The global financial crisis in 2007-2009 exposed the absence of adequate regulation within the banking sector which had built up an excessive amount of on- and off-balance sheet leverage and had neglected basic principles of liquidity risk management (Acharya and Richardson, 2009, Adrian and Shin, 2010, Goodhart, 2008). As a response, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision presented a revised and augmented regulatory framework. Since the financial crisis had demonstrated that microprudential regulation is not sufficient in safeguarding financial stability, the regulators put an emphasizes on macroprudential policies to improve the resilience of the financial sector. Key reforms in this respect are the tightening of capital requirements and the introduction of uniform liquidity requirements (BCBS, 2010).

Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen sind arbeitsmarktpolitische Maßnahmen, die auf eine Verbesserung von Arbeitsmarktergebnissen (z. B. Beschäftigung und Löhne) abzielen. Da Arbeitsmärkte komplexen Anpassungsmechanismen unterliegen, sind diese Maßnahmen jedoch unter Umständen kontraproduktiv oder werden von Nebenwirkungen begleitet. Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es, die Beschäftigungseffekte von Mindestlöhnen und des Kündigungsschutzes zu analysieren. Das erste Kapitel führt den Leser in die Thematik Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen ein. Im zweiten Kapitel wird untersucht, wie die Einführung des Mindestlohns in Deutschland auf die Beschäftigung wirkt. Es wird gezeigt, dass geringfügige Beschäftigung abgenommen und sozialversicherungspflichtige Beschäftigung zugenommen hat. Das dritte Kapitel widmet sich derselben Maßnahme, jedoch mit einem anderen Schwerpunkt: Die Mindestlohneinführung erhöht die Arbeitsmarktmobilität aus Niedriglohnländern (der Tschechischen Republik und Polen) in Grenzregionen. Diese Zunahme ausländischer Arbeitskräfte hat keine negativen Effekte auf die deutsche Beschäftigung zur Folge. Im vierten Kapitel wird ein Problem existierender NK-SAM-Modelle adressiert, die das Modellieren von Kündigungsschutz erlauben. Eine hierfür vorgeschlagene Erweiterung verbessert die empirische Relevanz des Modells unter einer restriktiven Annahme.

The effects of private equity buyouts on employment, productivity, and job reallocation vary tremendously with macroeconomic and credit conditions, across private equity groups, and by type of buyout. We reach this conclusion by examining the most extensive database of U.S. buyouts ever compiled, encompassing thousands of buyout targets from 1980 to 2013 and millions of control firms. Employment shrinks 12% over two years after buyouts of publicly listed firms—on average, and relative to control firms—but expands 15% after buyouts of privately held firms. Postbuyout productivity gains at target firms are large on average and much larger yet for deals executed amid tight credit conditions. A postbuyout tightening of credit conditions or slowing of gross domestic product growth curtails employment growth and intrafirm job reallocation at target firms. We also show that buyout effects differ across the private equity groups that sponsor buyouts, and these differences persist over time at the group level. Rapid upscaling in deal flow at the group level brings lower employment growth at target firms. We relate these findings to theories of private equity that highlight agency problems at portfolio firms and within the private equity industry itself.

Neue Fragestellungen der monetäre Ökonomik betreffen seit der globalen Finanzmarktkrise sowohl die Erklärung der ungewöhnlichen Konsumentenpreisentwicklung als auch die Untersuchung der Interdependenzen zwischen den Finanzmärkten und der realen Wirtschaftstätigkeit sowie des geldpolitischen Transmissionsprozesses. In dieser Dissertation werden die Fragestellungen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Nichtlinearitäten analysiert. Die ersten beiden Beiträge untersuchen die Faktoren der Inflationsdynamik des Euroraums sowie der ASEAN-5-Länder anhand von nichtlinearen Phillips-Kurven und zeigen, dass die Veränderung der Inflationsprozesse bedeutend von den langfristigen Inflationserwartungen beeinflusst wird. Der dritte Beitrag untersucht die Entwicklung des Finanz-Akzelerator-Effektes (FAE) im Hinblick auf die Veränderung des Finanzsektors anhand eines zeitvarianten, strukturellen vektorautoregressiven Modells und zeigt, dass in den USA der FAE ab Anfang der 1990iger Jahre ansteigt.

The adverse macroeconomic consequences of the Great Recession in 2009 spread well beyond the United States, highlighting the importance of financial stability and the housing market for real economic activity. Moreover, the vicious bank-sovereign cycle and the resulting sovereign-debt crisis of 2010-2012 posed a big threat to the survival of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as a whole. While there is widespread consensus about the underlying causes of these crises, policy makers are still debating about what can be done to prevent future crises and, especially in the Euro area, deeply disagree on the direction of reforms. After all, most regulatory measures face not only the trade-off between financial resilience versus efficiency but also the fundamental choice between rule or discretion based interventions (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018).

We examine the effects of the big five personalities of CEOs (openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism) on their annual compensation. We hand-collect the tweets of S&P 1500 CEOs and use IBM's Watson Personality Insights to measure their personalities. CEOs with high ratings of agreeableness and conscientiousness get more compensation. We further find that the firms with these CEOs outperform their peers due to better investment efficiency. Firms are willing to pay higher compensation for talent, especially for firms with better operations, located in states with higher labor unionization, or facing higher competition in the product market. Overall, CEO personality is a valid predictor of CEOs' compensation.

This article shows that when a compensation peer firm experiences a significant failure in its say-on-pay (SOP) voting, the focal firm’s stock price is adversely affected, resulting in reduced CEO pay in the subsequent period. This pay-reduction effect is amplified when the board is more powerful, when proxy advisors express concerns about CEO pay, and when the compensation consultant lacks quality. Directors who react to the price drop and cut the CEO’s pay receive higher votes in future director elections, implying a market feedback effect for directors of the focal firm triggered by their peers’ SOP voting failure.

Syndicated loan data provided by DealScan is an essential input in banking research to answer urging questions on bank lending, e.g., in the presence of financial or geopolitical shocks or climate change. However, many data options raise the question of how to choose the estimation sample. We employ a standard regression framework analyzing bank lending during the financial crisis of 2007/08 to study how conventional but varying usages of DealScan affect the estimates. The key finding is that the direction of coefficients remains relatively robust. However, statistical significance depends on the data and sampling choice, and we provide guidelines for applied research.

Syndicated loan data provided by DealScan is an essential input in banking research. This data is rich enough to answer urging questions on bank lending, e.g., in the presence of financial shocks or climate change. However, many data options raise the question of how to choose the estimation sample. We employ a standard regression framework analyzing bank lending during the financial crisis of 2007/08 to study how conventional but varying usages of DealScan affect the estimates. The key finding is that the direction of coefficients remains relatively robust. However, statistical significance depends on the data and sampling choice and we provide guidelines for applied research.