Managerial Stability and the Pricing of New Equity Issuances: The Effects of State Enforcement of Noncompetition Agreements

In this paper, we empirically investigate the relationship between managerial stability induced by the legal enforcement of noncompetition agreements and the pricing of new equity issuances. Making use of the variation in the enforceability of noncompetition contracts across states in the U.S., we find that managerial stability is negatively related to underpricing and price revision for our sample of new equity issuing firms. Our results demonstrate that the stability of management is important for an issuing firm to convey its intrinsic value credibly to the market.

30. Juni 2017

Autoren Yin-chi Liao Bill Francis Iftekhar Hasan Haizhi Wang


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