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The Reverse Revolving Door in the Supervision of European Banks

Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Alex Sclip, Konstantin Wagner
IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 25, 2023
Abstract
We show that around one third of executive directors on the boards of national supervisory authorities (NSA) in European banking have an employment history in the financial industry. The appointment of executives without a finance background associates with negative valuation effects. Appointments of former bankers, in turn, spark positive stock market reactions. This „proximity premium“ of supervised banks is a more likely driver of positive valuation effects than superior financial expertise or intrinsic skills of former executives from the financial industry. Prior to the inception of the European Single Supervisory Mechanism, the presence of former financial industry executives on the board of NSA associates with lower regulatory capital and faster growth of banks, pointing to a more lenient supervisory style.
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Trading away Incentives

Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Shuo Xia
IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 23, 2022
Abstract
Equity pay has been the primary component of managerial compensation packages at US public firms since the early 1990s. Using a comprehensive sample of top executives from 1992-2020, we estimate to what extent they trade firm equity held in their portfolios to neutralize increments in ownership due to annual equity pay. Executives accommodate ownership increases linked to options awards. Conversely, increases in stock holdings linked to option exercises and restricted stock grants are largely neutralized through comparable sales of unrestricted shares. Variation in stock trading responses across executives hardly appears to respond to diversification motives. From a theoretical standpoint, these results challenge (i) the common, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of treating different equity pay items homogeneously, and (iii) the often taken for granted crucial role of diversification motives in managers’ portfolio choices.
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Benign Neglect of Covenant Violations: Blissful Banking or Ignorant Monitoring?

Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Moritz Stieglitz
IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 3, 2019
publiziert in: Economic Inquiry
Abstract
Theoretically, bank‘s loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalisation. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers‘ investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the firm. Exploiting granular bank-firm relationships observed in the syndicated loan market, we document substantial heterogeneity in monitoring across banks and through time. Better capitalised banks are more lenient monitors that intervene less with covenant violators. Importantly, this hands-off approach is associated with improved borrowers‘ performance. Beyond enhancing financial resilience, regulation that requires banks to hold more capital may thus also mitigate the tightening of credit terms when firms experience shocks.
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Effectiveness and (In)Efficiencies of Compensation Regulation: Evidence from the EU Banker Bonus Cap

Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Konstantin Wagner
IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 7, 2018
publiziert in: Journal of Accounting and Economics
Abstract
We investigate the (unintended) effects of bank executive compensation regulation. Capping the share of variable compensation spurred average turnover rates driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Other than that, banks‘ responses to raise fixed compensation sufficed to retain the vast majority of non-CEO executives and those at well performing banks. We fail to find evidence that banks with executives that are more affected by the bonus cap became less risky. In fact, numerous results indicate an increase of risk, even in its systemic dimension according to selected measures. The return component of bank performance appears to be unaffected by the bonus cap. Risk hikes are consistent with an insurance effect associated with raised the increase in fixed compensation of executives. The ability of the policy to enhance financial stability is therefore doubtful.
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Pricing Sin Stocks: Ethical Preference vs. Risk Aversion

Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Alessandro Gioffré
IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 20, 2017
publiziert in: European Economic Review
Abstract

We develop a model that reproduces the return and volatility spread between sin and non-sin stocks, where investors trade off dividends with the ethical assessment of companies. We relax the assumption of boycott behaviour and investigate the role played by the dividend share of sin stocks on their return and volatility spread relative to non-sin stocks. We empirically show that the dividend share predicts a positive return and volatility spread. This pattern is reproduced by our model when dividends and ethicalness are complementary goods and investors are sufficiently risk averse.

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Internal Governance and Creditor Governance: Evidence from Credit Default Swaps

Stefano Colonnello
IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 6, 2017
Abstract
I study the relation between internal governance and creditor governance. A deterioration in creditor governance may increase the agency costs of debt and managerial opportunism at the expense of shareholders. I exploit the introduction of credit default swaps (CDS) as a negative shock to creditor governance. I provide evidence consistent with shareholders pushing for a substitution effect between internal governance and creditor governance. Following CDS introduction, CDS firms reduce managerial risk-taking incentives relative to other firms. At the same time, after the start of CDS trading, CDS firms increase managerial wealth-performance sensitivity, board independence, and CEO turnover performance-sensitivity relative to other firms.
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Direct and Indirect Risk-taking Incentives of Inside Debt

Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Ngoc Giang Hoang
IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 20, 2016
publiziert in: Journal of Corporate Finance
Abstract
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about the relation between credit spreads and dif-ferent compensation components. First, we show that credit spreads are decreasing in inside debt only if it is unsecured. Second, the relation between credit spreads and equity incentives varies depending on the features of inside debt. We show that credit spreads are increasing in equity incentives. This relation becomes stronger as the seniority of inside debt increases. Using a sample of U.S. public firms with traded credit default swap (CDS) contracts, we provide evidence supportive of the model’s predictions.
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Shareholder Bargaining Power and the Emergence of Empty Creditors

Stefano Colonnello, M. Efing, Francesca Zucchi
IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 10, 2016
publiziert in: Journal of Financial Economics
Abstract
Credit default swaps (CDSs) can create empty creditors who potentially force borrowers into inefficient bankruptcy but also reduce shareholders‘ incentives to default strategically. We show theoretically and empirically that the presence and the effects of empty creditors on firm outcomes depend on the distribution of bargaining power among claimholders. Firms are more likely to have empty creditors if these would face powerful shareholders in debt renegotiation. The empirical evidence confirms that more CDS insurance is written on firms with strong shareholders and that CDSs increase the bankruptcy risk of these same firms. The ensuing effect on firm value is negative.
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Executive Compensation, Macroeconomic Conditions, and Cash Flow Cyclicality

Stefano Colonnello
IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 6, 2016
publiziert in: Finance Research Letters
Abstract
I model the joint effects of debt, macroeconomic conditions, and cash flow cyclicality on risk-shifting behavior and managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity. I show that risk-shifting incentives rise during recessions and that the shareholders can eliminate such adverse incentives by reducing the equity-based compensation in managerial contracts. I also show that this reduction should be larger in highly procyclical firms. Using a sample of U.S. public firms, I provide evidence supportive of the model’s predictions. First, I find that equity-based incentives are reduced during recessions. Second, I show that the magnitude of this effect is increasing in a firm’s cash flow cyclicality.
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Do Courts Matter for Firm Value? Evidence from the U.S. Court System

Stefano Colonnello, Christoph Herpfer
IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 1, 2016
publiziert in: Journal of Law and Economics
Abstract
We estimate the impact of U.S. state court characteristics on firm value by exploiting a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that exogenously changed firms‘ exposure to different courts. We find that increased exposure to more business-friendly courts is associated with positive announcement returns. We find no such association for objective court quality. We confirm that this U.S. Supreme Court ruling impacted firm value through the legal environment channel. We show that this ruling reduced the ability of affected firms to remove cases from certain state courts, and we show that announcement returns are stronger for firms that have high litigation exposure.
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