08.04.2020 • 5/2020
Gemeinschaftsdiagnose Frühjahr 2020: Wirtschaft unter Schock – Finanzpolitik hält dagegen
Die Corona-Pandemie löst eine schwerwiegende Rezession in Deutschland aus. Die Wirtschaftsleistung wird in diesem Jahr um 4,2% schrumpfen. Das erwarten die führenden Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitute in ihrem Frühjahrsgutachten. Für das kommende Jahr sagen sie eine Erholung und ein Wachstum von 5,8% voraus.
Gemeinschafts-Diagnose Frühjahr 2020 Wirtschaft unter Schock – Finanzpolitik hält dagegen ...
Wirtschaft unter Schock – Finanzpolitik hält dagegen Frühjahrsgutachten der Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitute: Die...
Makrodaten interaktiv Das Angebot präsentiert interaktiv anschaulich aufbereitete Zeitreihen aus amtlichen Veröffentlichungen (Statistisches Bundesamt, Arbeitskreis ...
IWH-Alumni Das IWH möchte den Kontakt zu seinen ehemaligen Mitarbeiterinnen und...
Monetary-fiscal Policy Interaction and Fiscal Inflation: A Tale of Three Countries
European Economic Review,
We study the impact of the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy on the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation using cross-country data from 1965 to 1999. In a first step, we contrast the monetary–fiscal narrative for Germany, the U.S., and Italy with evidence obtained from simple regression models and a time-varying VAR. We find that the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation is low during periods of an independent central bank and responsible fiscal policy and more pronounced in times of non-responsible fiscal policy and accommodative monetary authorities. In a second step, we use an estimated DSGE model to interpret the low-frequency measure structurally and to illustrate the mechanisms through which fiscal actions affect inflation in the long run. The findings from the DSGE model suggest that switches in the monetary–fiscal policy interaction and accompanying variations in the propagation of structural shocks can well account for changes in the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation.
Monetary Policy under the Microscope: Intra-bank Transmission of Asset Purchase Programs of the ECB
IWH Discussion Papers,
With a unique loan portfolio maintained by a top-20 universal bank in Germany, this study tests whether unconventional monetary policy by the European Central Bank (ECB) reduced corporate borrowing costs. We decompose corporate lending rates into refinancing costs, as determined by money markets, and markups that the bank is able to charge its customers in regional markets. This decomposition reveals how banks transmit monetary policy within their organizations. To identify policy effects on loan rate components, we exploit the co-existence of eurozone-wide security purchase programs and regional fiscal policies at the district level. ECB purchase programs reduced refinancing costs significantly, even in an economy not specifically targeted for sovereign debt stress relief, but not loan rates themselves. However, asset purchases mitigated those loan price hikes due to additional credit demand stimulated by regional tax policy and enabled the bank to realize larger economic margins.
Towards Deeper Financial Integration in Europe: What the Banking Union Can Contribute
IWH Discussion Papers,
The agreement to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe is a major step towards a Banking Union, consisting of centralized powers for the supervision of banks, the restructuring and resolution of distressed banks, and a common deposit insurance system. In this paper, we argue that the Banking Union is a necessary complement to the common currency and the Internal Market for capital. However, due care needs to be taken that steps towards a Banking Union are taken in the right sequence and that liability and control remain at the same level throughout. The following elements are important. First, establishing a Single Supervisory Mechanism under the roof of the ECB and within the framework of the current EU treaties does not ensure a sufficient degree of independence of supervision and monetary policy. Second, a European institution for the restructuring and resolution of banks should be established and equipped with sufficient powers. Third, a fiscal backstop for bank restructuring is needed. The ESM can play a role but additional fiscal burden sharing agreements are needed. Direct recapitalization of banks through the ESM should not be possible until legacy assets on banks’ balance sheets have been cleaned up. Fourth, introducing European-wide deposit insurance in the current situation would entail the mutualisation of legacy assets, thus contributing to moral hazard.