International Trade Barriers and Regional Employment: The Case of a No-Deal Brexit
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Oliver Holtemöller
Journal of Economic Structures,
Nr. 11,
2021
Abstract
We use the World Input–Output Database (WIOD) combined with regional sectoral employment data to estimate the potential regional employment effects of international trade barriers. We study the case of a no-deal Brexit in which imports to the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) would be subject to tariffs and non-tariff trade costs. First, we derive the decline in UK final goods imports from the EU from industry-specific international trade elasticities, tariffs and non-tariff trade costs. Using input–output analysis, we estimate the potential output and employment effects for 56 industries and 43 countries on the national level. The absolute effects would be largest in big EU countries which have close trade relationships with the UK, such as Germany and France. However, there would also be large countries outside the EU which would be heavily affected via global value chains, such as China, for example. The relative effects (in percent of total employment) would be largest in Ireland followed by Belgium. In a second step, we split up the national effects on the NUTS-2 level for EU member states and additionally on the county (NUTS-3) level for Germany. The share of affected workers varies between 0.03% and 3.4% among European NUTS-2 regions and between 0.15% and 0.4% among German counties. A general result is that indirect effects via global value chains, i.e., trade in intermediate inputs, are more important than direct effects via final demand.
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Alumni
IWH-Alumni Das IWH möchte den Kontakt zu seinen ehemaligen Mitarbeiterinnen und...
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Ostdeutschland
Nachhut Ostdeutschland Nur mit Investitionen in Köpfe lässt sich weiter aufholen ...
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College Choice, Selection, and Allocation Mechanisms: A Structural Empirical Analysis
J.-R. Carvalho, T. Magnac, Qizhou Xiong
Quantitative Economics,
Nr. 3,
2019
Abstract
We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry to analyze interactions between the selection mechanism, eliciting college preferences through exams, and the allocation mechanism. We set up a framework in which success probabilities and student preferences are shown to be identified from data on their choices and their exam grades under exclusion restrictions and support conditions. The counterfactuals we consider balance the severity of congestion and the quality of the match between schools and students. Moving to deferred acceptance or inverting the timing of choices and exams are shown to increase welfare. Redistribution among students and among schools is also sizeable in all counterfactual experiments.
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IWH-FDI-Mikrodatenbank
IWH-FDI-Mikrodatenbank Die IWH-FDI-Mikrodatenbank (FDI = Foreign Direct Investment)...
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Potential International Employment Effects of a Hard Brexit
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Oliver Holtemöller
Abstract
We use the World Input Output Database (WIOD) to estimate the potential employment effects of a hard Brexit in 43 countries. In line with other studies we assume that imports from the European Union (EU) to the UK will decline by 25% after a hard Brexit. The absolute effects are largest in big EU countries which have close trade relationships with the UK like Germany and France. However, there are also large countries outside the EU which are heavily affected via global value chains like China, for example. The relative effects (in percent of total employment) are largest in Malta and Ireland. UK employment will also be affected via intermediate input production. Within Germany, the motor vehicle industry and in particular the “Autostadt” Wolfsburg are most affected.
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Does the Technological Content of Government Demand Matter for Private R&D? Evidence from US States
Viktor Slavtchev, S. Wiederhold
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
Nr. 2,
2016
Abstract
Governments purchase everything from airplanes to zucchini. This paper investigates the role of the technological content of government procurement in innovation. In a theoretical model, we first show that a shift in the composition of public purchases toward high-tech products translates into higher economy-wide returns to innovation, leading to an increase in the aggregate level of private R&D. Using unique data on federal procurement in US states and performing panel fixed-effects estimations, we find support for the model's prediction of a positive R&D effect of the technological content of government procurement. Instrumental-variable estimations suggest a causal interpretation of our findings.
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College Choice and the Selection of Mechanisms: A Structural Empirical Analysis
J.-R. Carvalho, T. Magnac, Qizhou Xiong
Abstract
We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry to study the interaction between the revelation of college preferences through exams and the selection of allocation mechanisms. We propose a method in which preferences and expectations of students are identified from data on choices and multiple exam grades. Counterfactuals we consider balance costs arising from congestion and exam organization. Moving to deferred acceptance or inverting the timing of choices and exams are shown to increase welfare. Redistribution among students or schools is sizeable in all counterfactual experiments.
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College Choice Allocation Mechanisms: Structural Estimates and Counterfactuals
J.-R. Carvalho, T. Magnac, Qizhou Xiong
Abstract
We evaluate a simple allocation mechanism of students to majors at college entry that was commonly used in universities in Brazil in the 1990s and 2000s. Students first chose a single major and then took exams that select them in or out of the chosen major. The literature analyzing student placement, points out that this decentralized mechanism is not stable and is not strategy-proof. This means that some pairs of major & students can be made better off and that students tend to disguise their preferences using such a mechanism. We build up a model of performance and school choices in which expectations are carefully specified and we estimate it using cross-section data reporting choices between two medical schools and grade performances at the entry exams. Given those estimates, we evaluate changes in selection and students’ expected utilities when other mechanisms are implemented. Results highlight the importance of strategic motives and redistributive effects of changes of the allocation mechanisms.
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