This paper examines how political networks influence insider trading in China. Using biographical data to construct chairman–politician social networks, we find that firms with stronger political networks engage in significantly less insider trading. The effect is stronger for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) and for long-standing or high-ranking connections. The muted trading persists during periods when insiders possess valuable private information, including prior to M&A announcements and major policy events. The evidence suggests that personal political networks function as informal governance mechanisms that discipline managerial opportunism when formal governance through state ownership is absent.

Using survey experiments in the United States and Germany with about 12,000 participants, we study perceptions of socioeconomic inequality in life expectancy and policy demand. Respondents overestimate the rich-poor gap in both countries, judging the life expectancy of the rich roughly accurately but placing that of the poor well below its true level. These misperceptions vary little with political orientation or other characteristics. Correcting them shifts concern but leaves policy demand largely unchanged across general, specific, and real-stakes measures. Instead, demand divides politically, sharply in the United States and much less in Germany, consistent with views about the role of government rather than the inequality itself shaping policy demand.

Drawing on detailed career and biographical data of Chinese politicians, this study builds a dynamic social network for all political elites in China and examines the selection process of provincial-level politicians. Using regression and tree-based machine learning techniques and leveraging individuals’ global centrality within political networks, we unveil the relative importance of economic performance, political networks, and career trajectory in determining the selection of provincial leaders. Our findings highlight the critical role of network embeddedness.

There is growing evidence on the role of economic conditions in the recent successes of populist and extremist parties. However, little is known about the role of over-indebtedness, even though debtor distress has grown in Europe following the financial crisis. We study the unique case of the Czech Republic, where by 2017, nearly one in ten citizens had been served at least one debtor distress warrant even though the country consistently features low unemployment. Our municipality-level difference-in-differences analysis asks about the voting consequences of a rise in debtor distress following a 2001 deregulation of consumer-debt collection. We find that debtor distress has a positive effect on support for (new) extreme right and populist parties, but a negative effect on a (traditional) extreme-left party. The effects of debtor distress we uncover are robust to whether and how we control for economic hardship; the effects of debtor distress and economic hardship are of similar magnitude, but operate in opposing directions across the political spectrum.

We investigate how a state's political corruption affects a resident firm's debt contracting and how a change in anti-corruption regulation alters the relation between corruption and loan contracting. Firms in more corrupt states are associated with significantly higher loan spreads and tighter loan covenants than firms in less corrupt states. Furthermore, the passage of the Dodd–Frank whistleblowing provision amplifies the conhcerns of banks about the detrimental impact of corruption due to the increased exposure of firms to whistleblowing threats. The detrimental impact of corruption is further amplified when a state has a higher level of whistleblowing involvement, when firms are located in more corrupt states or closer to the SEC office, and when the bank's state is less corrupt than the firm's state. In general, we document the externality of corruption in the debt financing of firms and the response of banks to changes in regulation.

Lowering carbon intensity in manufacturing is necessary to transform current production technologies. We test if local agents’ preferences, revealed by vote shares for the Green party during local elections in Germany, relate to the carbon intensity of investments in production technologies. Our sample comprises all investment choices made by manufacturing establishments from 2005-2017. Our results suggest that ecological preferences correlate with significantly fewer carbon-intensive investment projects while investments stimulating growth and reducing carbon emissions increase by 14 percentage points. Both results are more distinct in federal states where the Green Party enjoys political power and local ecological preferences are high.

Wir untersuchen die kurz- und langfristigen Auswirkungen eines starken Anstiegs chinesischer Importe auf Wahlergebnisse in Europa. Populistische sowie links- und rechtsextreme Parteien gewannen erst viele Jahre nach dem Höhepunkt des China-Schocks bedeutenden Zuwachs an Wählerstimmen. Wir zeigen, dass die Auswirkungen von Importschocks überwiegend zugunsten populistischer Parteien ausfallen. In geringerem Maße profitieren in der kurzen Frist zudem linksextreme Parteien, langfristig hingegen rechtsextreme Parteien. Die Effekte auf das Wahlverhalten sind jedoch moderat und wir schlussfolgern, dass Importschocks den Aufstieg der politischen Ränder nur in begrenztem Maße erklären können.

Bank lobbying has a bitter taste in most forums, ringing the bell of preferential treatment of big banks from governments and regulators. Using corporate loan facilities and hand-matched information on bank lobbying from 1999 to 2017, we show that lobbying banks increase their borrowers' overall performance. This positive effect is stronger for opaque and credit-constrained borrowers, when the lobbying lender possesses valuable information on the borrower, and for borrowers with strong corporate governance. Our findings are consistent with the theory positing that lobbying can provide access to valuable lender-borrower information, resulting in improved efficiency in large firms' corporate financing.

We provide first evidence for the long-run causal impact that Chinese imports to European regions had on voting outcomes and revisit earlier estimates of the short-run impact for a methodological reason. The fringes of the political spectrum gained ground many years after the China shock plateaued and, unlike an earlier study by Colantone and Stanig (2018b), we do not find any robust evidence for a short-run effect on far-right votes. Instead, far-left and populist parties gained in the short run. We identify persistent long-run effects of import shocks on voting. These effects are biased towards populism and, to a lesser extent, to the far-right.