strukturwandel und Produktivität. Seine Forschungsschwer- punkte liegen in den Bereichen Arbeitsmarktökonomik und Unternehmensfinanzierung.

Maximilian Mayer hat an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin und an der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt studiert. Er promovierte an der Graduate School of Economics, Finance, and Management (GSEFM).

Ihr Kontakt

Maximilian Mayer, Ph.D.
Maximilian Mayer, Ph.D.
Mitglied - Abteilung Strukturwandel und Produktivität
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Publikationen

Arbeitspapiere

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The Value of Firm Networks: A Natural Experiment on Board Connections

Ester Faia Maximilian Mayer Vincenzo Pezone

in: SSRN Working Papers, Nr. 269, 2022

Abstract

We present causal evidence on the effect of boardroom networks on firm value and compensation policies. We exploit a ban on interlocking directorates of Italian financial and insurance companies as exogenous variation and show that firms that lose centrality in the network experience negative abnormal returns around the announcement date. The key driver of our results is the role of boardroom connections in reducing asymmetric information. The complementarities with the input-output and cross-ownership networks are consistent with this channel. Using hand-collected data, we also show that network centrality has a positive effect on directors’ compensation, providing evidence of rent sharing.

Publikation lesen

The Value of Firm Networks: A Natural Experiment on Board Connections

Ester Faia Maximilian Mayer Vincenzo Pezone

in: CEPR Discussion Papers, Nr. 14591, 2020

Abstract

This paper presents causal evidence of the effects of boardroom networks on firm value and compensation policies. We exploit exogenous variation in network centrality arising from a ban on interlocking directorates of Italian financial and insurance companies. We leverage this shock to show that firms whose centrality in the network rises after the reform experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement date and are better hedged against shocks. Information dissemination plays a central role: results are driven by firms that have higher idiosyncratic volatility, low analyst coverage, and more uncertainty surrounding their earnings forecasts. Firms benefit more from boardroom centrality when they are more central in the input-output network, hence more susceptible to upstream shocks, when they are less central in the cross-ownership network, or when they have low profitability or low growth opportunities. Network centrality also results in higher directors' compensation, due to rent sharing and improved executives' outside option, and more similar compensation policies between connected firms.

Publikation lesen
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