25 Jahre IWH

Hinweis

Hidden Gems and Borrowers with Dirty Little Secrets: Investment in Soft Information, Borrower Self-Selection and Competition

This paper empirically examines the role of soft information in the competitive interaction between relationship and transaction banks. Soft information can be interpreted as a private signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank. We show that borrowers self-select to relationship banks depending on whether their privately observed soft information is positive or negative. Competition affects the investment in learning the private signal from firms by relationship banks and transaction banks asymmetrically. Relationship banks invest more; transaction banks invest less in soft information, exacerbating the selection effect. Finally, we show that firms where soft information was important in the lending decision were no more likely to default compared to firms where only financial information was used.

08. Mai 2013

Autoren Reint E. Gropp C. Gruendl Andre Guettler

Professor Reint E. Gropp, Ph.D.

Über den Autor

Professor Reint E. Gropp, Ph.D.

Seit November 2014 hat Reint E. Gropp das Amt des Präsidenten des IWH inne und ist Inhaber eines Lehrstuhls für Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg. Er ist Fellow des Center for Financial Studies, Frankfurt. Als Berater ist er unter anderem für die Bank of Canada und die Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco tätig.

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Hidden Gems and Borrowers with Dirty Little Secrets: Investment in Soft Information, Borrower Self-selection and Competition

Reint E. Gropp Andre Guettler

in: Journal of Banking & Finance, Nr. 2, 2018

Abstract

This paper empirically examines the role of soft information in the competitive interaction between relationship and transaction banks. Soft information can be interpreted as a valuable signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank. We show that borrowers self-select to relationship banks depending on whether their observed soft information is positive or negative. Competition affects the investment in learning the soft information from firms by relationship banks and transaction banks asymmetrically. Relationship banks invest more; transaction banks invest less in soft information, exacerbating the selection effect.

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