Compensation Regulation in Banking: Executive Director Behavior and Bank Performance after the EU Bonus Cap
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Konstantin Wagner
Journal of Accounting and Economics,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
The regulation that caps executives’ variable compensation, as part of the Capital Requirements Directive IV of 2013, likely affected executive turnover, compensation design, and risk-taking in EU banking. The current study identifies significantly higher average turnover rates but also finds that they are driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Banks indemnified their executives by off-setting the bonus cap with higher fixed compensation. Although our evidence is only suggestive, we do not find any reduction in risk-taking at the bank level, one purported aim of the regulation.
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14.02.2023 • 4/2023
IWH-Studie zu Europas Top-Bankern: Riskante Geschäfte trotz Boni-Obergrenze
Vor zehn Jahren beschloss das EU-Parlament, die flexible Vergütung von Bankmanagern zu deckeln. Doch die Obergrenze für Boni verfehlt ihr Ziel: Manager systemrelevanter europäischer Banken gehen unverändert hohe Risiken ein, zeigt eine Studie des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH).
Michael Koetter
Pressemitteilung lesen
Startseite
Schwafelnde Manager schaden dem Unternehmen Verweigert eine Top-Führungskraft gegenüber Profi-Investoren die Auskunft,...
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Effectiveness and (In)Efficiencies of Compensation Regulation: Evidence from the EU Banker Bonus Cap
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Konstantin Wagner
Abstract
We investigate the (unintended) effects of bank executive compensation regulation. Capping the share of variable compensation spurred average turnover rates driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Other than that, banks‘ responses to raise fixed compensation sufficed to retain the vast majority of non-CEO executives and those at well performing banks. We fail to find evidence that banks with executives that are more affected by the bonus cap became less risky. In fact, numerous results indicate an increase of risk, even in its systemic dimension according to selected measures. The return component of bank performance appears to be unaffected by the bonus cap. Risk hikes are consistent with an insurance effect associated with raised the increase in fixed compensation of executives. The ability of the policy to enhance financial stability is therefore doubtful.
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