cover_applied-economics-letters.jpg

Do Federal Reserve Bank Presidents’ Interest Rate Votes in the FOMC Follow an Electoral Cycle?

We find that Federal Reserve Bank presidents’ regional bias in their dissenting interest rate votes in the Federal Open Market Committee follows an electoral cycle. Presidents put more weight on their district’s economic environment during the year prior to their (re-)election relative to nonelection years.

01. Januar 2016

Autoren Stefan Eichler Tom Lähner

Ihr Kontakt

Für Wissenschaftler/innen

Professor Dr. Stefan Eichler
Professor Dr. Stefan Eichler
Forschungsgruppenleiter

Für Rückfragen stehe ich Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.

Anfrage per E-Mail

Für Journalistinnen/en

Mitglied der Leibniz-Gemeinschaft LogoTotal-Equality-LogoWeltoffen Logo