Using linked employer–employee panel data for West Germany that include direct information on the competition faced by plants, we investigate the effect of product market competition on the gender pay gap. Controlling for match fixed effects, we find that intensified competition significantly lowers the unexplained gap in plants with neither collective agreements nor a works council. Conversely, there is no effect in plants with these types of worker codetermination, which are unlikely to have enough discretion to adjust wages in the short run. We also document a larger competition effect in plants with few females in their workforces. Our findings are in line with Beckerian taste-based employer wage discrimination that is limited by competitive forces.

This paper analyzes wage assimilation of ethnic German immigrants to Germany using unique administrative data that include an administrative estimate of immigrants' expected wage in Germany at the time of migration. We find that a 10% higher wage potential translates into a 1.6% higher wage in Germany when also controlling for educational attainment, thus pointing at partial transferability of pre-migration skills to the host country's labor market. We also document that wage assimilation is significantly accelerated for immigrants with higher wage potentials. Our results are both in line with complementarities between pre-migration skills and host country-specific human capital and a U-shaped pattern of immigrants' job mobility with initial downgrading and subsequent upgrading.

Using a large administrative data set for Germany, this article compares employment developments in exiting and surviving establishments. Applying a matching approach, we find a clear “shadow of death” effect reflecting lingering illness: in both West and East Germany establishments shrink dramatically already several years before closure, employment growth rates differ strongly between exiting and surviving establishments, and this difference becomes stronger as exit approaches. Moreover, we provide first evidence that prior to exit the workforce becomes on average more skilled, more female, and older in exiting compared to surviving establishments. These effects are more clearly visible in West than in East Germany.

Building on the right-to-manage model of collective bargaining, this paper tries to infer union power from the observed results in wage setting. It derives a time-varying indicator of union strength taking account of taxation, unemployment benefits, and the labour market situation and confronts this indicator with annual data for Germany. The results show that union power did not change much from 1992 to 2002 but fell markedly (by about one-third) from 2002 to 2007 in the aftermath of substantial labour market reforms.

Anhand umfangreicher administrativer Daten vergleicht diese Studie die Entwicklung der Überlebenschancen neu gegründeter Betriebe in West- und Ostdeutschland für die Jahre 1994 bis 2008. Eine zentrale Frage lautet dabei, ob eine Angleichung der Überlebensraten zwischen West- und Ostdeutschland zu beobachten ist. Anhand von Methoden der Verweildaueranalyse kommt die Studie zu dem Ergebnis, dass sich die Überlebenschancen neu gegründeter Betriebe zu Beginn des Beobachtungszeitraums nicht stark zwischen West- und Ostdeutschland unterscheiden. In den Jahren 1998 und 1999 steigt die Schließungswahrscheinlichkeit in Ostdeutschland stark an, in Westdeutschland jedoch nicht, was vermutlich auf eine Änderung der Subventionspolitik für Betriebe in Ostdeutschland zurückzuführen ist. Seit der Jahrtausendwende nimmt der Unterschied in den Schließungswahrscheinlichkeiten zwischen West- und Ostdeutschland ab, was auf eine Angleichung der Überlebenschancen hindeutet.

We revisit the employer size wage effect (ESWE) – arguably the most basic and influential departure from the law of one price for labor. Our main result is that this canonical fact disappears completely across establishments within the same firm, even though they operate in different local labor markets. We uncover and dissect this fact by including a firm fixed effect in otherwise standard cross-sectional regressions of wages on establishment size. We implement this demanding specification in population-wide triple-linked firm-establishment-employee data in Germany. This result is new in the ESWE literature (for which our paper also provides the first systematic meta-analysis). This wage-size decoupling is hard to square with the view that employment is determined along a finitely elastic employerspecific labor supply curve – i.e., employers pay exactly the minimum needed for the quantity of labor, but no more – the foundation of the monopsony view. By contrast, large multi-establishment firms (MEF) appear to hire off their labor supply curves (or those curves are very elastic), pay wage premia above the monopsonistic minimum, and leave excess labor supply. We find some evidence for a reemergence of the ESWE within low-premium MEFs. Overall, at least for the 25% of German employment in large firms for which the ESWE disappears, wage setting and employment determination may be better accounted for by alternative models, namely accommodating above-market-clearing wage premia and rationing of labor supply, such as efficiency wage theories.

This paper provides new causal evidence on how patent allowances affect firms and their employees based on quasi-random assignment of patent applications to examiners. Exploiting employer-employee records with newly linked German firm data and web-scraped patent documents, we show that patent-induced shocks reduce firm exit, improve productivity, and increase wages, with rent-sharing elasticities between 0.10 and 0.21. Wage gains are broadly observed across occupational tasks, with high heterogeneity: managers benefit disproportionately in publicly traded firms, whereas broader wage increases accrue to workers in non-traded firms. Our findings highlight the role of institutional features and firm organization in shaping how rents are shared.

Spatial segregation of low- and high-wage workers is a persistent economic issue with broad social implications. Using social security data and an AKM wage decomposition, this paper examines spatial wage inequality in West Germany. Spatial inequality in log wages rose sharply between 1998 and 2008, mainly due to increased variance in worker pay premiums across regions (48%) and stronger positive spatial assortative matching of workers and establishments (40%), i.e. colocation. Changes in establishment wage premia are mostly unrelated to rising colocation whereas labor mobility even reduced it. Instead, growth in worker pay premiums among stayers was concentrated in regions where high-wage workers and high-wage establishments were overrepresented already in the 1990s and, thus, magnified pre-existing colocation leading to ‘colocation without relocation’. Germany’s rising trade surplus, especially with Eastern Europe, boosted stayers’ worker pay premiums in those ex-ante high-wage regions and fully explains rising colocation.

This paper analyzes the distribution and composition of pre-tax national income in Germany since 1992, combining personal income tax returns, household survey data, and national accounts. Inequality rose from the 1990s to the late 2000s due to falling labor incomes among the bottom 50% and rising incomes in the top 10%. This trend reversed after 2007 as labor incomes across the bottom 90% increased. The top 1% income share, dominated by business income, remained relatively stable between 1992 and 2019. A large share of Germany’s top 1% earners are non-corporate business owners in labor-intensive professions. At least half of the business owners in P99-99.9 and a quarter in the top 0.1% operate firms in professional services – a pattern mirroring the United States. From 1992 to 2019, Germany’s top 0.1% income concentration exceeded France’s and matched U.S. levels until the late 2000s.

We examine how connections to German federal parliamentarians influence firm dynamics using a novel dataset linking politicians and election candidates to the universe of firms. To identify the causal effects of political access, we exploit (i) new appointments to the company leadership team and (ii) discontinuities around the marginal seat of party election lists. Results reveal that political connections reduce firm exits and gradually increase employment growth, with heterogeneous productivity effects depending on the political mandate. Incorporating data on credit ratings, subsidies, and procurement contracts allows us to identify the mechanisms driving the effects over the politician’s career.