What’s slowing down the European Banking Union?
LSE Business Review,
Differences in national bank regulation and supervision hamper the process; political factors play a minor role, write Simon Grothe, Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, and Lena Tonzer
Evidenzbasierte Politikberatung (IWH-CEP)
Zentrum für evidenzbasierte Politikberatung (IWH-CEP) ...
Mitgliederversammlung Als eingetragener Verein ist das IWH satzungsgemäß in...
Brown Bag Seminar
Brown Bag Seminar Financial Markets Department In der Seminarreihe "Brown...
Delay Determinants of European Banking Union Implementation
European Journal of Political Economy,
Most countries in the European Union (EU) delay the transposition of European Commission (EC) directives, which aim at reforming banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance. We compile a systematic overview of these delays to investigate if they result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems. Transposition delays pertaining to the three Banking Union directives differ considerably across the 28 EU members. Bivariate regression analyses suggest that existing national bank regulation and supervision drive delays the most. Political factors are less relevant. These results are qualitatively insensitive to alternative estimation methods and lag structures. Multivariate analyses highlight that well-stocked deposit insurance schemes speed-up the implementation of capital requirements, banking systems with many banks are slower in implementing new bank rescue and resolution rules, and countries with a more intensive sovereign-bank nexus delay the harmonization of EU deposit insurance more.
The CompNet Competitiveness Database The Competitiveness Research Network (CompNet)...
Vier Forschungscluster ...
Drivers of Systemic Risk: Do National and European Perspectives Differ?
Journal of International Money and Finance,
With the establishment of the Banking Union, the European Central Bank has been granted the power to impose stricter regulations than the national regulator if systemic risks are not adequately addressed at the national level. We ask whether there is a cross-border externality in the sense that a bank’s systemic risk differs when applying a national versus a European perspective. On average, banks’ contribution to systemic risk is similar at the two regional levels, and so is the ranking of banks. Generally, larger banks and banks with a lower share of loans are more systemically important. The effects of these variables are qualitatively but not quantitatively similar at the national versus the European level.